No-Fault Case Law

The court considered the fact that the plaintiff, Infinity Health Products, Ltd., was seeking to recover first-party no-fault benefits as the assignee of Alexander Fitzmichael, Jr. The main issue before the court was whether the defendant, New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company, had established its "independent medical examination" No Show defense in order to deny the plaintiff's claim. The court reviewed evidence that showed the scheduling letters for the independent medical examinations had been timely mailed, and that the assignor had failed to appear for the scheduled examinations. The holding of the court was that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint, as the plaintiff had not challenged the defendant's entitlement to judgment. Therefore, the court reversed the order, and granted the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment.

The court considered the fact that the plaintiff initiated the action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits in May of 2008, and the defendant defaulted. More than two years later, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c), and the Civil Court denied defendant's unopposed motion. The main issue decided was whether the plaintiff offered a reasonable excuse for the delay in moving for leave to enter a default judgment and demonstrated that the complaint was meritorious. The holding of the case was that, upon review of the facts and plaintiff's failure to submit opposition to defendant's motion, dismissal of the complaint was required pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c). Therefore, the order was reversed, and defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint was granted.

The main issue in this case involved whether Bright Medical Supply Co. was barred by a temporary restraining order (TRO) from commencing an action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits. The court considered whether Bright Medical Supply Co. had knowledge of the TRO or its terms at the time the action was commenced. The court also examined whether GMAC Integon Ins. Co. had provided proof that Bright Medical Supply Co. was aware of the TRO. The court ultimately held that GMAC Integon Ins. Co. did not establish that Bright Medical Supply Co. had knowledge, actual or imputed, of the TRO's terms, and therefore, did not show that Bright Medical Supply Co. was barred from commencing the instant action. As a result, the judgment was reversed, the order was vacated, and GMAC Integon Ins. Co.'s motion to dismiss the complaint was denied.

The court considered the denial of a motion for summary judgment by the defendant in an action to recover first-party no-fault benefits. The main issue decided was whether the defendant had timely denied the claims at issue, as required by law. The court held that the affidavit submitted by the defendant failed to establish that the claims had been timely denied, and therefore the defendant's motion for summary judgment was properly denied. As a result, the court affirmed the order, stating that the defendant failed to establish that it was not precluded from raising the failure of the plaintiff's assignor to appear for an independent medical examination as a defense.

The court considered an action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, where the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and the plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. The issue at hand was whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover on claims for services rendered between July 17, 2007 and October 3, 2007, which had been denied on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to appear for examinations under oath (EUOs). The court ultimately affirmed the order, agreeing with the defendant that the EUO scheduling letters and denial of claim forms had been timely and properly mailed, and that the plaintiff's contentions were without merit. The main issue decided was whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover on claims for services rendered between the specified dates, despite the denial on the ground of failure to appear for EUOs. The holding of the court was that the defendant's affidavits were sufficient to establish that the EUO scheduling letters and denial of claim forms had been timely and properly mailed, and that the plaintiff's contentions were without merit. Therefore, the order granting the branch of defendant's motion seeking summary judgment dismissing those claims was affirmed.

The main facts considered by the court were that Metropolitan Medical Supplies, LLC, was seeking to recover $686.44 for the first cause of action and $1,409.24 for the second cause of action for first-party no-fault benefits that had been denied by GEICO Insurance Co. The trial was limited to the issue of the medical necessity of the billed-for supplies, and defendant's expert witness was allowed to testify for the first cause of action but was precluded from testifying for the second cause of action. Defendant's expert should have been allowed to testify for the second cause of action and therefore a new trial was ordered for that claim. The decision was reversed and the case was remitted to the Civil Court for entry of a new judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the first cause of action and for a new trial on the second cause of action.

The relevant facts the court considered were that Rainbow Supply of NY, Inc. was seeking to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits from Clarendon National Ins. Co. The main issue decided was whether Clarendon had timely denied the claim at issue, and whether they were precluded from raising as a defense the failure of Rainbow Supply's assignor to appear for an independent medical examination. The court held that the affidavit submitted by Clarendon in support of its motion for summary judgment failed to establish that they had timely denied the claim, and thus the denial of Clarendon's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed.

The relevant facts the court considered in this case include the plaintiff, Perfect Point Acupuncture, P.C., seeking to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits and the defendant, Auto One Insurance Company, denying the claims based on the plaintiff's assignor's failure to appear for independent medical examinations (IMEs). The main issue decided by the court was whether the defendant had properly established that the letters scheduling the IMEs had been mailed to the plaintiff's assignor, and therefore, whether the assignor had failed to comply with a condition precedent to the insurer's liability on the policy. The holding of the case was that the defendant did not sufficiently establish that the letters scheduling the IMEs had been mailed to the plaintiff's assignor, and therefore, the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was denied. The court also affirmed that the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was properly denied.

The main issue in this case was whether Ocean Diagnostic Imaging, P.C., as the assignee of AIKELI BOLES, had the legal authority to bring the action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, given that the sole officer, director, and shareholder of the plaintiff had died before the commencement of the action. The court considered relevant facts such as the death of Stephen A. Zinn, M.D., and the lack of evidence demonstrating that the commencement of the action was authorized by someone with the authority to do so. The court ultimately held that as the record did not demonstrate that the commencement of the action was authorized by someone with the authority to do so, the branch of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the complaint was granted, and the order of the Civil Court was reversed.

The court considered the facts that the defendant-insurer had timely and properly mailed notices for independent medical examinations to the plaintiff's assignor, and the assignor failed to appear for the examinations. The main issue decided was whether the defendant-insurer was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the action for first-party no-fault benefits. The court held that the defendant-insurer made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment by establishing proper mailing of the notices for the examinations and the assignor's failure to appear. The court found that the plaintiff did not raise a triable issue in opposition to the defendant's showing, and therefore granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.