April 30, 2014
Promed Durable Equip., Inc. v Geico Ins. (2014 NY Slip Op 50773(U))
Headnote
Reported in New York Official Reports at Promed Durable Equip., Inc. v Geico Ins. (2014 NY Slip Op 50773(U))
Promed Durable Equip., Inc. v Geico Ins. |
2014 NY Slip Op 50773(U) [43 Misc 3d 138(A)] |
Decided on April 30, 2014 |
Appellate Term, Second Department |
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ.
2012-94 K C
against
Geico Insurance, Appellant.
[*1]
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), entered November 21, 2011. The order, insofar as appealed from, upon denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, made, in effect, CPLR 3212 (g) findings in plaintiff’s favor, and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover for supplies furnished on October 17, 2008 is granted to the extent of dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover for an “E.M.S.,” “EMS Accessories,” “EMS Supply,” and a back massager, and the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover for supplies furnished on September 19, 2008 is granted to the extent of dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover for a “heating pad”; as so modified, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it had timely and properly denied the claims at issue based on a lack of medical necessity. Insofar as is relevant to this appeal, the Civil Court, upon denying plaintiff’s motion, made, in effect, CPLR 3212 (g) findings in plaintiff’s favor, denied defendant’s cross motion, and held that the only remaining issue for trial was medical necessity.
On appeal, defendant fails to articulate a sufficient basis to strike the Civil Court’s implicit CPLR 3212 (g) findings in plaintiff’s favor (see EMC Health Prods. as Assignee of Brian Byers v Geico Ins. Co., ___ Misc 3d ___, 2014 NY Slip Op _____ [Appeal No. 2012-1208 K C], decided herewith).
In support of its cross motion, defendant submitted sworn peer review reports which set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the peer reviewers’ determinations that there was a lack of medical necessity for the supplies at issue. In opposition to defendant’s motion, plaintiff submitted an affirmation by a doctor which was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the supplies, other than the “E.M.S.,” “EMS Accessories,” “EMS Supply” and a back massager furnished on October 17, 2008, and a “heating pad” furnished on September 19, 2008, were medically necessary.
As to the “E.M.S.,” “EMS Accessories,” “EMS Supply” and a back massager
furnished on October 17, 2008, and the “heating pad” furnished on September 19, 2008,
defendant’s peer reviewers concluded that these supplies were superfluous because
plaintiff’s assignor had been receiving physical therapy as well as treatment by a
chiropractor and an acupuncturist. In
Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover for supplies furnished on October 17, 2008 is granted to the extent of dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover for an “E.M.S.,” “EMS Accessories,” “EMS Supply” and a back massager, and the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover for supplies furnished on September 19, 2008 is granted to the extent of dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover for a “heating pad.”
Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: April 30, 2014