June 3, 2005
GPM Chiropractic, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Ins. Co (2005 NYSlipOp 50861(U))
Headnote
Reported in New York Official Reports at GPM Chiropractic, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Ins. Co (2005 NYSlipOp 50861(U))
| GPM Chiropractic, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Ins. Co |
| 2005 NYSlipOp 50861(U) |
| Decided on June 3, 2005 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: June 3, 2005 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK APPELLATE TERM : 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS PRESENT : PESCE, P.J., PATTERSON and BELEN, JJ.
2004-767 Q C
against
State Farm Mutual Insurance Co, Appellant.
Appeal by defendant from an order of the Civil Court, Queens County (A. Gazzara, J.), entered October 21, 2003, granting plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.
Order unanimously reversed with $10 costs and plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment denied.
In this action to recover first-party no-fault benefits for medical services rendered to its assignor, plaintiff health care provider established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by proof that it submitted a claim, setting forth the fact and the amount of loss sustained, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]; Amaze Med. Supply v Eagle Ins. Co., 2 Misc 3d 128[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51701[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). The burden then shifted to defendant to show a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]).
It is uncontroverted that defendant did not deny plaintiff’s claim within the statutory period. Consequently, defendant is precluded from raising most defenses (see Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195 [1997]; Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 282 [1997]), including any deficiency in the assignments (see New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 640 [2004]; Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 233 AD2d 433 [1996]; A.B. Med. [*2]Servs. PLLC. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 6 Misc 3d 70 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]). Moreover, defendant’s requests for examinations under oath did not toll the 30-day claim determination period inasmuch as the applicable insurance regulations did not contain a provision entitling an insurer to an examination under oath (see King’s Med. Supply v Kemper Auto & Home Ins. Co., 3 Misc 3d 131[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 50401[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]).
Nevertheless, defendant is not precluded from asserting the defense that the collision was in furtherance of an insurance fraud scheme, despite the untimely denial of the claim (see Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 751 [2002]). We find that the affidavit submitted by defendant’s special investigator was sufficient to demonstrate that defendant’s denial was based upon a “founded belief that the alleged injur[ies] do[ ] not arise out of an insured incident” (Central Gen. Hosp, 90 NY2d at 199). Consequently, a triable issue of fact exists as to whether there was a lack of coverage (see id.; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). Accordingly, plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is denied.
Decision Date: June 03, 2005