No-Fault Case Law

The relevant facts the court considered in this case were that Clinton Place Medical, P.C. was seeking to recover no-fault benefits from New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company. The insurance company had scheduled independent medical examinations (IMEs) for the plaintiff's assignor but the assignor failed to appear for the IMEs. The insurance company subsequently denied the claim forms, some of which were timely and some were not. The main issue decided was whether the insurance company was liable for the claims at issue, considering the failure of the assignor to appear for the IMEs and the timing of the denial of the claims. The holding of the case was that the branches of the insurance company's motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first, second, and fifth through eighth causes of action were granted, while the motion seeking to dismiss the third and fourth causes of action was denied.

The relevant facts that the court considered in this case were that Clinton Place Medical, P.C. was seeking to recover first-party no-fault benefits that were assigned to them by Daniel Canela. The main issue decided was whether the denial of the claim was timely after Canela failed to appear for scheduled independent medical examinations. The court held that there was a question of fact as to whether the denial was timely, and that such a defense is subject to preclusion if the denial of claim form was untimely. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment and held that the only issue for trial was the mailing of the denial.

The court considered the facts of an action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, where defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was granted. The main issue decided was whether the defendant had timely mailed verification requests and follow-up verification requests, and whether the plaintiff had provided the verification requested prior to commencing the action. The holding of the court was that the defendant had demonstrated they had not received all the verification requested, and the plaintiff did not show that such verification had been provided to the defendant prior to commencing the action, making the plaintiff's action premature. Therefore, the Civil Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The relevant facts considered by the court in this case were that the plaintiff, Eagle Surgical Supply, Inc., appealed an order from the Civil Court dismissing their complaint. The defendant, Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, had filed a motion for summary judgment based on the plaintiff's failure to appear for scheduled examinations under oath. However, the defendant did not provide evidence to establish when they had received the plaintiff's claim forms, which would have tolled the 30-day period within which the defendant was required to pay or deny the claims. The main issue decided by the court was whether the defendant had demonstrated that it was not precluded from raising its defense that the plaintiff failed to appear for scheduled EUOs. The court held that the defendant had failed to provide evidence to establish that it had tolled the 30-day period required to pay or deny the claims, and as a result, the defendant's motion for summary judgment should have been denied. Therefore, the judgment was reversed, the order was vacated, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied.

The main issue in this case was whether the defendant's defense of lack of medical necessity was valid in a lawsuit by a medical supply provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits. After a nonjury trial, the Civil Court found that the defendant's doctor's testimony had demonstrated that the supplies in question were not medically necessary and that the plaintiff had failed to rebut this showing. On appeal, the plaintiff objected to the admission of the peer review reports, but the court affirmed the judgment, stating that defendant properly established the lack of medical necessity at trial through the testimony of its expert witness. The court held that the peer review reports were not admissible to prove lack of medical necessity, but in this case, the defendant's expert witness's testimony based on his independent review of the medical records was sufficient to demonstrate the lack of medical necessity.

The court considered the denial of Plaintiff’s claims for no-fault benefits for physical therapy services provided to Santo Fernandez in January and February 2011. GEICO based its denial on the results of independent medical examinations (IMEs) conducted by three different doctors. Plaintiff's case was limited to the defense of lack of medical necessity, and the trial was based solely on the testimony of Dr. Jacquelin Emmanuel, the first doctor who conducted the IME. Plaintiff presented no witnesses in rebuttal, but submitted medical records for the court’s consideration. The main issue decided was whether plaintiff met its burden of proving the medical necessity of post-IME physical therapy treatments. The court decided that defendant’s proof satisfied its burden under the law, but plaintiff satisfied its burden through submission of medical records containing findings and opinions of the treating doctor, Dr. Demetrius. The court held in favor of the plaintiff.

The relevant facts considered by the court were that the defendant had timely issued examination under oath (EUO) scheduling letters and that the plaintiff had failed to appear for the scheduled EUOs. The main issue decided was whether the failure to appear for the EUOs could be grounds for timely denial of the claims at issue. The court held that the defendant had established that the time to pay or deny the plaintiff's claim had been tolled by the timely issuance of EUO scheduling letters, and that the plaintiff's failure to appear for the EUOs was a valid reason for the timely denial of the claims. Therefore, the court reversed the order and granted the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The court considered the fact that the defendant had established that a declaratory judgment had been entered on default in a Supreme Court, New York County, action, which provided that the named defendants, including the plaintiff, "are not entitled to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits stemming from the accident at issue." The main issue decided was whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits arising from the same accident at issue in the Supreme Court case. The holding of the case was that the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) and CPLR 3212 was properly granted, and the order was affirmed.

The court considered the timely mailing of the denial of claim form and conflicting medical expert opinions in the case of Advanced Orthopedics, PLLC v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. The main issue was whether there was a lack of medical necessity for the services provided, and whether the defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied based on this conflicting evidence. The court held that the conflicting medical expert opinions were sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact, so the defendant's motion for summary judgment was properly denied.

The court considered the specific details of a no-fault insurance claim brought by LMS Acupuncture, P.C. against Geico Insurance Company. The main issue decided was whether or not plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on their claims for recovery of no-fault benefits, including a specific claim for $80.02 for services rendered on August 2, 2010. The court held that plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment for the $80.02 claim as defendant failed to raise any other issues with regards to that specific claim. However, defendant demonstrated that it had fully paid plaintiff for the remaining services in accordance with the workers' compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services performed by chiropractors. Therefore, the court granted defendant's cross motion for summary judgment to dismiss all other claims made by plaintiff. The court affirmed the lower court's decision with modification, granting summary judgment to plaintiff for the $80.02 claim, but dismissing all other claims made by plaintiff.