No-Fault Case Law

The court considered the facts presented in the case of Ocean Diagnostic Imaging, Inc. v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., where the plaintiff sought to recover no-fault benefits for medical services provided to an assignor. The main issue decided was whether the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment, and whether the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment should be denied. The court held that the plaintiff had established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by providing evidence that it mailed the claim forms and that the defendant failed to pay or deny the claims within the prescribed 30-day period. However, the defendant was not precluded from asserting the defense of insurance fraud, despite the untimely denial of the claims. The court ultimately modified the order to deny the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and affirmed that the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment was properly denied.

The court in A.B. Medical Services PLLC v Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Company considered the failure of the insurer to timely pay or deny the claim within the 30-day statutory period, and the sufficiency of proof submitted to rebut a plaintiff's prima facie case for entitlement to no-fault benefits. The main issue decided was whether a timely denial relieves the insurer from the necessity of submitting proof in admissible form to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case, and the validity of assignments to health care providers of benefits for non-health-related services. The holding of the court was that defendant's failure to seek verification of the assignments or to allege any deficiency in the assignments in its denial of claim forms constituted a waiver of any defenses with respect thereto, and that despite its untimely denial of certain of plaintiff's claims, defendant was not precluded from asserting the defense that the alleged injuries do not arise out of a covered accident. Furthermore, the court held that renewal of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment would be unwarranted.

The court considered the motion made by defendant State Farm Insurance Company to sever the action brought by plaintiff Midwood Acupuncture, P.C. into separate actions on behalf of individual assignors. In this action, the plaintiff sought to recover first party No-Fault benefits with interest and statutory attorney's fees from the defendant for alleged medical services provided to its assignors. The main issue decided was whether the claims should be severed into separate actions, and the court held that severance was not necessary. The court found that even if the claims involved separate accidents and individuals, they did not lose their character as a series of transactions because they occurred at different places and times, and if they involved a common question of law, joinder was proper. Therefore, the court denied the defendant's motion to sever the action.

Plaintiffs were healthcare providers seeking first-party no-fault benefits for medical services offered to their assignor. They established that they sent the statutory claim forms and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue. The court considered the defendant's delay letters acknowledging the bills submitted, causing them to establish reception of the respective claims. The court also noted that an insurer's failure to timely pay or deny claims within the statutory period precludes it from asserting most defenses. The primary issue decided was whether the defendant effectively demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a lack of coverage. The holding was that despite the defendant's untimely denial of most claims, a triable issue of fact existed on whether there was a lack of coverage, so the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was properly denied.

The relevant facts considered by the court in this case involve a medical provider, Plaintiff, seeking to recover first party no-fault benefits from Defendant insurer. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment, alleging that Defendant did not pay or deny the claim within the required thirty-day period. In response, Defendant claimed the denials were timely, but Plaintiff argued that Defendant failed to provide legally sufficient proof of mailing the denials within the thirty-day period. The main issue decided in this case was the information required on an affidavit of mailing to meet the requirements of New York's no-fault law for a proper proof of mailing. The holding of the court was that the Defendant failed to meet its burden of proving that the denials were mailed within the thirty-day period, and therefore, summary judgment was awarded to Plaintiff. As a result, the court ordered the entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $1,181.63, plus interest, costs, and attorney fees.

The court considered the correspondence between the claimant's attorney and the insurance company, as well as the submission of an application for no-fault benefits. The main issue was whether this correspondence provided the insurance company with notice of the claim for uninsured motorist benefits as required by the insurance policy. The court found that the correspondence did not constitute the requisite notice, and the claimant failed to offer a valid excuse for her failure to give the insurance company timely notice. As a result, the Supreme Court properly granted the petition to stay arbitration, and the order was affirmed on appeal. The main holding was that the failure to satisfy the notice requirement specified in the insurance policy vitiates coverage for uninsured motorist benefits.

The main issue that the court considered was whether the plaintiff's lost-wage claim was too speculative to be compensated under Insurance Law § 5102 (a) (2) due to an injury sustained from an automobile accident. The court held that both the statute and the regulation contemplated a degree of certainty in the calculation of lost wages and stated that they apply to reimburse a claimant for wages actually lost from employment engaged in at the time of the accident, and that those lost wages from that employment can be increased if the claimant can demonstrate a reasonable projection that his or her future earnings from said employment will increase. The court ultimately affirmed the lower court's decision by agreeing with the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's lost-wage claim, as it was entirely speculative.

The case considered whether an insured met the criteria for notifying her insurer in a timely manner of her intention to file a supplemental underinsured motorist (SUM) claim. The appellant, Geraldine Celebucki, filed a claim for no-fault insurance benefits in July 1998 and later notified her insurer of her intent to file a SUM claim. However, the insurer disclaimed coverage for the SUM claim in February 2002 on the grounds that Celebucki had failed to notify them of her intent to seek such benefits until 3 ½ years after the accident. The court considered whether Celebucki provided notice of her SUM claim "as soon as practicable" and whether the notice was provided as required by her policy. The court held that timely written notice of the SUM claim was never provided and upheld the order that granted the insurer's application to stay arbitration.

The relevant facts considered in this legal case were that New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens sought to recover no-fault benefits, but Clarendon National Insurance Company failed to appear or answer the complaint. The main issue was whether the defendant had a reasonable excuse for their default and whether they had a meritorious defense. The court held that the defendant did not demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their default and therefore, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the defendant's motion to vacate the default judgment. The motion was denied and the judgment was reinstated by the court.

The court considered evidence submitted by the plaintiff, including assignments, proofs of claim, and denial of claim forms from the defendant as proof of mailing. The main issues included establishing whether the plaintiff had provided a prima facie case for summary judgment for recovery of no-fault benefits and determining if the defendant's belated denials could be deemed timely denied based on previously served blanket disclaimers. The holding of the case was that the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment, as the defendant either failed to pay or deny the claims within thirty days of receipt, and the defendant was precluded from raising the defense of lack of medical necessity. The plaintiff was awarded the requested amount for no-fault benefits, with 2% interest per month, as well as attorneys' fees.