—[*1] Bruno Gerbino & Soriano, LLP, Melville, N.Y. (Mitchell L. Kaufman of counsel), for appellant.

Moshe D. Fuld, P.C., Brooklyn, N.Y. (David Karp of counsel), for respondents.

In an action for a judgment declaring that the plaintiff is not obligated to pay certain no-fault insurance benefits, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Molia, J.), dated September 28, 2012, as, upon renewal of that branch of its prior motion which was for summary judgment, in effect, declaring that it is not obligated to pay the subject no-fault insurance benefits to the defendants Stracar Medical Services, P.C., Sweetwater Chiropractic, P.C., and Urban Well Acupuncture, P.C., adjourned the matter and directed that those defendants appear and testify at an examination under oath, at a date, time, and place mutually agreed upon by the parties.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, upon renewal, the determination in an order of the same court dated December 8, 2010, denying that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for summary judgment, in effect, declaring that it is not obligated to pay the subject no-fault claims to the defendants Stracar Medical Services, P.C., Sweetwater Chiropractic, P.C., and Urban Well Acupuncture, P.C., is vacated, that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for summary judgment is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that the plaintiff is not obligated to pay the subject no-fault claims to the defendants Stracar Medical Services, P.C., Sweetwater Chiropractic, P.C., and Urban Well Acupuncture, P.C.; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the plaintiff.

The instant action arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on January 18, 2009, involving a vehicle insured by the plaintiff. The vehicle’s owner and driver, as well as the three passengers allegedly in the vehicle at the time of the accident, assigned their no-fault insurance benefits to certain medical providers, who are the defendants in this action. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, in effect, declaring that it is not obligated to pay these no-fault benefits to the defendants Stracar Medical Services, P.C., Sweetwater Chiropractic, P.C., and Urban Well Acupuncture, P.C. (hereinafter collectively the assignees). The plaintiff argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because the assignees failed to appear at an examination under oath, as required by the subject insurance policies and, thus, they breached a condition precedent to coverage [*2]under the policies and were not entitled to recover their patients’ no-fault benefits. In an order dated December 8, 2010, the Supreme Court denied that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for summary judgment, in effect, declaring that it is not obligated to pay no-fault benefits to the assignees.

The plaintiff moved for leave to renew the subject branch of its motion. In an order dated September 28, 2012, the Supreme Court granted renewal, but thereupon adjourned the matter and directed the assignees to appear and testify at an examination under oath. The Supreme Court determined that the assignees “shall be given a final opportunity to appear for the [examination under oath] sought by plaintiff.” The plaintiff appeals.

Upon renewal, the Supreme Court erred in adjourning the matter and giving the assignees another chance to appear at an examination under oath. “It is well established that the failure to comply with the standard policy provision requiring disclosure by way of submission to an examination under oath, as often as may be reasonably required, as a condition precedent to performance of the promise to indemnify, constitutes a material breach” of the policy, precluding recovery of the policy proceeds (Bulzomi v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 92 AD2d 878, 878 [1983] see Interboro Ins. Co. v Clennon, 113 AD3d 596 [2014] Argento v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 184 AD2d 487, 487-488 [1992]). In support of that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment, the plaintiff, upon renewal, submitted evidence establishing “that it twice duly demanded an examination under oath” from the assignees, that the assignees twice failed to appear, and that the plaintiff “issued a timely denial of the claims” arising from the assignees’ provision of medical services to the assignors (Interboro Ins. Co. v Clennon, 113 AD3d at 597). Based upon the foregoing, the plaintiff established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see id.; Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720, 721 [2006]).

In opposition to the plaintiff’s prima facie showing, the assignees failed to submit evidence of a reasonable excuse for their noncompliance with the demands for examinations under oath, or of partial performance on their part (see Lentini Bros. Moving & Stor. Co. v New York Prop. Ins. Underwriting Assn., 53 NY2d 835, 836 [1981] Bulzomi v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 92 AD2d at 878-879). The assignees also failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to the reasonableness or propriety of the demands for the examinations under oath (see Interboro Ins. Co. v Clennon, 113 AD3d at 597). Moreover, “the [assignees’] breach of the policy was not cured by [their] belated expression of a willingness to cooperate which was made more than two years after the loss and only in response to the insurer’s motion for summary judgment” (Johnson v Allstate Ins. Co., 197 AD2d 672, 672 [1993] see Lentini Bros. Moving & Stor. Co. v New York Prop. Ins. Underwriting Assn., 53 NY2d at 836; Azeem v Colonial Assur. Co., 96 AD2d 123, 125 [1983], affd 62 NY2d 951 [1984]). “[A]n insurance company is entitled to obtain information promptly while the information is still fresh to enable it to decide upon its obligations and protect against false claims. To permit [the defendants] to give the information more than [two] years after the [loss] would have been a material dilution of the insurance company’s rights” (Argento v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 184 AD2d at 488).

In view of the assignees’ unexcused and willful failure to comply with the demands for examinations under oath, and the lack of evidence of partial performance, the Supreme Court, upon renewal, should have unconditionally awarded summary judgment to the plaintiff (see Lentini Bros. Moving & Stor. Co. v New York Prop. Ins. Underwriting Assn., 53 NY2d at 837; Matter of New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v Rafailov, 41 AD3d 603, 604-605 [2007] Bulzomi v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 92 AD2d at 878-879; Argento v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 184 AD2d at 488; cf. V.M.V. Mgt. Co., Inc. v Peerless Ins., 15 AD3d 647 [2005] Avarello v State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 208 AD2d 483 [1994]).

In light of our determination, we need not reach the plaintiff’s remaining contention.

Since this is a declaratory judgment action, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for the entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that the plaintiff is not obligated to pay the subject no-fault benefits to the assignees (see Lanza v Wagner, 11 NY2d 317, 334 [1962], appeal dismissed 371 US 74 [1962], cert denied 371 US 901 [1962]). Dillon, J.P., Hall, Austin and Duffy, JJ., concur.

—[*1] Shayne, Dachs, Sauer & Dachs, LLP, Mineola (Jonathan A. Dachs of counsel), for appellant.

Crisci, Weiser & McCarthy, New York (Jayashri C. Srinivasan Cuffey of counsel), for respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Mary Ann Brigantti-Hughes, J.), entered on or about January 7, 2013, which granted defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint, and denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

11 NYCRR 65-3.11 (a) provides, in relevant part, for the payment of no-fault benefits “directly to the applicant . . . or, upon assignment by the applicant . . . to [the] providers of health care services.” Plaintiff Aetna Health Plans is not a “health care provider” under the statute, but rather a health care insurer (see A.M. Med. Servs., P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 101 AD3d 53, 62 [2d Dept 2012] Craig Antell, D.O., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 11 Misc 3d 137[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 50521[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2006]).

While the No-Fault Law provides a limited window of arbitration between no-fault insurers (see Insurance Law §§ 5105, 5106 [d] Eagle Ins. Co. v ELRAC, Inc., 291 AD2d 272 [1st Dept 2002]), the statutory language does not pertain to a health insurer such as Aetna. Thus, Aetna cannot maintain a claim against defendant under the principle of subrogation (see Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y. v Allstate Ins. Co., 2007 NY Slip Op 33925[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2007]). Nor may Aetna assert a breach of contract claim against Hanover, [*2]since it is not in privity of contract with Hanover, and there has been no showing that it was an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract. Concur—Tom, J.P., Acosta, Freedman and Kapnick, JJ. [Prior Case History: 2013 NY Slip Op 33221(U).]

—[*1] Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y., for appellant.

Gullo & Associates, LLC, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Cristina Carollo of counsel), for respondent.

In an action to recover no-fault benefits under a policy of automobile insurance, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Brown, J.), dated July 10, 2012, as denied its motion for summary judgment on the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Generally, a party opposing a motion for summary judgment need only “raise a triable issue of fact with respect to the . . . theory . . . that is the subject of the moving party’s prima facie showing” (Stukas v Streiter, 83 AD3d 18, 24 [2011]). Here, in light of the limited basis of the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the complaint, which was premised solely on the defendant’s alleged failure to timely pay or deny the no-fault claim within 30 days of receipt of proof of the claim (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a] [1]; [c]), “the defendant’s only burden in opposition . . . was to raise a triable issue of fact regarding its timely . . . denial of the [plaintiff’s] claim” (Lenox Hill Hosp. v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 89 AD3d 905, 905 [2011]; see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C., v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33 [2013]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 89 AD3d 1081, 1082-1083 [2011]). In opposition to the plaintiff’s prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the defendant satisfied its burden by raising a triable issue of fact as to whether it did in fact mail a proper NF-10 denial of claim form to the plaintiff only 22 days after its receipt of the claim verification that it had previously requested (see Wyckoff Hgts. Med. Ctr. v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 855 [2014]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lancer Ins. Co., 94 AD3d 984 [2012]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co., 57 AD3d 659 [2008]).

We do not reach the parties’ remaining contentions regarding the merits of the defendant’s cross motion, since the defendant has not appealed from so much of the order as denied its cross motion. Mastro, J.P., Hall, Lott and Sgroi, JJ., concur.

—[*1] Spina, Korshin & Welden, Woodbury, N.Y. (Jeanne M. Ortega of counsel), for appellant.

Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y., for respondents.

In an action to recover no-fault benefits under a policy of automobile insurance, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Brown, J.), entered December 20, 2011, which granted the motion of the plaintiff Wyckoff Heights Medical Center, as assignee of Aida Ruiz, for summary judgment on the first cause of action.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the plaintiff Wyckoff Heights Medical Center, as assignee of Aida Ruiz, for summary judgment on its first cause of action is denied.

The plaintiff Wyckoff Heights Medical Center, as assignee of Aida Ruiz (hereinafter the plaintiff), made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on to the first cause of action by submitting evidence that the prescribed statutory billing forms were mailed to and received by the defendant, which failed to either pay or deny the claim within the requisite 30-day period (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [c]; Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 278 [1997]; Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33 [2013]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Hereford Ins. Co., 95 AD3d 1306, 1306-1307 [2012]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lancer Ins. Co., 94 AD3d 984 [2012]; NYU-Hosp. for Joint Diseases v American Intl. Group, Inc., 89 AD3d 702, 703 [2011]; Mount Sinai Hosp. v Country Wide Ins. Co., 85 AD3d 1136, 1137 [2011]).

However, in opposition, the defendant raised a triable issue of fact as to whether it timely and properly denied the subject claim (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). The defendant submitted evidence showing that it mailed to the plaintiff a denial of claim form NF-10 within the requisite 30-day period (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [c]). Although the denial of claim form incorrectly stated the amount of the claim and the amount in dispute, under the circumstances of this case, these minor errors did not render the denial fatally defective and a nullity (see NYU-Hospital for Joint Diseases v Esurance Ins. Co., 84 AD3d 1190, 1191-1192 [2011]; St. Barnabas Hosp. v Penrac, Inc., 79 AD3d 733, 734 [2010]).

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the fact that the defendant attached to its denial [*2]of claim form an unaffirmed and unsworn peer review report, which contained a stamped facsimile of the physician’s signature and did not comply with CPLR 2106, did not render the denial of claim ineffective, since the defendant was not obligated to submit the peer review report in the first instance (see CPLR 2106; cf. Vista Surgical Supplies, Inc. v Travelers Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 778 [2008]). The relevant no-fault regulations do not require that a denial of claim form be supported by a peer review report or other medical evidence at the time that the denial of claim form is issued (cf. 11 NYCRR 65-3.8). Indeed, this Court has previously held that a defendant is not required to set forth a medical rationale in its denial of claim form (see New York Univ. Hosp. Rusk Inst. v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 39 AD3d 832, 832-833 [2007]; A.B. Med. Servs., PLLC v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 39 AD3d 779, 780 [2007]; A.B. Med. Servs., PLLC v GEICO Cas. Ins. Co., 39 AD3d 778, 779 [2007]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the first cause of action. Rivera, J.P., Chambers, Hall and Miller, JJ., concur.

—[*1] Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y., for appellant.

McDonnell & Adels, PLLC, Garden City, N.Y. (Jannine A. Gordineer of counsel), for respondent.

In an action to recover no-fault benefits under a policy of automobile insurance, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Mahon, J.) dated September 6, 2012, which denied its motion for summary judgment on the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the complaint is granted.

The plaintiff made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by “demonstrating that the necessary billing documents were mailed to, and received by, [the defendant insurer] and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue” (Sound Shore Med. Ctr. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 AD3d 157, 164-165 [2013]; see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a] [1]; [c]; Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33 [2d Dept 2013]), since “the prescribed statutory billing form had been mailed to and received by the defendant insurer, which failed either to pay or deny the claim within the requisite 30-day period” (Westchester Med. Ctr. v Hereford Ins. Co., 95 AD3d 1306, 1306 [2012]; see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33 [2013]). Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the papers submitted in support of the plaintiff’s motion were in sufficient evidentiary form to warrant the granting of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33 [2013]).

In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The defendant acknowledged that it received the billing form on November 4, 2011. Neither the letter that the defendant describes as a request for a verification, dated December 6, 2011, nor its later denial of claim form dated December 20, 2011, was sent within the 30-day post-receipt-of-claim period (see id.; Sound Shore Med. Ctr. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 AD3d at 164; see also 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [b]; Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp., 8 NY3d 294, 300-301 [2007]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the complaint. Mastro, J.P., Dickerson, Chambers and Roman, JJ., concur.

—[*1] McDonnell & Adels, PLLC, Garden City, N.Y. (Jannine A. Gordineer of counsel), for appellant.

Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y., for respondents.

In an action to recover no-fault benefits under three separate policies of automobile insurance, the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Brandveen, J.), entered December 1, 2011, which, upon an order of the same court dated October 21, 2011, granting that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the second cause of action, is in favor of the plaintiff Richmond University Medical Center, as assignee of Arnold Sealey, and against it in the total sum of $6,698.56.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

By failing to timely contest, at the claims stage, the adequacy of the claim forms used by the plaintiff Richmond University Medical Center, as assignee of Arnold Sealey, to establish proof of claim, the defendant waived its right to rely on any deficiencies in those forms at the litigation stage (see Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d 312, 318 [2007]; Fair Price Med. Supply Corp. v Travelers Indem. Co., 10 NY3d 556, 563 [2008]; Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33 [2nd Dept 2013]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 40 AD3d 984, 984 [2007]). Accordingly, by submitting evidence in admissible form that the prescribed statutory billing form had been mailed to and received by the defendant insurer, which failed to either pay or deny the claim within the requisite 30-day period, the plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the second cause of action (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33 [2013]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Hereford Ins. Co., 95 AD3d 1306, 1306-1307 [2012]).

We note that the defendant does not contend on appeal that it raised a triable issue of fact in opposition to the plaintiffs’ prima facie showing, but only that the plaintiffs failed to meet their prima facie burden. Therefore, we do not address the issue of whether the defendant raised a triable issue of fact in opposition.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment appealed from. Dillon, J.P., Balkin and Chambers, JJ., concur.

Miller, J., concurs in the result on constraint of this Court’s opinion and order in Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (114 AD3d 33 [2d Dept 2013]).

—[*1] McDonnell & Adels, PLLC, Garden City, N.Y. (Jannine A. Gordineer of counsel), for appellant.

Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y. (Mark A. Green of counsel), for respondents.

In an action to recover no-fault benefits under a policy of automobile insurance, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Parga, J.), entered February 10, 2012, as granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the first cause of action.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiffs’ submissions included a postal receipt indicating that the prescribed NF-5 statutory billing form corresponding to the no-fault claim at issue, and related documents, were received by the defendant on May 26, 2011. The person who mailed the NF-5 form averred, in support of the plaintiffs’ motion, that the defendant neither paid nor properly denied the claim within 30 days. This initial showing was sufficient to demonstrate the plaintiffs’ prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the first cause of action (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [c]; Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33 [2013]). In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether it timely paid or denied the claim, or requested additional verification within the time frame set forth in the no fault regulations (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33 [2013]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the first cause of action. Mastro, J.P., Chambers, Hall and Lott, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 2012 NY Slip Op 30418(U).]

—[*1] Jaffe & Koumourdas, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Jean H. Kang of counsel), for appellant.

Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y., for respondents.

In an action to recover no-fault benefits under two separate policies of automobile insurance, the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Winslow, J.), entered October 13, 2011, which, upon an order of the same court entered August 2, 2011, granting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the complaint and denying its cross motion, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, is in favor of the plaintiffs and against it in the sum of $66,682.29.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof, in effect, awarding the plaintiffs damages in the sum of $7,354.28 on the first cause of action and substituting therefor a provision dismissing that cause of action; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements, that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the first cause of action is denied, that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing that cause of action is granted, the order entered August 2, 2011, is modified accordingly, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for the entry of an appropriate amended judgment.

The plaintiffs made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the second cause of action, which related to the claim submitted by Westchester Medical Center in connection with the injuries allegedly sustained by its assignor, Robert de los Santos, by submitting evidence that the prescribed statutory billing form had been mailed to and received by the defendant insurer, which failed to either pay or deny the claims within the requisite 30-day period (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33, 2013 NY Slip Op 08430 [2d Dept 2013]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Hereford Ins. Co., 95 AD3d 1306, 1306-1307 [2012]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lancer Ins. Co., 94 AD3d 984, 984 [2012]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 89 AD3d 1081, 1082 [2011]). A medical provider is not required, as part of its prima facie showing, to demonstrate the admissibility of its billing records or to prove the truth of their content under the business records exception to the hearsay rule (see CPLR 4518 [a]; Viviane [*2]Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33, 45 [2013]). In opposition to the plaintiffs’ showing in connection with the second cause of action, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether it properly requested further verification of that claim (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 89 AD3d at 1083; Mount Sinai Hosp. v Triboro Coach, 263 AD2d 11 [1999]). By failing to timely contest, at the claims stage, the adequacy of the claim forms employed by Westchester Medical Center to establish proof of the claim it submitted on behalf of de los Santos, the defendant waived its right to rely on any deficiencies in those forms at the litigation stage (see Fair Price Med. Supply Corp. v Travelers Indem. Co., 10 NY3d 556, 563 [2008]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d 312, 318 [2007]; Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33, 46 [2013]). Similarly, on its cross motion for summary judgment, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that it properly requested verification of that claim (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Countrywide Ins. Co., 45 AD3d 676, 676 [2007]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the second cause of action and properly denied that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 750, 754 [2007]).

In connection with that branch of its cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action, however, the defendant established, prima facie, that payment on the claim made by the plaintiff New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens on behalf of its assignor, Khushi Robinson, was not overdue since there were verification requests that remained outstanding with respect to that claim (see New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 30 AD3d 492, 493 [2006]). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see id.). Specifically, the defendant submitted evidence that it timely and properly requested further verification of that claim and timely and properly followed up on that request, but that New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens did not respond (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Country Wide Ins. Co., 84 AD3d 790, 791 [2011]; St. Barnabas Hosp. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 57 AD3d 517, 518 [2008]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Countrywide Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 729, 730 [2007]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the first cause of action, and granted that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing that cause of action. Balkin, J.P., Roman, Sgroi and Cohen, JJ., concur.

—[*1] John C. Buratti & Associates, New York (Julie M. Sherwood of counsel), for appellant.

Marshall & Marshall, PLLC, Jericho (Jeffrey Kadushin of counsel), for respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Sharon A.M. Aarons, J.), entered on or about October 3, 2012, which, after a framed issue hearing, found that defendant Farmers Insurance Company is obligated to provide plaintiff with coverage for the subject accident, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Mandatory arbitration is the sole available remedy pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.11 and Insurance Law §§ 5105 and 5221 (b) (6) in order to determine issues of coverage between insurance carriers and defendant Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC). The fact that appellant submitted its “contentions,” which included the affirmative defense of no coverage due to cancellation of the policy, establishes that it was aware of the arbitration proceeding, and yet did not appear, seek an adjournment to present the necessary documentation regarding the cancellation, or file a petition to vacate the arbitration award pursuant to CPLR 7511. Thus, appellant had a “full and fair opportunity to contest the decision” (Matter of American Ins. Co. [Messinger—Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.], 43 NY2d 184, 192 [1977] [emphasis omitted]), and failed to do so.

The issue in both actions was the alleged cancellation of the insurance policy, which was decided by the arbitrator. The fact that plaintiff now seeks bodily injury benefits does not alter [*2]this result, as there is no evidence that the parties arbitrated under an agreement to limit the preclusive effect of the arbitration decision (cf. Kerins v Prudential Prop. & Cas., 185 AD2d 403, 404 [3d Dept 1992]). Concur—Tom, J.P., Friedman, DeGrasse, Feinman and Gische, JJ.

—[*1] Brand, Glick & Brand, P.C., Garden City (Peter M. Khrinenko of counsel), for appellant.

Budin, Reisman, Kupferberg & Bernstein, LLP, New York (Harlan S. Budin of counsel), for respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol E. Huff, J.), entered April 30, 2012, which granted the petition to vacate the arbitration awards, and remanded the matter for a new arbitration before a new arbitrator, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the arbitration awards reinstated.

The arbitral awards, rendered in compulsory arbitration, were not irrational or contrary to settled law, and therefore should have been confirmed. Respondent insurer’s disclaimer, based strictly upon primacy of coverage, was not so absolute or unequivocal as to constitute a repudiation of the policy (see Seward Park Hous. Corp. v Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 43 AD3d 23, 30 [1st Dept 2007]). The arbitrators were therefore correct that petitioner was required, but failed, to comply with the conditions precedent to coverage found in the implementing no-fault regulations. He did not submit timely written proof of claim to the insurer, including the particulars regarding the nature and extent of the injuries and treatment received and contemplated (11 NYCRR 65-1.1, 65-2.4 [c]).

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur—Friedman, J.P., Acosta, Renwick, Manzanet-Daniels and Gische, JJ.