Trinity Medicine, P.C. v National Gen. Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 50197(U))

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant. McDonnell, Adels & Klestzick, PLLC (Michael J. Giordano of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), dated January 12, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant’s motion to open its default in answering and to compel plaintiff to accept defendant’s late answer.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for services rendered to its assignor as a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on August 26, 2017. The summons and complaint were served upon defendant on or about December 22, 2020. Defendant did not serve an answer. Plaintiff applied for a default judgment and mailed defendant a copy of the default judgment application on October 28, 2021.

On November 17, 2021, defendant moved, pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d) and/or 2001, to open its default and to compel plaintiff to accept its late answer on the ground that defendant had a reasonable excuse for its delay in answering as well as a meritorious defense to the action.

In support of its motion, defendant submitted the affidavit of an employee who worked at [*2]defendant’s attorney’s office who was responsible for serving the answer. She averred that, although the answer had been timely prepared, she had inadvertently failed to serve it. Defendant’s attorney argued that forgetting to serve the answer amounted to law office failure and should be excused by the Civil Court, especially considering that there was no evidence that this was willful or part of a pattern of neglect by defendant, or that plaintiff had been prejudiced by the default. As a meritorious defense, defendant asserted that the subject action was barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. Defendant submitted a Supreme Court, Nassau County, declaratory judgment which declared that the August 26, 2017 motor vehicle accident involving plaintiff’s assignor was an intentional act and, therefore, there was no duty on defendant’s part to provide coverage for any claims arising therefrom.

Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment and, in opposition to defendant’s motion, argued that the affidavit of the law office employee was vague as to the details leading to the oversight in serving an answer and mere neglect was not a reasonable excuse. Moreover, the declaratory judgment did not have res judicata or collateral estoppel effect since it did not involve the same parties or causes of action as the subject action and was not fully litigated, as it was obtained on default.

By order dated January 12, 2024, the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) granted defendant’s motion, finding that defendant had provided a reasonable excuse for its default and a meritorious defense to the action. The order also denied plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals from so much of the order as granted defendant’s motion.

In order to open its default and obtain an order compelling plaintiff to accept a late answer, defendant had to provide a reasonable excuse for the delay in answering and demonstrate a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see CPLR 3012 [d]; Pain Mgt. Ctr. of N.J., P.C. v All Car Rent-A-Car, 57 Misc 3d 138[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 51310[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]). “The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse lies within the trial court’s discretion” (New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 120 AD3d 1322, 1323 [2014]) and the court has discretion to accept law office failure as a reasonable excuse (see CPLR 2005) where there is a lack of evidence of willfulness or neglect (see Roussodimou v Zafiriadis, 238 AD2d 568 [1997]). Here, the law office failure resulted from an isolated, inadvertent mistake, not from repeated neglect (see Gutman v A to Z Holding Corp., 91 AD3d 718 [2012]), and plaintiff never demonstrated or suggested, in the Civil Court or on appeal, any prejudice caused by defendant’s default (see Parisien v Allstate Ins. Co., 76 Misc 3d 14 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]; see also New York Univ. Hosp. Tisch Inst. v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 15 AD3d 554, 555 [2005]). Consequently, the Civil Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in finding that defendant had provided a reasonable excuse.

Defendant also demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious defense to the action. The declaratory judgment from the Supreme Court, Nassau County, was a conclusive final determination that defendant was not obligated to provide coverage or reimbursements for [*3]any and all no-fault related services submitted by plaintiff and plaintiff’s assignor for the subject motor vehicle accident and, thus, the instant action should be barred by res judicata (see Matter of Hunter, 4 NY3d 260, 269 [2005]; Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 NY 304 [1929]; see also Watts v Swiss Bank Corp., 27 NY2d 270 [1970]), notwithstanding that the declaratory judgment was entered on default (see Lazides v P & G Enters., 58 AD3d 607 [2009]; St. Mark’s Med. Health Care, PLLC v 21st Century Ins. Co., 68 Misc 3d 127[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 50851[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

BUGGS, J.P., OTTLEY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.