December 27, 2004

New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co. (2004 NY Slip Op 09609)

Headnote

The relevant facts considered in this legal case were that New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens sought to recover no-fault benefits, but Clarendon National Insurance Company failed to appear or answer the complaint. The main issue was whether the defendant had a reasonable excuse for their default and whether they had a meritorious defense. The court held that the defendant did not demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their default and therefore, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the defendant's motion to vacate the default judgment. The motion was denied and the judgment was reinstated by the court.

Reported in New York Official Reports at New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co. (2004 NY Slip Op 09609)

New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co. (2004 NY Slip Op 09609)
New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co.
2004 NY Slip Op 09609 [13 AD3d 596]
December 27, 2004
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, February 23, 2005
New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens, as Assignee of David McNeal, et al., Appellants,
v
Clarendon National Insurance Company, Respondent.

[*1]In an action to recover no-fault benefits, the plaintiffs appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Davis, J.), dated February 10, 2004, as granted the defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment of the same court entered July 11, 2003, upon its failure to appear or answer the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and as a matter of discretion, with costs, the motion is denied, and the judgment is reinstated.

It is well settled that a defendant seeking to vacate a default in appearing or answering a complaint must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a meritorious defense (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Glibbery v Cosenza & Assoc., 4 AD3d 393 [2004]; Kaplinsky v Mazor, 307 AD2d 916 [2003]). The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment since the defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for its default. Ritter, J.P., H. Miller, Schmidt, Crane and Skelos, JJ., concur.