April 30, 2004

Matter of New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (Valois) (2004 NY Slip Op 03399)

Headnote

In this case, the respondent sustained injuries in a single-car accident and registered a blood alcohol content of .10% when tested at the hospital. She later pleaded guilty to driving while ability impaired. When she filed for no-fault benefits, her claim was denied by the petitioner due to the policy's intoxication exclusion. As a result, the respondent filed for arbitration while the petitioner sought a stay. The relevant facts in the case included whether the respondent was actually intoxicated at the time of the accident. The court decided that the parties had agreed to arbitrate the dispute and that it was for the arbitrator to address the merits of the dispute. The holding of the case was that the matter would proceed to arbitration, and the court denied the petitioner's motion for a permanent stay and the respondent's cross-motion for summary judgment without costs.

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (Valois) (2004 NY Slip Op 03399)

Matter of New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (Valois)

2004 NY Slip Op 03399 [6 AD3d 1183]

April 30, 2004

Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

As corrected through Wednesday, June 30, 2004

In the Matter of the Arbitration between New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Appellant, and Michelle Valois, Respondent.

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Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Chautauqua County (Joseph Gerace, J.), entered February 19, 2003. The order denied petitioner’s motion for a permanent stay of arbitration and respondent’s cross motion for summary judgment and ordered that the matter proceed to arbitration.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Respondent sustained injuries in a single-car accident at 2:51 a.m. on March 31, 2000. A blood test at the hospital at 4:20 a.m. indicated that respondent had a blood alcohol content of .10%. Respondent was charged with driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]) and subsequently pleaded guilty to driving while ability impaired (§ 1192 [1]). Respondent applied for no-fault benefits under her motor vehicle insurance policy, but petitioner denied the claim on the ground that it fell within the intoxication exclusion of the policy. Respondent filed a demand for arbitration, contending that she was not intoxicated at the time of the accident, and petitioner in turn commenced this proceeding seeking a stay of arbitration. After Supreme Court granted petitioner’s order to show cause for a temporary stay, petitioner moved for a permanent stay of arbitration. Respondent cross-moved for summary judgment granting her no-fault benefits as a matter of law. The court denied the motion and cross motion and ordered that the matter proceed to arbitration, concluding that, while res judicata did not apply to bar arbitration, respondent raised an issue of fact whether she was actually intoxicated within the meaning of the policy.

We affirm, but for a different reason. We conclude that petitioner’s supporting affidavit fails to allege a sufficient basis upon which to grant a stay of arbitration (see CPLR 7503 [b]). There are only three threshold questions to be resolved by a court faced with a motion to stay arbitration: whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate; if so, whether there was compliance with the agreement; and whether the claim would be time-barred if asserted in State court (see Matter of Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v Luckie, 85 NY2d 193, 201-202 [1995], rearg denied 85 NY2d 1033 [1995]; Matter of County of Rockland [Primiano Constr. Co.], 51 NY2d 1, 6-7 [1980]). The insurance policy at issue here contains a broad agreement to arbitrate “any matter relating to the [*2]claim” and thus it is for the arbitrator to decide whether respondent was intoxicated and thus not entitled to no-fault benefits under the policy (see Matter of Cowper Co. [Hires-Turner Glass Co.], 72 AD2d 934 [1979], affd 51 NY2d 937 [1980]; see also Matter of Resnick v Serlin, 119 AD2d 825 [1986]). Further, the policy does not contain a condition precedent to arbitration and there is no dispute over a limitations period. Thus, we conclude that the parties agreed to arbitrate the instant dispute and that it is for the arbitrator to address the merits of the dispute (see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Alfarone, 62 AD2d 1034, 1035 [1978]; see also CPLR 7501). Present—Green, J.P., Wisner, Hurlbutt, Kehoe and Lawton, JJ.