The following numbered papers were read on this special proceeding: NYSCEF Document Numbers 1-9.

Upon the foregoing papers, the Court having elected to determine the within petition on submission pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.8-f and IAS Part 2 Rules, Part I (Motions & Special Proceedings), Subpart C (Appearances), Section 6 (Personal Appearances) (“All motions presumptively are to be argued in person unless the Court informs the parties at least two days in advance that it has made a sua sponte determination that a motion will be determined on submission.),”^[FN1] and due deliberation having been had thereon,

It is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the within special proceeding is determined as follows:

In this special proceeding pursuant to CPLR 7502 and 7510, the within petition of Petitioner John T. Mather Memorial Hospital, a medical provider, to confirm a No-Fault Insurance master arbitration award against Respondent American Transit Insurance Company is GRANTED but without an award of an attorney’s fee for services rendered in connection with the petition to confirm. It is noted that Respondent has not appeared to oppose the petition.

The master arbitration award in American Arbitration Association Case No. 99-22-1233-6879 of Master Arbitrator Anne L. Powers, which affirmed the award of Arbitrator Dimitrios Stathopoulos, is confirmed in its entirety.

Petitioner herein is awarded the principal amount ($21,316.95), interest, attorney’s fees, and return of filing fee ($40.00) as determined in the hearing arbitration (see the arbitration award of Arbitrator Stathopoulos, appearing as NYSCEF Doc No. 3). The interest shall accrue from the arbitration filing date (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.5 [s] [3], 65-3.9 [c]; Canarsie Med. Health, P.C. v National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 21 Misc 3d 791, 797 [Sup Ct, NY County 2008]), at the rate of two percent per month, simple, calculated on a pro-rata basis using a 30-day month (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.9 [a]). The attorney’s fee for the arbitration shall be 20% of the sum of the principal plus interest to payment.

The attorney’s fee for the master arbitration is $130.00 per the award of Master Arbitrator Powers appearing as NYSCEF Doc No. 4.

This Court denies an attorney’s fee to Petitioner herein for prevailing in this special proceeding to confirm the master arbitration award. In seeking an attorney’s fee, Petitioner relies on 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4), which provides, “The attorney’s fee for services rendered in connection with a court adjudication of a dispute de novo, as provided in section 5106(c) of the Insurance Law, or in a court appeal from a master arbitration award and any further appeals, shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter.” Petitioner’s action of seeking to confirm an [*2]arbitration award is not in the nature of appeal. An “appeal” is an action taken by a party to have a determination reviewed because it was adverse to the party. The master arbitrator’s award was not adverse to Petitioner. Quite the opposite, Petitioner agreed with the determination. The purpose for this Article 75 proceeding is to obtain a judgment so that Petitioner can levy upon Respondent’s assets in order to enforce the award of monetary compensation as determined in the arbitration process. Moreover, this special proceeding is not a de novo dispute. Nothing in the language of 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) provides support for this Court to grant Petitioner an attorney’s fee. The language of the regulation is clear and unambiguous and would not apply to this unopposed Article 75 special proceeding to confirm a master arbitration No-Fault award (see Matter of Medical Socy. of State of NY v Serio, 100 NY2d 854 [2003]; Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d 451, 458 [1980]). A court should not read into a regulation a provision which is not present (see Jansen Ct. Homeowners Assn. v City of New York, 17 AD3d 588 [2d Dept 2005]), especially since the No-Fault Law is in derogation of the common law and so must be strictly construed (see Presbyterian Hosp. in City of NY v Atlanata Cas. Co., 210 AD2d 210 [2d Dept 2001]).

Petitioner also cites to Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp. (148 AD3d 703 [2d Dept 2017]) as support for its request for an attorney’s fee in this special proceeding to confirm the No-Fault master arbitration award. Petitioner emphasizes the following language in said opinion at page 705: “The term ‘court appeal’ applies to a proceeding such as this, taken pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate or confirm a master arbitration award (see Matter of Hempstead Gen. Hosp. v National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 179 AD2d 645 [1992])” (emphasis added). This Court holds that to the extent the Appellate Division included the words “or confirm” it was dicta because in Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp. at issue was a petition to vacate a master arbitration award. Hence GEICO Ins. Co.’s petition to vacate constituted an appeal from the master arbitration award; not so in the case at bar. Moreover, Matter of Hempstead Gen. Hosp. v National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., cited in Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., involved an appeal in the form of an Article 75 special proceeding, to vacate a master arbitration award in favor of the No-Fault insurer. Again, there was an actual appeal, unlike the present sitatuion, where Petitioner John T. Mather Memorial Hospital seeks merely to confirm a master arbtriation award in its favor, and there is not even any opposition from Respondent Americal Transit Insurance Company.

Petitioner claims that Respondent has failed to pay the amount due per the No-Fault insurance arbitration result: “Here, . . . payment was not made and, since the Petition to confirm must be granted, Petitioner is entitled to its hourly attorney fees in this proceeding” (NYSCEF Doc No. 1 ¶ 12 at 3 [emphasis added]). This is a misunderstanding of the No-Fault Insurance Regulations. Said Regulations actually do provide for a remedy in this type of situation. Section 65-3.10 of the No-Fault Insurance Regulations (11 NYCRR 65-3.10) provides in subdivision (b) as follows:

If a dispute is resolved in accordance with any of the optional arbitration procedures contained in this Part, either during the initial review by the Department of Financial Services or by an arbitration award, and if payment is not made by the insurer in accordance with the terms specified in the conciliation letter or arbitration award within 45 days following such resolution, an additional attorney’s fee shall be paid by the insurer when the attorney writes to the insurer in order to receive such overdue payment. The additional attorney’s fee shall be $60 and shall become payable only after written request [*3]from the attorney to the insurer, received by the insurer more than 45 days after mailing of the conciliation letter or arbitration award. Such fee shall not be payable if payment was made by the insurer prior to the attorney’s request for such payment or if an arbitration award is appealed in accordance with the provisions of this Part.

Therefore, once payment is obtained, Petitioner is entitled to $60 for its efforts in securing same. The fee will be payable since Respondent American Transit Insurance Company did not appeal the determination of the master arbitrator, assuming that payment of the awarded amount was not made within 45 days after after mailing of the master arbitration award. While the $60 may not be commensurate with Petitioner’s view of the amount to which it is entitled for enforcement of the arbitratration award, the remedy it seeks pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4) must be rejected based on the clear language of that regulation. Petitioner is not entitled to hour attorney fees as it has argued.

Respondent herein shall recover from Petitioner herein $200 as costs as well as disbursements allowed by law, to be taxed by the Clerk, since Petitioner has prevailed in having the master arbitration award confirmed (see CPLR 8101, 8201, 8202, 8301; Meehan v Nassau Community College, 242 AD2d 155 [2d Dept 1998]).

The Court having elected to determine the within petition on submission pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.8-f and IAS Part 2 Rules, Part I (Motions & Special Proceedings), Subpart C (Appearances), Section 6 (Personal Appearances) (“All motions presumptively are to be argued in person unless the Court informs the parties at least two days in advance that it has made a sua sponte determination that a motion will be determined on submission.),”

It is hereby ORDERED as follows:

(1) The within petition shall be determined on submission.

(2) If opposition papers have not been filed yet despite the fact that the deadline for same pursuant to the CPLR may have passed, leave to file them by January 3, 2024, 5:00 p.m., is granted.

(3) If reply papers have not been filed yet despite the fact that the deadline for same pursuant to the CPLR may have passed, leave to file them by January 5, 2004, 5:00 p.m., is granted.

(4) Any papers filed past said deadlines shall not be considered.

(5) There shall be no personal appearances on the calendar date noted above.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Maksin Leyvi and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant. Nicolini, Paradise, Ferretti & Sabella, PLLC (Francis J. Ammendolea of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (D. Bernadette Neckles, J.), dated December 15, 2022. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the policy limits had been exhausted, and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

For the reasons stated in Pain Med., PLLC, as Assignee of Van-Bochove, Nourine v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2024 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2023-753 K C], decided herewith), the order is modified by providing that defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

OTTLEY, J.P., BUGGS and HOM, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Maksim Leyvi and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant. Nicolini, Paradise, Ferretti & Sabella, PLLC (Francis J, Ammendolea of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (D. Bernadette Neckles, J.), dated December 15, 2022. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the policy limits had been exhausted, and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

For the reasons stated in Pain Med., PLLC, as Assignee of Van-Bochove, Nourine v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2024 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2023-753 K C], decided herewith), the order is modified by providing that defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

OTTLEY, J.P., BUGGS and HOM, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant. De Martini & Yi, LLP (Bryan Visnius of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (D. Bernadette Neckles, J.), dated January 6, 2023. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the policy limits had been exhausted, and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

To obtain summary judgment on its asserted defense of policy exhaustion, defendant had to prove that it had paid the limits of the policy in accordance with 11 NYCRR 65-3.15 (see Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp., 8 NY3d 294 [2007]; Alleviation Med. Servs., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 55 Misc 3d 44 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017], affd 191 AD3d 934 [2021]). Here, defendant failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that it had [*2]made any payments under the policy because, as plaintiff argues, defendant’s claim specialist did not lay a sufficient foundation for the payment log, upon which defendant relied, to be accepted as proof that the payments listed therein had been made (see CPLR 4518 [a]; People v Kennedy, 68 NY2d 569 [1986]; JPC Med., P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 75 Misc 3d 136[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50562[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]; JPF Med. Servs., P.C. v Nationwide Ins., 69 Misc 3d 127[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 51122[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]; Charles Deng Acupuncture, P.C. v 21st Century Ins. Co., 61 Misc 3d 154[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 51815[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]). Consequently, defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment was properly denied, as plaintiff failed to establish that the claim at issue had not been timely denied (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498 [2015]) or that defendant had issued a timely denial of claim form that was conclusory, vague, or without merit as a matter of law (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

OTTLEY, J.P., BUGGS and HOM, JJ., concur.

Plaintiff, medical provider, Stark Medical Supply Inc. (hereinafter “Plaintiff”), as assignee of Emmanuel Dorvil (hereinafter “Assignor”), commenced this action to recover assigned first-party no fault benefits from Foremost Property and Casualty Insurance (hereinafter “Defendant”), for a medical service performed to the assignor following a motor vehicle accident, which occurred May 29, 2017.

A Summary Judgement order signed by this Court on December 2, 2020 found that the subject bills were received and timely and properly denied. The Order limits the trial to the sole issue of whether the policy was exhausted at the time of the claim.

At trial, held November 29, 2023, defendant called its witness, Megan Scorben, a claims specialist who is employed by for defendant. Ms. Scorben testified that she reviewed the claim log, there was a previous medical payment on this accident, and that at full value there was $1,000 on the policy plus an additional $500 if the motorcycle rider was wearing a helmet. Upon voir dire, plaintiff questioned whether Ms. Scorben personally added in data herself and she replied that she did not. Ms. Scorben also testified that she was not working for the defendant when the payment logs that she was relying upon were created, however she did state that she reviewed and maintained the records in the regular course of her employment responsibilities.

During cross-examination of Ms. Scorben, plaintiff questioned the dates that were input into the log that Ms. Scorben relied upon in her determination that the policy was exhausted. She stated that there was in fact a “typo” and the date should read June, 15, 2017 and that the dates reads June 15, 2018. Plaintiff also questioned the witness’ reliance on information in the log that shows that payment was made prior to the incorrect/typo service dates of the bill and Ms. Scorben replied affirmatively.

For a policy exhaustion defense to bar plaintiff from recovery in a no-fault matter, the defendant must ” demonstrate that the policy had been exhausted at the time the claims at issue were deemed complete.” Ortho Passive Motion, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co., NY Slip Op 50771 [Application Term 2d 2017]. The Second Department further clarifies that “defendant has not argued, let alone demonstrated, that there was a technical defect or ministerial mistake in the judgment “not affecting a substantial right of a party.” Id.

The Court finds that in the matter sub judice, defendant has failed to prove policy exhausted. Firstly, despite the contentions of the defendant and its witness, the incorrect dates in the log is not merely “ministerial mistakes” as the errors “do substantially affect the rights of plaintiff.” Id.

Secondly, the log entries do not prove that the policy was exhausted when the “claims at issue were deemed complete.” Id. Defendant has failed to provide this court with any evidence, documentary or testimony to successfully establish that the policy was exhausted when the claims were completed. There is nothing beyond the testimony of the witness to show that the date in the log was in error, thus there is nothing to show that the payment preceded the bill herein.

WHEREFORE it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgement be entered in favor of plaintiffs in the sum of $1, 281.32 plus filing fees, and interest from July 24, 2018.

Petre and Associates, P.C. (Mark Petre of counsel), for appellant. The Law Office of John Trop (Jeff G. Winston of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Keisha M. Alleyne, J.), dated March 8, 2023. The order granted defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment of that court entered May 3, 2022 upon defendant’s failure to appear or answer the complaint and to compel plaintiff to accept defendant’s answer.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment entered May 3, 2022 and to compel plaintiff to accept defendant’s answer is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, a judgment was entered on May 3, 2022 upon defendant’s failure to appear or answer the complaint. According to the affidavit of service, the summons and complaint were served upon a named individual known by the process server to be an employee of defendant authorized to accept service of process. Defendant subsequently moved to vacate the default judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) and to compel plaintiff to accept defendant’s answer pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d). Plaintiff opposed the motion. By order dated March 8, 2023, the Civil Court granted defendant’s motion. On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendant provided neither a reasonable excuse for its default nor a potentially meritorious defense to the action.

“A defendant seeking to vacate a default in answering a complaint pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) and to compel the plaintiff to accept an untimely answer pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d) [*2]must show both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a potentially meritorious defense (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Abrahim, 183 AD3d 698 [2020]; US Bank N.A. v Dedomenico, 162 AD3d 962, 964 [2018])” (JE & MB Homes, LLC v U.S. Bank N.A., 189 AD3d 1195, 1196 [2020]).

In support of its contention that it possessed a reasonable excuse for its default, defendant submitted an affidavit from a claims representative who averred that either the summons and complaint were not received, based on the absence of a record documenting the receipt of this document in defendant’s electronic system, or that the summons and complaint were not processed due to a reduction in the number of personnel in defendant’s office, where service allegedly occurred, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant’s claim of lack of receipt is insufficient to constitute a reasonable excuse, as defendant neither submitted an affidavit from the individual who had been named in the process server’s affidavit of service as having received service nor explained why such affidavit could not be provided (see Renelique v Allstate Ins. Co., 67 Misc 3d 128[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 50401[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]; Pierre J. Renelique Physician, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 64 Misc 3d 98, 100 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]; Aminov v Allstate Ins. Co., 62 Misc 3d 139[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50056[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]). Further, defendant’s assertion that a COVID-19-related staff reduction may have resulted in the failure to process the summons and complaint was conclusory and unsubstantiated, and, therefore, is also insufficient to qualify as a reasonable excuse (see V. v Leo, 219 AD3d 961, 962 [2023]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Krauss, 128 AD3d 813, 814 [2015]; Ahava Med. Diagnostic, P.C. v Hertz Co., 72 Misc 3d 138[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 50772[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2021]). In light of the foregoing, it is unnecessary to consider whether defendant demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see Hingorani v Venus Enters. 11 Corp., 208 AD3d 1229, 1230 [2022]; Ahava Med. Diagnostic, P.C. v Hertz Co., 2021 NY Slip Op 50772[U], *1).

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment entered May 3, 2022 and to compel plaintiff to accept defendant’s answer is denied.

HOM, J.P., TOUSSAINT and BUGGS, JJ., concur.

The following numbered papers were read on this special proceeding:

Upon the foregoing papers, this matter being determined on the submissions of the parties, and due deliberation having been had thereon,

The proper standard of review by a No-Fault insurance master arbitrator is whether the hearing arbitrator’s determination was arbitrary and capricious, irrational, or without a plausible basis, or incorrect as a matter of law; the master arbitrator may not engage in an extensive factual review, which includes weighing the evidence, assessing the credibility of various medical reports, or making independent findings of fact (Matter of Petrofsky (Allstate Ins. Co.), 54 NY2d 207 [1981]).

The standard for Article 75 court scrutiny of a master arbitrator’s review of a hearing arbitrator’s award in terms of whether there was an error of law is whether it was so irrational as to require vacatur (see Matter of Smith (Firemen’s Ins. Co.), 55 NY2d 224, 232 [1982]; Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, PC v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 170 AD3d 1168 [2d Dept 2019]; Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v New York City Transit Authority, 167 AD3d 869 [2d Dept 2018]; Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 149 AD3d 828 [2d Dept 2017]). The master arbitrator’s determination of the law need not be correct, and mere errors of law are insufficient to set aside the master arbitrator’s award; on questions of substantive law, the master arbitrator’s determination must be upheld if there is a rational basis for his determination; if the master arbitrator’s errors on a matter of law are irrational, his award may be set aside (see Matter of Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v Spine Americare Med., P.C., 294 AD2d 574 [2d Dept 2002]).

Judicial review of a master arbitrator’s factual determination in an arbitration appeal is limited to whether the master arbitrator exceeded his or her power, for instance by impermissibly weighing the credibility of a witness, by reviewing the hearing arbitrator’s factual determination, or by reviewing medical reports de novo (see Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Keegan (201 AD2d 724 [2d Dept 1994]).

Here, the Master Arbitrator assessed the evidence submitted de novo to him in support of a defense by the No-Fault insurer that the subject policy had exhausted (the grounds for vacatur raised by the No-Fault insurer herein). He found it deficient. “In this case, a review of Modria and the papers submitted by the parties finds only a bare payment ledger. Thus, there was insufficient evidence before the arbitrator to sustain an exhaustion defense,^[FN1] and there is likewise insufficient evidence before this master arbitrator.” (NYSCEF Doc No. 4 at 2.) His legal and factual conclusions were neither arbitrary, capricious, irrational, without a plausible basis, or incorrect as a matter of law. As for the No-Fault insurer being compelled to pay above the policy limit, said determination is not incorrect as a matter of law (see Nyack Hospital v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 8 NY3d 294 [2007]; Quality Health Supply Corp. v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 73 Misc 3d 1231[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 51187[U] [Civ Ct, Kings County 2021]; Country-Wide Ins. Co. v. Excel Surgery Ctr., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 33351[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2018]; Country-Wide Ins. Co. v. Excel Surgery Ctr., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 33260[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2018]). As for the No-Fault insurer’s deficient evidence in support of a policy exhaustion defense, the master arbitrator did not exceed his powers (see Alleviation Medical Serv., P.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 191 AD3d 934 [2d Dept 2021]); JPF Med. Serv., P.C. v. Nationwide Ins., 69 Misc 3d 127[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 51122[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Dists 2020]; Metro Pain Specialist, P.C. v. Hertz Co., 66 Misc 3d 129[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 52047[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Dists 2019]; Island Life Chiropractic, P.C. v. Commerce Ins. Co., 56 Misc 3d 129[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50856[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Dists 2017]; Country-Wide Ins. Co. v. CPM Med Supply, Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 30193[U], *3 [Sup Ct, NY County 2022]; MVAIC v. Metro Pain Specialists, PC, 2020 NY Slip Op 30808[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2020]; Island Life Chiropractic Pain Care PLLC v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 65 Misc 3d 1212[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 51589[U] [Civ Ct, Kings County 2019]; All Healthy Style Med., P.C. v. ELRAC, Inc., 61 Misc 3d 1203[A], 2018 NY Slip Op. 51333[U] [Civ Ct, Kings County 2018]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2010 NY Slip Op 30649[U] [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2010]); cf. Ameriprise Ins. Co. v. Electrodiagnostic & Physical Med., P.C., 2020 NY Slip Op 33246[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2020].

Furthermore, none of the grounds specified in CPLR 7511 (b) for vacating an arbitration award have been established.

It is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the within special proceeding is determined as follows:

The within petition of Petitioner herein is DENIED, and the special proceeding is DISMISSED.

The master arbitration award in American Arbitration Association Case No. 99-21-1194-3799 of Master Arbitrator Richard B. Ancowitz, which affirmed the award of Arbitrator Yael Aspir, is confirmed in its entirety.

Respondent herein is awarded the principal amount, interest, attorney’s fees, and return of filing fee as determined in the arbitration (see the arbitration award and the master arbitration award). The interest shall accrue from February 18, 2021, which is the arbitration filing date (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.5 [s] [3], 65-3.9 [c]; Canarsie Med. Health, P.C. v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 21 Misc 3d 791, 797 [Sup Ct, NY County 2008]), at the rate of two percent per month, simple, calculated on a pro-rata basis using a 30-day month (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.9 [a]).

Petitioner herein shall pay Respondent herein an attorney’s fee of $325.00 for work performed by counsel on this Article 75 proceeding, in the absence of evidence from Respondent herein as to the dates and hours during which work was performed (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [j] [4]). Based on a review of Respondent’s opposition papers and presuing that five hours work was performed, this Court applies the $65.00 per hour fee provided for in 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [j] [2]; see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Nexray Med. Imaging P.C., — Misc 3d —[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 51311[U] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2023]).

Respondent herein shall recover from Petitioner herein the costs and disbursements as allowed by law to be taxed by the Clerk.