No-Fault Case Law

The court considered the appeal from an order of the Civil Court which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in an action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits. The main issue decided was whether the action was premature because the plaintiff had failed to provide requested verification. The court reversed the order and denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, citing a related case for the reasons stated in that decision. The holding of the case was that the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was denied, and the order was reversed.

The court considered an appeal from an order of the Civil Court which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint brought by TAM Medical Supply Corp., as Assignee of Mussenden, Sheldon. The order was granted on the ground that the action was premature because plaintiff had failed to provide requested verification. The main issue decided was whether the action was premature due to the plaintiff's failure to provide requested verification. The holding of the case was that the order granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment was reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was denied.

The court considered an order granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment in a case where a provider was seeking to recover first-party no-fault benefits. The main issue decided was whether the action was premature due to the plaintiff's failure to provide requested verification. The court held that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the action was premature, as the plaintiff's affidavit was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the requested verification had been mailed to and received by the defendant. Therefore, the court reversed the order and denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The main issue in the case was whether the provider, Clinton Place Medical, P.C., was entitled to recover first-party no-fault benefits, as it appealed the denial of their cross motion for summary judgment and the granting of the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, or alternatively, compel the plaintiff to respond to the defendant's discovery demands. The court considered the defendant's demand for various financial records and the owner of the plaintiff for an examination before trial, as well as the plaintiff's refusal to produce these records and comply with the demands. The holding of the case was that the order from the Civil Court, which granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint and compel discovery, was affirmed. Therefore, the plaintiff was required to provide the requested financial records and produce the owner for an examination before trial.

The main issue in this case was whether the lower court erred in denying the plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment and granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. The court considered the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 or, in the alternative, to compel the plaintiff to respond to the defendant's notice for discovery and inspection, and its "demand for verified written interrogatories." The court held that the order of the Civil Court was affirmed, with the plaintiff being compelled to provide the defendant with verified responses to specific discovery demands and to produce the plaintiff's owner for an examination before trial. The court considered the reasons stated in a similar case and affirmed the decision of the lower court.

The main issues in this case were whether the appellant was obligated to produce information sought by the appellee, and whether the appellant was entitled to summary judgment. The court held that since the appellant failed to timely challenge the propriety of the appellee's notice for discovery and inspection, it was obligated to produce the information sought except as to matters which are privileged or palpably improper. The court also found that the discovery at issue was not palpably improper, and the appellee was entitled to an examination before trial of the appellant's owner. Therefore, the court affirmed the order, insofar as appealed from, and held that the appellant's contention that it was entitled to summary judgment was premature.

The relevant facts the court considered were that the plaintiff, Vladimir Shur, was seeking to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits from the defendant, Unitrin Advantage Insurance Company. The main issue decided was whether the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted, and if the plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment should have been granted. The holding of the case was that the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was denied, as the court found that the defendant had failed to make a prima facie showing of lack of causation regarding the injuries. The court also found that the plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment should not have been granted, as the plaintiff had failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment.

The main issue in this case was whether the plaintiff was obligated to pay certain no-fault insurance benefits for medical services rendered to the defendant's assignor, which the plaintiff claimed were not medically necessary. The plaintiff appealed from an order denying its unopposed motion for a default judgment after the defendant failed to appear or answer the complaint. The court considered the requirements for proper service of the summons and complaint, the defendant's default, and the facts constituting the claim. The court held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate strict compliance with the service requirements under Limited Liability Company Law, particularly in regards to the filing of an "affidavit of compliance." As a result, the plaintiff was not entitled to a default judgment. The order denying the plaintiff's motion for a default judgment was affirmed.

The court considered the facts of the case where Promed Orthocare Supply, Inc. was seeking to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for various medical supplies provided to its assignor. In a nonjury trial, the court found that the cervical traction unit for which recovery was sought was not medically necessary, based on the testimony of defendant's expert witness. However, the Civil Court erred in refusing to consider expert testimony from the witness who did not prepare the peer review report, and indicating that testimony from the author of the peer review report was required. The court held that testimony of an expert witness who did not prepare the peer review report can be used to prove a lack of medical necessity and that a new trial was required on the second cause of action. The judgment was reversed, and the matter remitted to the Civil Court for the entry of a judgment in favor of plaintiff in the principal sum of $549.18 on the first cause of action, with a new trial on the second cause of action.

The relevant facts considered in the case were that the plaintiff insurance company sought a judgment declaring that it was not obligated to pay certain no-fault insurance benefits because the defendant failed to appear for examinations under oath. The defendant filed an answer about 3 1/2 months past the statutory time to file an answer. The issue decided was whether the plaintiff should be compelled to accept the untimely answer as timely or to extend the time for the defendant to answer. The holding of the case was that the defendant did not provide a reasonable excuse for the delay and failed to demonstrate a potentially meritorious defense to the action, so the Supreme Court was correct in denying the defendant's motion.