Matter of Global Liberty Ins. Co. v Coastal Anesthesia Servs., LLC (2016 NY Slip Op 08964)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of Global Liberty Ins. Co. v Coastal Anesthesia Servs., LLC (2016 NY Slip Op 08964)

Matter of Global Liberty Ins. Co. v Coastal Anesthesia Servs., LLC (2016 NY Slip Op 08964)
Matter of Global Liberty Ins. Co. v Coastal Anesthesia Servs., LLC
2016 NY Slip Op 08964 [145 AD3d 644]
December 29, 2016
Appellate Division, First Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, February 1, 2017

[*1]

 In the Matter of Global Liberty Insurance Co., Appellant,
v
Coastal Anesthesia Services, LLC, as Assignee of Lourdes Irizarry, Respondent.

The Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C., Garden City (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel), for appellant.

Russell Friedman & Associates, LLP, Lake Success (Dara C. Goodman of counsel), for respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Julia I. Rodriguez, J.), entered April 6, 2016, which denied petitioner’s application to vacate a master arbitration award entitling respondent to no-fault insurance benefits, and granted respondent’s cross motion to confirm the award, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Petitioner failed to demonstrate the existence of any of the statutory grounds for vacating the Master Arbitrator’s award (CPLR 7511 [b]). The decision of the Master Arbitrator in affirming the arbitration award had evidentiary support, a rational basis, and was not arbitrary and capricious (see Matter of Petrofsky [Allstate Ins. Co.], 54 NY2d 207, 211 [1981]). The original arbitrator properly acted within her discretionary authority to refuse to entertain any late submissions proffered by petitioner (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.2 [b] [3]; Matter of Mercury Cas. Co. v Healthmakers Med. Group, P.C., 67 AD3d 1017 [2d Dept 2009]). Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Sweeny, Richter, Manzanet-Daniels and Feinman, JJ.

Matter of Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v Global Liberty Ins. Co. of N.Y. (2016 NY Slip Op 08078)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v Global Liberty Ins. Co. of N.Y. (2016 NY Slip Op 08078)

Matter of Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v Global Liberty Ins. Co. of N.Y. (2016 NY Slip Op 08078)
Matter of Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v Global Liberty Ins. Co. of N.Y.
2016 NY Slip Op 08078 [144 AD3d 1160]
November 30, 2016
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, January 4, 2017

[*1]

 In the Matter of Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, as Subrogee of Mohan Singh, Respondent,
v
Global Liberty Insurance Co. of N.Y., Appellant.

The Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C., Garden City, NY, for appellant.

Sim & Record, LLP, Bayside, NY (Sang J. Sim of counsel), for respondent.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR 7511 to vacate an arbitration award dated March 24, 2014, in which Global Liberty Insurance Co. of N.Y. cross-petitioned to confirm the award, Global Liberty Insurance Co. of N.Y. appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Asher, J.), dated March 25, 2015, which granted the petition and denied the cross petition.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The petitioner, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, as subrogee of Mohan Singh (hereinafter Liberty Mutual), paid no-fault benefits on behalf of its insured for the medical treatment of a third party who was injured in a motor vehicle collision with a livery vehicle insured by Global Liberty Insurance Co. of N.Y. (hereinafter Global). Liberty Mutual thereafter sought to recover payments of $11,398.38 from Global in compulsory arbitration pursuant to Insurance Law § 5105. Despite finding that the livery vehicle insured by Global was 100% at fault in the happening of the accident, and notwithstanding Liberty Mutual’s submission of a payment ledger detailing the payments it made for various medical services, the arbitrator determined that Liberty Mutual did not properly manage the medical claims and awarded it only $5,699.19, or 50% of the amount sought. Liberty Mutual thereafter commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR 7511 to vacate the arbitration award, contending that the arbitrator erred in awarding it damages of only $5,699.19, rather than the full amount of $11,398.38, and Global cross-petitioned to confirm the award. The Supreme Court granted Liberty Mutual’s petition and denied Global’s cross petition, determining that there was no evidence to support the arbitrator’s findings. We affirm.

While judicial review of arbitration awards is limited to the grounds set forth in CPLR 7511, an award that is the product of compulsory arbitration, such as the one at issue in this case, “must satisfy an additional layer of judicial scrutiny—it ‘must have evidentiary support and cannot be arbitrary and capricious’ ” (City School Dist. of the City of N.Y. v McGraham, 17 NY3d 917, 919 [2011], quoting Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d 214, 223 [1996]; see Matter of Fiduciary Ins. Co. v American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida, 132 AD3d 40, 46 [2015]; Matter of Travelers Indem. Co. v United Diagnostic Imaging, P.C., 70 AD3d 1043 [2010]; Matter of Mercury Cas. [*2]Co. v Healthmakers Med. Group, P.C., 67 AD3d 1017 [2009]).

Here, in response to Liberty Mutual’s submission of evidence establishing the medical payments for which it sought reimbursement, Global failed to produce any evidence that any of the medical claims were improperly paid (see generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Stack, 55 AD3d 594, 595 [2008]). Accordingly, the arbitrator’s determination that Liberty Mutual was not entitled to full reimbursement was not supported by evidence in the record and was arbitrary and capricious (see generally Matter of Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v New York State Ins. Fund, 47 AD3d 633, 634 [2008]). Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court properly granted Liberty Mutual’s petition and denied Global’s cross petition. Chambers, J.P., Dickerson, Miller and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.

Matter of Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. Kemper A. Unitrin Bus. v Professional Health Radiology (2016 NY Slip Op 06767)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. Kemper A. Unitrin Bus. v Professional Health Radiology (2016 NY Slip Op 06767)

Matter of Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. Kemper A. Unitrin Bus. v Professional Health Radiology (2016 NY Slip Op 06767)
Matter of Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. Kemper A. Unitrin Bus. v Professional Health Radiology
2016 NY Slip Op 06767 [143 AD3d 536]
October 13, 2016
Appellate Division, First Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, December 7, 2016

[*1]

 In the Matter of Unitrin Advantage Insurance Company Kemper A. Unitrin Business, Appellant-Respondent,
v
Professional Health Radiology, as Assignee of Anggi Camacho, Appellant. Unitrin Advantage Insurance Company Kemper A. Unitrin Business, Appellant, v Professional Health Radiology, as Assignee of Nestor Camacho, Respondent.

Gullo & Associates, LLC, Brooklyn (Cristina Carollo of counsel), for appellant-respondent/appellant.

Gary Tsirelman, P.C., Brooklyn (David M. Gottlieb and Stefan Belinfanti of counsel), for respondent-appellant/respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Melvin L. Schweitzer, J.), entered January 29, 2014, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied and dismissed petitioner Unitrin’s petition to vacate a no-fault master arbitration award dated June 3, 2013, and granted respondent Professional Health Radiology as assignee of Nestor Camacho’s counterclaim to the extent of confirming the award, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Order, same court (Lawrence K. Marks, J.), entered March 14, 2014, which denied Unitrin’s petition to vacate a no-fault master arbitration award dated June 3, 2013, granted respondent Professional Health Radiology as assignee of Anggi Camacho’s counterclaim to confirm the award, and denied Professional Health’s counterclaim for attorney’s fees in connection with the court proceeding, unanimously modified, on the law, to grant the counterclaim for attorney’s fees, and remand the matter to Supreme Court for further proceedings consistent with this decision, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Unitrin failed to establish that it was entitled to deny Professional Health’s claims on the ground that Professional Health’s assignors, Nestor Camacho and Anggi Camacho, did not appear for independent medical examinations (IMEs) (see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Clark, 131 AD3d 840 [1st Dept 2015]). The no-fault regulations include mandatory notice requirements governing insurer requests for both IMEs and examinations under oath (11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [e]). The regulations expressly provide that the insurer “shall inform the applicant at the time the examination is scheduled that the applicant will be reimbursed for any loss of earnings and reasonable transportation expenses incurred in complying with the request” (id.). Unitrin failed to establish that the requisite regulatory language was contained within its November 30, 2011 letters sent to the assignors, and, based on the multiple errors committed by Unitrin, it failed to establish inadvertent law office error, or that the cases should be remanded, in the interest of justice, for a new arbitration hearing.

[*2] Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (a), if a valid claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, “the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to [the] limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations.” “In a proceeding for judicial review of an award by a master arbitrator, an attorney’s fee shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter” (Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 139 AD3d 947, 948 [2d Dept 2016]; see 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [j] [4]). Professional Health, therefore, is entitled to attorney’s fees in connection with the Supreme Court proceeding regarding Anggi Camacho, and we remand the matter for further proceedings to determine those fees. Professional Health did not file a cross appeal with respect to the denial of its counterclaim for attorney’s fees in connection with the Supreme Court proceeding regarding Nestor Camacho, and this Court lacks the power to grant the counterclaim (see Hecht v City of New York, 60 NY2d 57 [1983]). Concur—Renwick, J.P., Manzanet-Daniels, Gische and Webber, JJ.

Global Liberty Ins. Co. v W. Joseph Gorum, M.D., P.C. (2016 NY Slip Op 06680)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Global Liberty Ins. Co. v W. Joseph Gorum, M.D., P.C. (2016 NY Slip Op 06680)

Global Liberty Ins. Co. v W. Joseph Gorum, M.D., P.C. (2016 NY Slip Op 06680)
Global Liberty Ins. Co. v W. Joseph Gorum, M.D., P.C.
2016 NY Slip Op 06680 [143 AD3d 768]
October 12, 2016
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, December 7, 2016

[*1]

 Global Liberty Insurance Company, Appellant,
v
W. Joseph Gorum, M.D., P.C., as Assignee of Maldotha Conyers, et al., Respondents.

The Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C., Garden City, NY, for appellant.

Law Offices of Economou & Economou, P.C., Syosset, NY (Ralph C. Caio of counsel), for respondent Laxmidhar Diwan, M.D., as assignee of Jerry Souffront.

In an action pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (c) for a de novo determination of claims for no-fault insurance benefits, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Brown, J.), entered March 9, 2016, as denied those branches of its motion which were (a) for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant W. Joseph Gorum, M.D., P.C., as assignee of Maldotha Conyers, and (b) for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant Laxmidhar Diwan, M.D., as assignee of Jerry Souffront, declaring that it was not obligated to provide insurance coverage, and dismissing the second counterclaim asserted by that defendant.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant W. Joseph Gorum, M.D., P.C., as assignee of Maldotha Conyers, and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiff, a no-fault insurance carrier, commenced this action pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (c) for a de novo adjudication of two separate insurance disputes concerning the denial of no-fault claims involving the defendant W. Joseph Gorum, M.D., P.C., as assignee of Maldotha Conyers, and the defendant Laxmidhar Diwan, M.D., as assignee of Jerry Souffront. Both Gorum and Diwan had been awarded more than $5,000 against the plaintiff as a result of master arbitration awards.

The plaintiff moved, inter alia, for leave to enter a default judgment against Gorum, which failed to answer the complaint or appear in this action. The Supreme Court denied that branch of the plaintiff’s motion with respect to Gorum on the basis that the plaintiff failed to submit an affirmation from its expert with an original signature. The plaintiff also moved for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against Diwan declaring it was not obligated to provide insurance coverage for the services Diwan performed for Souffront, since such services were [*2]not medically necessary to treat injuries Souffront sustained in a motor vehicle accident, and for summary judgment dismissing Diwan’s second counterclaim, which alleged breach of contract. The court denied those branches of the plaintiff’s motion with respect to Diwan, determining that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

On a motion for leave to enter a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215, the movant is required to file proof of (1) service of the summons and complaint, (2) the facts constituting the claim, and (3) the other party’s default (see CPLR 3215 [f]; Liberty County Mut. v Avenue I Med., P.C., 129 AD3d 783, 784-785 [2015]; Fried v Jacob Holding, Inc., 110 AD3d 56, 59 [2013]). To demonstrate “the facts constituting the claim,” the movant need only submit sufficient proof to enable a court to determine if the claim is viable (see Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d 62, 71 [2003]; Fried v Jacob Holding, Inc., 110 AD3d at 60; Neuman v Zurich N. Am., 36 AD3d 601, 602 [2007]). Here, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff submitted proof of service of the summons and complaint upon Gorum (see Business Corporation Law § 306 [b] [i]; CPLR 3215 [g] [4] [i]) and that Gorum had not answered or appeared in this action, thereby admitting all traversable allegations (see Rokina Opt. Co. v Camera King, 63 NY2d 728, 730 [1984]). However, the court erred in denying that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for leave to enter a default judgment against Gorum on the basis that its expert’s affirmation, in the form of a peer review, did not have an original signature (see CPLR 2101 [e]; Rechler Equity B-1, LLC v AKR Corp., 98 AD3d 496, 497 [2012]; Billingy v Blagrove, 84 AD3d 848, 849 [2011]; Campbell v Johnson, 264 AD2d 461, 461 [1999]). Further, the plaintiff’s expert’s affirmed peer review demonstrated facts constituting the cause of action asserted against Gorum (see Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d at 71). Thus, the court should have granted the plaintiff leave to enter a default judgment against Gorum.

However, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against Diwan and dismissing Diwan’s second counterclaim. The peer review reports and medical records submitted in support of this motion failed to demonstrate as a matter of law that the surgery performed by Diwan on Souffront was not medically necessary (see Cortland Med. Supply, Inc. v 21st Century Centennial Ins. Co., 46 Misc 3d 136[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 51886[U], *1 [App Term, 1st Dept 2014]; Amherst Med. Supply, LLC v A. Cent. Ins. Co., 41 Misc 3d 133[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51800[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2013]; Premier Health Choice Chiropractic, P.C. v Praetorian Ins. Co., 41 Misc 3d 133[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51802[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2013]; Total Equip., LLC v Praetorian Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 141[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50078[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012]; Eastern Star Acupuncture, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 142[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50380[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]). In light of the plaintiff’s failure to meet its prima facie burden, this Court need not consider the sufficiency of the opposing papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). Balkin, J.P., Austin, Sgroi and Duffy, JJ., concur.

AutoOne Ins. Co. v Eastern Is. Med. Care, P.C. (2016 NY Slip Op 05354)

Reported in New York Official Reports at AutoOne Ins. Co. v Eastern Is. Med. Care, P.C. (2016 NY Slip Op 05354)

AutoOne Ins. Co. v Eastern Is. Med. Care, P.C. (2016 NY Slip Op 05354)
AutoOne Ins. Co. v Eastern Is. Med. Care, P.C.
2016 NY Slip Op 05354 [141 AD3d 499]
July 6, 2016
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, August 31, 2016

[*1] (July 6, 2016)

 AutoOne Insurance Company, Appellant,
v
Eastern Island Medical Care, P.C., as Assignee of Jaime Benitez, Respondent.

The Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C., Garden City, NY, for appellant.

Don L. Hochler, P.C., Woodbury, NY, for respondent.

In an action pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (c) for a de novo determination of a claim for no-fault insurance benefits, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Marber, J.), entered October 20, 2014, which, upon an order of the same court entered October 1, 2014, denying that branch of its motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (b) to dismiss the third affirmative defense, granting the defendant’s cross motion to confirm the award of a master arbitrator dated January 24, 2014, and, in effect, denying, as academic, those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint and pursuant to CPLR 3211 (b) to dismiss the first, second, fourth, fifth, seventh, and eleventh affirmative defenses, and pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the second counterclaim and stated portions of the first counterclaim, is in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff in the principal sum of $6,406.82.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (b) to dismiss the first, second, third, and fourth affirmative defenses are granted, the defendant’s cross motion to confirm the award of the master arbitrator is denied as academic, the order entered October 1, 2014, is modified accordingly, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a determination on the merits of those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were (a) for summary judgment on the complaint, (b) pursuant to CPLR 3211 (b) to dismiss the fifth, seventh, and eleventh affirmative defenses, and (c) pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the second counterclaim and stated portions of the first counterclaim.

The plaintiff, AutoOne Insurance Company, a no-fault insurance carrier, was entitled to commence this action to compel the de novo adjudication of the insurance dispute at issue since a master arbitrator’s award in favor of the defendant, Eastern Island Medical Care, P.C., as assignee of Jaime Benitez, exceeded the statutory threshold sum of $5,000 (see Insurance Law § 5106 [c]; Allstate Ins. Co. v Nalbandian, 89 AD3d 648, 649 [2011]; Matter of Capuano v Allstate Ins. Co., 122 AD2d 138, 139 [1986]).

The Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for summary judgment on the complaint on the ground that the demand for a trial de novo was untimely filed (see Insurance Law § 5106 [c]; CPLR 7511; 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [h] [2]; see also [*2]Matter of Slater v Eagle Ins. Co., 294 AD2d 368, 369 [2002]). As this arbitration dispute was originally submitted to the American Arbitration Association (hereinafter AAA) and was not court-ordered, the 35-day timetable applied by the court pursuant to 28 NYCRR 28.12 was not applicable (see 22 NYCRR 28.2). Instead, the plaintiff had 90 days from the date the master arbitrator’s award was mailed to it to commence this action (see Insurance Law § 5106 [c]; CPLR 7511; 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [h] [2]; see also Matter of Slater v Eagle Ins. Co., 294 AD2d at 369), and the plaintiff did so. Thus, the court erred in granting the defendant’s cross motion to confirm the award of the master arbitrator on the ground that this action was not timely commenced and in denying that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (b) to dismiss the third affirmative defense, which alleged that the action was not timely commenced. As the plaintiff timely invoked its right to a de novo review by the Supreme Court, the defendant’s cross motion to confirm the award of the master arbitrator was rendered academic (see Allstate Ins. Co. v Nalbandian, 89 AD3d at 649) and the defense of untimeliness was without merit (see Matter of Slater v Eagle Ins. Co., 294 AD2d at 369; Matter of Abadinsky v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 250 AD2d 673, 673-674 [1998]; Matter of Capuano v Allstate Ins. Co., 122 AD2d at 138).

The defendant’s contention that the plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies or satisfy a condition precedent because the plaintiff defaulted before the master arbitrator is without merit. There is no dispute that the plaintiff timely demanded review by a master arbitrator within 21 calendar days of the mailing of the award by the AAA no-fault arbitrator (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [d] [2]). Further, the insurance regulations specifically provide that a master arbitration will proceed even if a party fails to appear or submit materials and that the master arbitrator must make a determination on the merits, not in favor of an appearing party solely on the default of the other party (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [d] [8]). Thus, the plaintiff’s failure to file a brief with the master arbitrator was not determinative of whether it satisfied a condition precedent or exhausted its administrative remedies (cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v Nalbandian, 89 AD3d at 649). The plaintiff exhausted its administrative remedies when it filed its demand for review by a master arbitrator, and the master arbitrator issued an award which was final and binding except, as is relevant here, when a party commences a court action to adjudicate the dispute de novo when the award is $5,000 or more (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [h] [1]).

Thus, the Supreme Court also should have granted those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (b) to dismiss the first (failure to exhaust administrative remedies), second (default in master arbitration proceeding), and fourth (failure to satisfy condition precedent) affirmative defenses, as those defenses were without merit as a matter of law (see Mazzei v Kyriacou, 98 AD3d 1088, 1089 [2012]; Greco v Christoffersen, 70 AD3d 769, 771 [2010]).

Since the Supreme Court did not consider the merits of those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (b) to dismiss the remaining affirmative defenses, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the second counterclaim and stated portions of the first counterclaim, and for summary judgment on the complaint, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a determination of those branches of the motion on the merits (see Allstate Ins. Co. v Nalbandian, 89 AD3d at 649; Hunter Sports Shooting Grounds, Inc. v Foley, 73 AD3d 702, 705 [2010]). Austin, J.P., Cohen, Miller and Duffy, JJ., concur.

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v Raia Med. Health, P.C. (2016 NY Slip Op 04916)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v Raia Med. Health, P.C. (2016 NY Slip Op 04916)

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v Raia Med. Health, P.C. (2016 NY Slip Op 04916)
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v Raia Med. Health, P.C.
2016 NY Slip Op 04916 [140 AD3d 1029]
June 22, 2016
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, August 3, 2016

[*1]

 Liberty Mutual Insurance Company et al., Respondents,
v
Raia Medical Health, P.C., et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

Jeffrey I. Baum & Associates, P.C., Garden City, NY (Maksim Leyvi of counsel), for appellants.

McDonnell & Adels, PLLC, Garden City, NY (Stuart M. Flamen and Stephanie A. Tebbett of counsel), for respondents.

In an action for declaratory relief and to recover damages for fraud and unjust enrichment, the defendants Raia Medical Health, P.C., and Joseph A. Raia appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McCormack, J.), entered July 3, 2014, as granted the plaintiffs’ motion to preliminarily enjoin the defendants Raia Medical Health, P.C., and New Imaging & Diagnostic Services, P.C., inter alia, during the pendency of this action, from, among other things, commencing against the plaintiffs any new actions, arbitrations, or proceedings seeking reimbursement for no-fault benefits, and staying all such currently pending actions, arbitrations, or proceedings, and denied their cross motion pursuant to CPLR 7503 (a) to compel arbitration and stay all further proceedings in the action.

Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order as granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for a preliminary injunction against the defendant New Imaging & Diagnostic Services, P.C., is dismissed, as the appellants are not aggrieved by that portion of the order (see CPLR 5511); and it is further,

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the plaintiffs.

The defendant Raia Medical Health, P.C. (hereinafter RMH), which was owned by the defendant Joseph A. Raia (hereinafter together the appellants), allegedly billed the plaintiffs for medical services rendered to injured parties who had assigned their no-fault insurance benefits to RMH. In November 2013, the plaintiffs commenced this action for declaratory relief and to recover damages for fraud and unjust enrichment, alleging, inter alia, that RMH was ineligible to recover no-fault benefits, since it was not wholly owned and controlled by licensed physicians and was engaged in fee splitting with unlicensed individuals. The plaintiffs moved to preliminarily enjoin, among others, RMH, its agents, servants, employees, and all persons acting on its behalf, during the [*2]pendency of this action, from, among other things, “filing, commencing and/or instituting against plaintiffs any new actions, arbitrations or other proceedings seeking reimbursement for no-fault benefits,” and “staying all currently pending actions, arbitrations or other proceedings instituted by and/or on behalf of [RMH] against plaintiffs involving reimbursement for no-fault benefits.” The appellants cross-moved pursuant to CPLR 7503 (a) to compel arbitration and to stay all further proceedings in the action. The Supreme Court granted the preliminary injunction sought by the plaintiffs and denied the appellants’ cross motion.

“To obtain a preliminary injunction, a movant must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury if a preliminary injunction is not granted, and (3) a balance of equities in his or her favor” (M.H. Mandelbaum Orthotic & Prosthetic Servs., Inc. v Werner, 126 AD3d 859, 860 [2015]; see CPLR 6301; Doe v Axelrod, 73 NY2d 748, 750 [1988]; Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. v Marchese, 96 AD3d 791, 791-792 [2012]). “The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court” (Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. v Marchese, 96 AD3d at 792; see Nobu Next Door, LLC v Fine Arts Hous., Inc., 4 NY3d 839, 840 [2005]).

Here, the plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits on their declaratory judgment causes of action. “Insurance Law § 5102 et seq. requires no-fault carriers to reimburse patients (or, as in this case, their medical provider assignees) for ‘basic economic loss’ ” (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela, 4 NY3d 313, 320 [2005]). However, “[a] provider of health care services is not eligible for reimbursement under section 5102 (a) (1) of the Insurance Law if the provider fails to meet any applicable New York State or local licensing requirement necessary to perform such service in New York” (11 NYCRR 65-3.16 [a] [12]). “State law mandates that professional service corporations be owned and controlled only by licensed professionals” (One Beacon Ins. Group, LLC v Midland Med. Care, P.C., 54 AD3d 738, 740 [2008]), and provides that a professional service corporation may issue shares only to individuals, inter alia, “who are or have been engaged in the practice of such profession in such corporation or a predecessor entity” (Business Corporation Law § 1507 [a]). In this case, the plaintiffs established that RMH provided only radiological services consisting of X rays, and MRI and CT scans, and produced an affidavit from Raia, in which he admitted that he had “no training or experience in the field of radiology, including the performance and/or interpretation of MRI studies and/or x-rays.” Raia also averred that he did not consider himself “competent [in] either (i) interpreting MRI studies and/or x-ray studies that are performed on patients; or (ii) supervising the interpretations of MRI studies and/or x-ray studies.” The plaintiffs also submitted an affidavit from an investigator for the plaintiff Liberty Mutual Insurance Company within its Special Investigations Unit, who concluded that RMH was merely a “reincarnation” of Socrates Medical Health, P.C. (hereinafter Socrates), a predecessor professional corporation purportedly owned by Raia which was actually controlled by a nonphysician. The investigator indicated, among other things, that Socrates’s medical director, who was also RMH’s initial medical director, had previously faced “charges by the Attorney General of New Jersey that included being employed by unlicensed MRI facilities and negligently misreading MRI studies,” and had “agreed to pay $60,000.00 and be subject to monitoring for two years.” Thus, the plaintiffs’ submissions demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.

Further, under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiffs demonstrated the likelihood of irreparable injury absent the granting of the preliminary injunction, based on the multiplicity of actions and arbitrations, and the risk of inconsistent results (see Ansonia Assoc. v Ansonia Residents’ Assn., 78 AD2d 211, 219 [1980]; 21st Century Advantage Ins. Co. v Cabral, 35 Misc 3d 1240[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 51086[U] [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2012]; St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co. v Nandi, 15 Misc 3d 1145[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51154[U] [Sup Ct, Queens County 2007]; Allstate Ins. Co. v Elzanaty, 929 F Supp 2d 199, 221-222 [ED NY 2013]; cf. Matter of Countrywide Ins. Co. v DHD Med., P.C., 86 AD3d 431, 431 [2011]). The plaintiffs submitted evidence of well over 100 pending actions and open arbitrations commenced against them by RMH. Lastly, the plaintiffs established that the balance of the equities was in their favor.

The appellants’ remaining contentions are without merit.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion [*3]which was for a preliminary injunction against RMH and denied the appellants’ cross motion pursuant to CPLR 7503 (a) to compel arbitration and stay all further proceedings in the action. Rivera, J.P., Roman, Maltese and Duffy, JJ., concur.

Mapfre Ins. Co. of N.Y. v Manoo (2016 NY Slip Op 04446)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Mapfre Ins. Co. of N.Y. v Manoo (2016 NY Slip Op 04446)

Mapfre Ins. Co. of N.Y. v Manoo (2016 NY Slip Op 04446)
Mapfre Ins. Co. of N.Y. v Manoo
2016 NY Slip Op 04446 [140 AD3d 468]
June 9, 2016
Appellate Division, First Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, August 3, 2016

[*1]

 Mapfre Insurance Company of New York, Appellant,
v
Balgobin Manoo et al., Defendants, and Active Care Medical Supply Corporation, Respondent.

Bruno, Gerbino & Soriano, LLP, Melville (Mitchell L. Kaufman of counsel), for appellant.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC, Brooklyn (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Manuel J. Mendez, J.), entered on or about November 13, 2014, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted the motion of defendant Active Care Medical Supply Corporation (Active Care) to reargue and, upon reargument, denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, reversed on the law, without costs, plaintiff’s motion granted, and it is declared that plaintiff is not obligated to pay Active Care for the claim at issue.

On November 14, 2011, plaintiff’s insured, defendant Balgobin Manoo, was involved in an automobile accident. On or about January 10, 2012, he received treatment from Active Care, at which time he executed an assignment of benefits. Prior thereto, plaintiff had referred Manoo’s claim for no-fault benefits for investigation due to inconsistencies in his statements as to treatment.

The policy’s New York State Mandatory Personal Injury Protection Endorsement required, as a condition precedent, full compliance with the conditions of coverage, which included the insured’s appearance at an examination under oath (EUO), “as may reasonably be required” (see 11 NYCRR 65-1.1). By letter dated February 3, 2012, plaintiff requested an EUO to confirm the facts and circumstances of Manoo’s loss and the treatment he received. The letter, which scheduled the EUO for February 16, was received by Manoo on February 9. Meanwhile, Active Care drafted an NF-3 claim form dated February 7, 2012.

Manoo did not appear on February 16, 2012 for his EUO. By letter dated February 23, 2012, the EUO was rescheduled for March 9, 2012. When Manoo again failed to appear, by letter dated March 16, 2012, the EUO was rescheduled for a third and final date of March 30, 2012. Manoo failed to appear, and plaintiff commenced this action seeking a declaratory judgment that defendants are ineligible to receive no-fault reimbursements due to Manoo’s failure to comply with a condition precedent to coverage under his insurance policy and the no-fault regulations by failing to appear for an EUO.

Supreme Court initially granted plaintiff summary judgment declaring that it was not obligated to provide no-fault coverage to Active Care. However, upon granting reargument, the court denied summary judgment and restored the action. In so ruling, the court held that plaintiff did not establish that its initial February 3, 2012 request for an EUO was made within the time frame set forth in the no-fault implementing regulations, because it submitted no proof as to when it received Active Care’s NF-3 form (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [b] [“Subsequent to the receipt of one or more of the completed verification forms, any additional verification required by the insurer to establish proof of claim shall be requested within 15 business days of receipt of the [*2]prescribed verification forms”]). We now reverse.

Plaintiff made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing Active Care’s claim for first-party no-fault benefits by establishing that it timely and properly mailed the notices for EUOs to Manoo and that Manoo failed to appear at his initial and follow-up EUOs. The record establishes that plaintiff requested Manoo’s initial EUO by letter dated February 3, 2012. Although Active Care’s NF-3 form is dated February 7, 2012, plaintiff was entitled to request the EUO prior to its receipt thereof (see 11 NYCRR 65-1.1; Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 18, 20-21 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004], affd 35 AD3d 720 [2d Dept 2006]; Life Tree Acupuncture P.C. v Republic W. Ins. Co., 50 Misc 3d 132[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50023[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2016]; Alfa Med. Supplies, Inc. v Praetorian Ins. Co., 50 Misc 3d 126[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51847[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2015]). The notification requirements for verification requests under 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 and 65-3.6 do not apply to EUOs that are scheduled prior to the insurance company’s receipt of a claim form (see Fogel, 7 Misc 3d at 21; New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v Bronx Chiropractic Servs, P.C., 2014 NY Slip Op 33210[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2014]).

Once Active Care presented its claim dated February 7, 2012, plaintiff was required to comply with the follow-up provisions of 11 NYCRR 65-3.6 (b) (see Inwood Hill Med., P.C. v General Assur. Co., 10 Misc 3d 18, 19-20 [App Term, 1st Dept 2005]). Plaintiff established that it fulfilled its obligation under section 65-3.6 (b) by rescheduling Manoo’s EUOs within 10 days of his failure to appear at each scheduled exam (see Arco Med. NY, P.C. v Lancer Ins. Co., 37 Misc 3d 136[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 52178[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]). The second EUO scheduling letter was sent on February 23, 2012, which was just seven days after the February 16, 2012 nonappearance. The third EUO scheduling letter was sent on March 16, 2012, which was just seven days after the March 9, 2012 nonappearance.

In opposition, Active Care did not raise a triable issue with respect to Manoo’s nonappearance or the mailing or reasonableness of the underlying notices (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011]; Easy Care Acupuncture P.C. v Praetorian Ins. Co., 49 Misc 3d 137[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51524[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2015]).

The failure of a person eligible for no-fault benefits to appear for a properly noticed EUO constitutes a breach of a condition precedent vitiating coverage (see Hertz Corp. v Active Care Med. Supply Corp., 124 AD3d 411 [1st Dept 2015]; Allstate Ins. Co. v Pierre, 123 AD3d 618 [1st Dept 2014]). “There is no requirement to demonstrate that the claims were timely disclaimed since the failure to attend medical exams was an absolute coverage defense” (American Tr. Ins. Co. v Lucas, 111 AD3d 423, 424-425 [1st Dept 2013], citing New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 17 NY3d 586, 593 [2011]).

The dissent believes that Fogel should not be followed because it is inconsistent with settled principles in this Department. Yet the dissent cites no precedent holding that an insurer cannot request an EUO prior to its receipt of a claim form pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-1.1 and the terms of the policy’s Mandatory Personal Injury Protection Endorsement. As the Second Department explained in Fogel (35 AD3d 720), “The appearance of the insured for IMEs at any time is a condition precedent to the insurer’s liability on the policy (see 11 NYCRR 65-1.1). This conclusion accords with the language of the mandatory endorsement and the interpretation given it by the State Insurance Department, which promulgated the regulations (see 2005 Ops Ins Dept No. 05-02-21 [www.ins.state.ny.us/ogco2005/rg050221.htm; http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/webdocs/no-fault_benefits_cutoff_ date.htm]; 2003 Ops Ins Dept No. 03-02-12 [www.ins.state.ny.us/ogco2003/rg030212.htm; http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/webdocs/failure_to_attend_no_fault_ ime.htm]; 2002 Ops Ins Dept No. 02-04-19 [www.ins.state.ny.us/ogco2002/rg 204121.htm; http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/webdocs/no_faultinsurer_ medicalexaminations.htm])” (id. at 722).

In sum, plaintiff established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment through evidence that (i) it mailed Manoo the original EUO request in accordance with the policy’s New [*3]York State Mandatory Personal Injury Protection Endorsement, before Active Care prepared its verification; (ii) after Manoo failed to appear at that EUO, and Active Care submitted its verification, plaintiff twice rescheduled the EUO in conformity with the requirements of 11 NYCRR 65-3.6 (b); and (iii) Manoo never appeared for an EUO, a condition precedent to coverage. In opposition, Active Care did not disprove any of these facts. On this record, plaintiff’s failure to tender proof as to the exact date it received Active Care’s verification is immaterial, and the dissent’s position would unduly reward an insured who repeatedly failed to honor his obligation to appear for an EUO under the policy and the Insurance Department regulations. Concur—Tom, J.P., Friedman, Sweeny and Andrias, JJ.

Acosta, J., dissents in a memorandum as follows: I dissent because I believe that plaintiff failed to establish prima facie that it was entitled to a judgment declaring that it had no duty to cover defendant Active Care Medical Supply Corporation’s bills for no-fault medical services rendered to Active Care’s assignor, defendant Manoo, due to Manoo’s failure to appear at examinations under oath (EUOs) (see National Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v Tam Med. Supply Corp., 131 AD3d 851 [1st Dept 2015]; Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559, 560 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011]).

Although Manoo’s failure to appear for a properly noticed EUO constitutes a breach of a condition precedent vitiating coverage (see Hertz Corp. v Active Care Med. Supply Corp., 124 AD3d 411 [1st Dept 2015]; Allstate Ins. Co. v Pierre, 123 AD3d 618 [1st Dept 2014]), plaintiff failed to tender proof that it received Active Care’s verification. Thus, plaintiff did not demonstrate that it requested Manoo’s EUO subsequent to such receipt within the time prescribed in the Insurance Department Regulations (11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [b] [“(s)ubsequent to the receipt of one or more of the completed verification forms, any additional verification required by the insurer to establish proof of claim shall be requested within 15 business days of receipt of the prescribed verification forms” (emphasis added)]). Plaintiff’s argument that it submitted evidence showing that its request for Manoo’s EUO was made prior to the date of Active Care’s claim is unavailing in the absence of proof of when the claim was received (see id.). Indeed, plaintiff’s motion never disclosed when it received any claim forms whatsoever from either Manoo (Form NF-2) or any medical provider who rendered services to him (Form NF-3). Plaintiff would have this Court ignore 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 (b), notwithstanding the long-established rule that “[t]he No-Fault Law is in derogation of the common law and so must be strictly construed” (Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Atlanta Cas. Co., 210 AD2d 210, 211 [2d Dept 1994]; see also Matter of Bayswater Health Related Facility v Karagheuzoff, 37 NY2d 408, 414 [1975]; Pekelnaya v Allyn, 25 AD3d 111, 118 [1st Dept 2005]). To the extent Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (7 Misc 3d 18, 21 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004], affd 35 AD3d 720 [2d Dept 2006]) holds otherwise, I would not follow it, because it is inconsistent with settled principles in this Department. Plaintiff having failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, it is irrelevant that, as the majority notes, plaintiff rescheduled Manoo’s EUO within 10 days of Manoo’s failing to appear.

Matter of Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v Garcia (2016 NY Slip Op 04421)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v Garcia (2016 NY Slip Op 04421)

Matter of Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v Garcia (2016 NY Slip Op 04421)
Matter of Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v Garcia
2016 NY Slip Op 04421 [140 AD3d 886]
June 8, 2016
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, August 3, 2016

[*1]

 In the Matter of Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, Respondent,
v
Francisco Garcia et al., Appellants.

Cannon & Acosta, LLP, Huntington Station, NY (June Redecker of counsel), for appellants.

Adams, Hanson, Rego & Kaplan, Yonkers, NY (Michael A. Zarkower of counsel), for respondent.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to permanently stay arbitration of an uninsured motorist claim, Francisco Garcia and Jaime Torres appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Santorelli, J.), dated May 28, 2015, which, upon finding that the proceeding had been timely commenced, granted the petition to permanently stay arbitration.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed as time-barred.

“ ’CPLR 7503 (c) requires that an application to stay arbitration be made within 20 days after service of a notice of intention to arbitrate’ ” (Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Urban, 78 AD3d 1064, 1065 [2010], quoting Matter of Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v Zacharoudis, 65 AD3d 1353, 1353-1354 [2009]; see Matter of Nationwide Ins. Co. v Singh, 6 AD3d 441, 443 [2004]). Unless a party makes an application for a stay of arbitration within the 20-day period, CPLR 7503 (c) precludes it from seeking a judicial determination on its objections to arbitration (see Matter of State Farm Ins. Co. v Williams, 50 AD3d 807, 808 [2008]; Matter of Standard Fire Ins. Co. v Mouchette, 47 AD3d 636 [2008]). “As an exception to this rule, however, a motion to stay arbitration may be entertained when its basis is that the parties never agreed to arbitrate” (Matter of CNA Ins. Co. v Carsley, 243 AD2d 474, 475 [1997] [internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipsis and citations omitted]; see Matter of Matarasso [Continental Cas. Co.], 56 NY2d 264, 266 [1982]; Matter of Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v Louis, 122 AD3d 637, 638 [2014]; Matter of AIU Ins. Co. v Orellana, 18 AD3d 652 [2005]). Here, Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (hereinafter Progressive) commenced this proceeding to permanently stay arbitration more than 20 days after service upon it by the appellants, Francisco Garcia and Jaime Torres, of their notices of intention to arbitrate.

Contrary to the determination of the Supreme Court, Progressive’s contention that arbitration should be stayed on the ground that the appellants’ accident did not involve an adverse “motor vehicle,” but rather an all-terrain vehicle (see Matter of Progressive Northeastern Ins. Co. v Scalamandre, 51 AD3d 932, 933 [2008]), does not relate to whether the parties had an agreement to arbitrate. Rather, that issue relates to whether certain conditions of the insurance contract were [*2]complied with so as to entitle the appellants to uninsured motorist benefits, and therefore, had to be asserted within the 20-day time limit set forth in CPLR 7503 (c) (see Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Urban, 78 AD3d at 1066; Matter of AIU Ins. Co. v Orellana, 18 AD3d 652 [2005]).

Moreover, Progressive failed to establish that the appellants’ notices of intention to arbitrate were deceptive and intended to prevent it from timely commencing the proceeding (see Matter of Standard Fire Ins. Co. v Mouchette, 47 AD3d 636 [2008]; Matter of Nationwide Ins. Co. v Singh, 6 AD3d at 444). The appellants’ notices of intention to arbitrate complied with the requirements of CPLR 7503 (c), and the petitioner failed to proffer an affidavit by someone with personal knowledge to support its contention that the appellants’ service of the notices of intention to arbitrate upon a certain post office box address used by Progressive to process no-fault claims prevented it from timely contesting the issue of arbitrability (see Matter of Standard Fire Ins. Co. v Mouchette, 47 AD3d at 636; Matter of Nationwide Ins. Co. v Singh, 6 AD3d at 444). Indeed, Progressive submitted a copy of a letter from its own claims representative to the appellants’ counsel acknowledging receipt of the appellants’ notices well within the 20-day period.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding as time-barred.

In light of our determination, we need not reach the parties’ remaining contentions. Rivera, J.P., Dickerson, Maltese and Barros, JJ., concur.

Matter of Global Liberty Ins. Co. v Professional Chiropractic Care, P.C. (2016 NY Slip Op 04156)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of Global Liberty Ins. Co. v Professional Chiropractic Care, P.C. (2016 NY Slip Op 04156)

Matter of Global Liberty Ins. Co. v Professional Chiropractic Care, P.C. (2016 NY Slip Op 04156)
Matter of Global Liberty Ins. Co. v Professional Chiropractic Care, P.C.
2016 NY Slip Op 04156 [139 AD3d 645]
May 31, 2016
Appellate Division, First Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, June 29, 2016

[*1]

 In the Matter of Global Liberty Insurance Co., Appellant,
v
Professional Chiropractic Care, P.C., Respondent.

The Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C., Garden City (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel), for appellant.

The Law Office of Sukhibir Singh, Richmond Hill (Ralph C. Caio of counsel), for respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Kenneth L. Thompson, Jr., J.), entered July 10, 2015, which denied the petition to vacate a master arbitrator’s award, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the petition granted, and the award vacated. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

The master arbitrator’s award was arbitrary because it irrationally ignored the law, which petitioner insurer had presented to the master arbitrator, that the no-fault policy issued by petitioner was void ab initio due to respondent’s assignor’s failure to attend duly scheduled independent medical exams (see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Lucas, 111 AD3d 423, 424 [1st Dept 2013]). The alleged error in petitioner’s denial of claim form is of “no moment” (Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559, 560 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011]), and was not a sufficient or rational basis for the award (see Auto One Ins. Co. v Hillside Chiropractic, P.C., 126 AD3d 423, 424 [1st Dept 2015], citing Matter of Petrofsky [Allstate Ins. Co.], 54 NY2d 207, 211 [1981]).

Respondent waived its objections regarding improper service of the petition, since it never moved to dismiss the petition on those grounds (see CPLR 3211 [e]; B.N. Realty Assoc. v Lichtenstein, 21 AD3d 793, 796 [1st Dept 2005]; Matter of Resnick v Town of Canaan, 38 AD3d 949, 951 [3d Dept 2007]). Concur—Friedman, J.P., Renwick, Moskowitz, Richter and Kapnick, JJ. [Prior Case History: 48 Misc 3d 1202(A), 2015 NY Slip Op 50936(U).]

Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp. (2016 NY Slip Op 03879)

Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp. (2016 NY Slip Op 03879)

Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp. (2016 NY Slip Op 03879)
Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp.
2016 NY Slip Op 03879 [139 AD3d 947]
May 18, 2016
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, June 29, 2016

[*1]

 In the Matter of GEICO Insurance Company, Respondent,
v
AAAMG Leasing Corp., as Assignee of Dawn Channer, Appellant.

[Recalled and vacated, see 148 AD3d 703.]

Israel Israel & Purdy, LLP, Great Neck, NY (Justin Skaferowsky of counsel), for appellant.

Printz & Goldstein, Woodbury, NY (Lawrence J. Chanice of counsel), for respondent.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated August 4, 2014, AAAMG Leasing Corp., as assignee of Dawn Channer, appeals from so much of an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Feinman, J.), entered March 3, 2015, as denied that branch of its cross petition which was for an award of an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to Insurance Department Regulations (11 NYCRR) § 65-4.10 (j) (4).

Ordered that the order and judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, with costs, and that branch of the cross petition of AAAMG Leasing Corp., as assignee of Dawn Channer, which was for an award of an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to Insurance Department Regulations (11 NYCRR) § 65-4.10 (j) (4) is granted to the extent of awarding an additional attorney’s fee in the sum of $650, and is otherwise denied.

AAAMG Leasing Corp., as assignee of Dawn Channer (hereinafter the appellant), is a medical provider which made a claim for no-fault benefits from the petitioner insurance carrier. The petitioner denied the claim, stating that the supplies provided were not medically necessary.

The appellant sought arbitration of the claim, and in an award dated April 28, 2014, the arbitrator awarded the appellant the sum of $3,870.45, plus interest, and an attorney’s fee in the sum of $850.

The petitioner sought review of the arbitrator’s award by a master arbitrator. In a determination dated August 4, 2014, the master arbitrator affirmed the original arbitration award, and awarded an additional attorney’s fee in the sum of $650 pursuant to Insurance Department Regulations (11 NYCRR) § 65-4.10 (j) (2) (i), which the master arbitrator stated was the maximum allowable fee.

The petitioner then commenced the instant proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate the master arbitration award dated August 4, 2014. The appellant cross-petitioned to [*2]confirm the arbitration award, and sought an additional attorney’s fee pursuant to Insurance Department Regulations (11 NYCRR) § 65-4.10 (j) (4). The petitioner opposed that demand for relief. In the alternative, the petitioner stated that the appellant’s fee should be limited to $650.

In the order and judgment appealed from, the Supreme Court confirmed the arbitration award. That branch of the cross petition which was for an award of an additional attorney’s fee was denied without comment. The appeal is limited to so much of the order and judgment as denied that branch of the cross petition which was for an award of an additional attorney’s fee.

The general rule is that in proceedings involving arbitration, as in other litigation, an attorney’s fee is not recoverable unless provided for by agreement or statute (see Myron Assoc. v Obstfeld, 224 AD2d 504 [1996]). Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (a), if a valid claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, “the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to [the] limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations.” In a proceeding for judicial review of an award by a master arbitrator, an attorney’s fee shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-4.10 [j] [4]; Matter of Hempstead Gen. Hosp. v National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 179 AD2d 645 [1992]).

The limitations of an attorney’s fee recoverable in an appeal from a master arbitration award are set forth in Insurance Department Regulations (11 NYCRR) § 65-4.10 (j). Insurance Department Regulations (11 NYCRR) § 65-4.10 (j) (5) states: “No attorney shall demand, request or receive from the insurer any payment or fee in excess of the fees permitted by this subdivision for services rendered with respect to a no-fault master arbitration dispute.”

The maximum attorney’s fee for a master arbitration dispute is $65 per hour, up to a maximum fee of $650, plus an additional fee of $80 per hour for oral argument, if oral argument is requested (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-4.10 [j] [2] [i], [ii]). Additional fees may be awarded “if the master arbitrator determines that the issues in dispute were of such a novel or unique nature as to require extraordinary skills or services” (Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-4.10 [j] [3]).

In this case, the appellant did not ask for an attorney’s fee for oral argument, and there was no finding that the issues involved were novel or unique. Accordingly, the appellant was entitled to an award of an additional attorney’s fee in the sum of $650. Leventhal, J.P., Hall, Hinds-Radix and LaSalle, JJ., concur.