No-Fault Case Law

The main issue in this case was whether the plaintiff, who had been offered a job at a new company at a salary of $2,000 per week with benefits, was entitled to recover no-fault benefits for lost wages after sustaining injuries in a car accident. The court considered the fact that the plaintiff had significant experience in the automotive parts industry, had been unemployed for seven months prior to the accident, and that the company offering him the job was in a state of disrepair after being affected by a hurricane. The court ultimately held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover lost wages as the evidence showed that the company was in financial distress, had ceased operations, and was ultimately sold for only $40,000. The court reversed the order of the Supreme Court, granted the defendant summary judgment, and dismissed the complaint.

The court considered a case in which a provider was seeking to recover first-party no-fault benefits. The main issue decided was whether the provider was entitled to summary judgment, and whether the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment should be granted to dismiss the complaint. The holding of the court was that the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint was denied. The court referred to a similar case, Island Life Chiropractic, P.C. v. Country Wide Ins. Co., to support this decision. The decision was made by the Appellate Term, Second Department.

The relevant facts considered by the court were that the plaintiff, Gentlecare Ambulatory Anesthesia Services, and Lyonel F. Paul, M.D., as Assignees of Stevenson, Connie, appealed an order from the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County, denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granting defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The main issue decided in the case was whether the provider was entitled to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits from the defendant, Country Wide Insurance Company. The holding of the case was that defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was denied, and the order was modified accordingly. The court referenced a previous case, Island Life Chiropractic, P.C. v Country Wide Ins. Co., to support their decision.

The main issue in this case was whether the trial court erred in tolling the accrual of postjudgment interest on the amount of a default judgment and in compelling the plaintiff to file a satisfaction of judgment. The court found that the plaintiff, as the prevailing party, was not required to make a demand for the money and did not cause the delay in paying the judgment, so the trial court erred in tolling the accrual of interest on the judgment. However, the defendant demonstrated that they had partially paid the judgment and were entitled to the entry of a partial satisfaction of judgment in the amount of $22,999.70. The appellate term court reversed the previous order and denied the defendant's motion to toll the accrual of postjudgment interest, but granted the motion to direct the clerk to enter a partial satisfaction of judgment in the amount of $22,999.70.

The relevant facts in this case involved a provider seeking to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits from an insurance company. The main issue was whether the insurance company's defense under State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela was subject to the preclusion rule. The court held that the defense did not need to be preserved in a timely denial, and therefore, the insurance company's discovery demands were not palpably improper. The court affirmed the order, stating that the "Mallela defense" does not need to be preserved in a timely denial, and therefore, the discovery demands at issue were appropriate.

The main issue in this case was whether the provider, New Millennium Medical Imaging, P.C., was entitled to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits from American Transit Ins. Co. The court considered the denial of the plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment and the late opposition papers filed by the defendant, which raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the claims had been timely denied. The court affirmed the denial of the cross motion for summary judgment, stating that the Civil Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in considering the defendant's late opposition papers and finding that they raised a triable issue of fact. Therefore, the holding of the case was that the denial of the cross motion for summary judgment was affirmed.

The relevant facts that the court considered in this case were that Compas Medical, P.C. was seeking to recover first-party no-fault benefits as the assignee of Pierre, Eddy. Compas Medical, P.C. moved for summary judgment, but Hereford Insurance Co. opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that insurance coverage was not provided for the vehicle involved in the accident at the time of the incident. The main issue decided by the court was whether Hereford Insurance Co. was obligated to provide insurance coverage for the vehicle on the date of the accident in question. The court ultimately held that the order denying the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granting the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment was affirmed. In summary, the court considered the insurance coverage for the vehicle at the time of the accident and ultimately decided in favor of Hereford Insurance Co., affirming the denial of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and the granting of the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment.

The main issue in Compas Med., P.C. v Hereford Ins. Co. was whether the defendant provided insurance coverage for the vehicle in question on the date of the accident at issue. The court considered the affidavit submitted by the defendant's employee, which described a record search revealing that there was no relevant insurance policy in effect on the date of the accident. The court held that the defendant's affidavit was sufficient to demonstrate, prima facie, that the plaintiff's claim did not arise out of a covered incident. As a result, the Civil Court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Therefore, the court affirmed the order.

The court considered the master arbitrator's award, which upheld the decision of an arbitrator to deny Essential Health Chiropractic's claims to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits. GEICO Insurance Company cross-petitioned to confirm the master arbitrator's award. The main issue decided was whether the master arbitrator's determination had a rational basis and was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to settled law. The court held that the master arbitrator's decision did have a rational basis and was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to settled law, and therefore denied the petition to vacate the master arbitrator's award and granted the cross petition to confirm the award. The court also noted that a special proceeding should terminate in a judgment, not an order.

The court considered the appeal of a master arbitrator's award, which upheld the denial of the petitioner's claims to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits. The main issue decided was whether the master arbitrator's determination had a rational basis and was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to settled law. The court found that the master arbitrator's decision was based on a rational basis and not contrary to settled law, so the District Court properly denied the petition to vacate the master arbitrator's award and granted the cross-petition to confirm the award. Therefore, the holding of the case was that the order to affirm the denial of the petition and grant the cross-petition to confirm the award was affirmed.