No-Fault Case Law

The relevant facts considered by the court were that Astoria Wellness Medical, P.C. was seeking to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, but the defendant argued that the acupuncture services were rendered by a professional service corporation owned by a doctor who was not licensed to perform acupuncture. The main issue decided in this case was whether the plaintiff was eligible for reimbursement of the no-fault benefits because the acupuncture services were allegedly rendered by a licensed acupuncturist employed by the plaintiff. The court ultimately affirmed the lower court's decision to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment and deny the plaintiff's cross motion as moot, based on a similar case with similar facts. Therefore, the holding of the case was that the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed.

The court considered the fact that Alfa Medical Supplies, Inc. was seeking to recover first-party no-fault benefits as the assignee of two individuals, Zoila Correa and Miriam Soto. GEICO General Insurance Company denied the claims on the grounds of lack of medical necessity. The main issue decided was whether Alfa Medical Supplies, Inc. provided sufficient evidence to establish its entitlement to summary judgment. The holding of the case was that Alfa Medical Supplies, Inc. failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish its entitlement to summary judgment for its claims as the assignee of Zoila Correa and Miriam Soto. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment was denied, and the judgment in favor of Alfa Medical Supplies, Inc. was reversed.

The main issue in this case was whether respondent's injuries in a workplace accident qualified as an "accident arising out of such [underinsured] motor vehicle's ownership, maintenance or use." The court ultimately held that the injuries fell within the scope of the parties' agreement because, despite the vehicle not being in motion at the time of the incident, the coworker had used the vehicle to transport the sheet metal to the junkyard after work. This usage was found to present a causal connection between the coworker's use of the vehicle and respondent's injuries. Additionally, the court pointed out that the parked vehicle being utilized as a storage bin for sheet metal did not constitute ongoing vehicle activity and, thus, did not compel a conclusion that the vehicle was in use when the respondent was injured. However, a dissenting opinion was also issued, disagreeing with the majority's broad interpretation of vehicle usage and arguing that respondent's injuries were not related to the use of the motor vehicle.

The relevant facts of the case were that the plaintiff had notified the defendant, his no-fault insurance carrier, of an accident in January 2002, with the latter denying coverage for the claim in July 2002. Plaintiff then commenced an action for breach of contract and dealing in bad faith almost six years later. After defendant served an answer on August 28, 2008, plaintiff rejected it because it was not verified, and a second answer served on September 4, 2008 was rejected as untimely. Supreme Court granted defendant's motion—giving defendant 30 days to file, serve and file proof of service of the second answer—and denied plaintiff's cross motion. The main issues decided were whether there were reasonable excuses for the delay in serving the verified answer and whether the answer set forth a meritorious defense to the claims. The holding of the case was that given the reasonable excuse for the delay, the minimal delay, defendant's expeditious motion to compel acceptance of the answer, the absence of proof that the default was willful or any indication that plaintiff was prejudiced by the delay, and the existence of an arguably meritorious defense, the court decided to grant defendant's motion to extend the time to answer and to compel plaintiff to accept service.

The relevant facts considered by the court were that the defendant had established that it had mailed notices of independent medical examinations (IMEs) to the assignors, and the assignors failed to appear for the IMEs. The main issue decided was whether the plaintiff had raised a triable issue regarding the reasonableness of the requests for IMEs and the assignors' failure to attend. The holding of the case was that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint based on the plaintiff's failure to comply with a condition precedent to coverage. The court reversed the order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, with costs, and dismissed the complaint.

The relevant facts of the case were that a healthcare provider claimed first-party no-fault benefits from an insurance company. The insurance company denied the claim on the grounds of lack of medical necessity and that the amount sought exceeded the workers' compensation fee schedule. The main issue in the case was whether the denial of the claim forms was timely mailed and whether the insurance company demonstrated a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment. The holding of the case was that the insurance company demonstrated that the denial of claim forms were timely mailed and made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment, therefore the court reversed the lower court's decision and granted the insurance company's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The court considered an appeal from an order of the Civil Court that granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in an action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits. The defendant had established that it had timely denied the claim on the ground of lack of medical necessity and had submitted an affirmed peer review report setting forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the conclusion that the medical services at issue were not medically necessary. The plaintiff did not dispute that the defendant had established lack of medical necessity and did not rebut the defendant's showing that the services at issue were not medically necessary. The main issue decided was whether the defendant's motion for summary judgment was properly granted, and the holding of the court was that the order was affirmed without costs as the plaintiff's remaining contentions lacked merit.

The relevant facts considered by the court were that the plaintiff, a psychologist, had filed a commercial claims action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits from the defendant insurance company, Allstate. Allstate failed to appear or answer, resulting in a default judgment against them in 2004. In 2008, Allstate moved to vacate the default judgment, arguing that the small claims part of the Civil Court of the City of New York did not have subject matter jurisdiction over actions brought by an assignee, and that its motion to vacate the default judgment should be granted pursuant to CPLR 317 or 5015. The main issue decided by the court was whether Allstate's motion to vacate the default judgment should be granted, and the holding of the court was that the order denying Allstate's motion to vacate the default judgment was affirmed without costs. The court's decision was based on the reasons stated in a related case, Dr. Robert E. Stoessel, Psychologist, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (___ Misc 3d ___, 2010 NY Slip Op ______ [Appeal No. 2009-576 Q C], decided herewith).

The case involves Allstate Insurance Company appealing a lower court's decision to deny their motion to vacate a default judgment in favor of Dr. Robert E. Stoessel, Psychologist, P.C. The lawsuit revolved around Stoessel suing for assigned first-party no-fault benefits in the sum of $880.52, which Allstate failed to appear or answer to. They argued that small claims court does not have jurisdiction for actions brought by an assignee. However, the appellate court ruled that the action was properly commenced in the Commercial Claims Part by the plaintiff, and that there was proof that the defendant had been served with the notice of claim. Therefore, the motion to vacate the default judgment was denied, and the order was affirmed without costs.

The main issue in this case was whether an insurer could obtain documentary material relating to a potential Mallela defense in a demand for an examination under oath (EUO). The court considered the demand for an EUO that required the production of documents evidencing ownership and financial information of the medical provider, Dynamic Medical Imaging, P.C. The court found that the insurer's demand for written documentation for a Mallela defense through an EUO was improper and not subject to court review. The holding of the court was that the demand for an EUO was improper, and therefore, the insurer's motion for summary judgment was denied. Additionally, the court noted that the defendant had alleged a Mallela defense in their answer and was not prevented from asserting or proving the defense or obtaining proper discovery in regards to the defense.