Index No. CV-726719-19QU

Plaintiff’s Counsel:
Law Offices of Gabriel & Moroff, P.C.
2 Lincoln Avenue, Suite 302
Rockville Centre, NY 11570

Defendant’s Counsel:
McDonnell Adels Klestzick, P.L.L.C.
401 Franklin Avenue
Garden City, NY 11530

I. Papers

The following papers were read on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint and Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment seeking judgment on its claims against Defendant:

Papers Numbered

Defendant’s Notice of Motion and Affirmation in Support dated April 21, 2021 (“Motion“) and electronically filed with the court on April 23, 2021. 1

Plaintiff’s Notice of Cross-Motion seeking summary judgment and Affirmation in Support dated and electronically filed with the court on August 30, 2021 (“Cross-Motion“). 2

Defendant’s Affirmation in Opposition to Cross-Motion and Reply dated as of January 10, 2022 (“Opposition to Cross-Motion“) and electronically filed with the court on January 11, 2022. 3

II. Background

In a summons and complaint filed November 15, 2019, Plaintiff sued Defendant insurance company to recover a total of $2,114.99 in unpaid No-Fault benefits for medical services provided to Plaintiff’s assignor Soto from January 29, 2019 to May 8, 2019 resulting from an automobile accident on September 11, 2018, plus attorneys’ fees and statutory interest. Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that Plaintiff failed to provide additional documentary verification within one-hundred twenty (120) days (11 NYCRR § 65-3.8[b][3]). Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment on its claims against Defendant.

III. Discussion and Decision

CPLR 3212 provides that “a motion for summary judgment shall be supported by affidavit, by a copy of the pleadings and by other available proof, such as depositions and written admissions” (CPLR 3212[b]). “Mere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient” (Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). “A defendant moving for summary judgment [seeking an order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint] has the initial burden of coming forward with admissible evidence, such as affidavits by persons having knowledge of the facts, reciting the material facts and showing that the cause of action has no merit” (GTF Mktg. v Colonial Aluminum Sales, 66 NY2d 965, 967 [1985]; Anghel v Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, P.C., 190 AD3d 906, 907 [2d Dept 2021], see Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 NY3d 824, 833 [2014]). A motion for summary judgment “shall be granted if, upon all the papers and proof submitted, the cause of action or defense shall be established sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in favor of any party” (CPLR 3212[b]; Zuckerman v. City of New York, at 562, see GTF Mktg. v Colonial Aluminum Sales, 66 NY2d at 968).

Insurers must pay or deny No-Fault benefit claims “within thirty (30) calendar days after receipt of the proof of the claim” (Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498, 501 [2015]; Fair Price Med. Supply Corp. v Travelers Indem. Co., 10 NY3d 556, 563 [2008]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d 312, 317 [2007]; see Insurance Law § 5106[a]; 11 NYCRR § 65-3.8[c]; Presbyterian Hosp. in City of NY v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 278 [1997]). “New York Law prohibits unlicensed individuals from organizing a professional service corporation for profit or exercising control over such entities” (Andrew Carothers, M.D., P.C. v Progressive Ins. Co., 33 NY3d 389, 404 [2019], see Business Corporation Law §§ 1507; 1508; Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am. v Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C., 155 AD3d 885, 886 [2d Dept 2017]; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v Raia Med. Health, P.C., 140 AD3d 1029, 1031 [2d Dept 2016]; One Beacon Ins. Group, LLC v [*2]Midland Med. Care, P.C., 54 AD3d 738, 740 [2d Dept 2008]). “A provider of health care services is not eligible for reimbursement under section 5102(a)(1) of the Insurance Law if the provider fails to meet any applicable New York State or local licensing requirement necessary to perform such service in New York . . .” (11 NYCRR § 65-3.16[a][12]; Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am. v Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C., 155 AD3d at 886; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v Raia Med. Health, P.C., 140 AD3d at 1031; One Beacon Ins. Group, LLC v Midland Med. Care, P.C., 54 AD3d at 740). In the No Fault context, corporate practices evincing a willful, material noncompliance with licensing and incorporation statutes may establish a medical provider’s ineligibility to receive reimbursement (Andrew Carothers, M.D., P.C. v Progressive Ins. Co., 33 NY3d at 405, see State Farm v Mallela, 4 NY3d 313, 321 [2005]; Radiology Today, P.C. v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 4, 7 [App Term 2d Dept 2011]). The elements of common law fraud need not be shown (Andrew Carothers, M.D., P.C. v Progressive Ins. Co., 33 NY3d at 405) if noncompliance with the above-described licensing requirement is established through admissible evidence.

Failure to establish timely payment or denial of the claim precludes the insurer from offering evidence of its defense to non-payment (Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d at 506; Fair Price Med. Supply Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 10 NY3d at 563; Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d at 318; Presbyterian Hosp. in City of NY v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d at 281-86). However, the defense that a health care provider is ineligible to receive No Fault insurance benefit payments is not subject to preclusion (All Boro Psychological Servs., P.C. v Auto One Ins. Co., 35 Misc 3d 136[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50777[U] *2 [App Term 2d Dept 2012]; Radiology Today, P.C. v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d at 6; Midborough Acupuncture P.C. v State Farm Ins. Co., 13 Misc 3d 58, 59 [App Term 2d Dept 2006]; A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Misc 3d 71 [App Term 2006]).

In the instant matter, Defendant received Plaintiff’s eight (8) bills from February 26, 2019 to May 31, 2019 for services rendered from January 29, 2019 to May 8, 2019 respectively and denied those claims from July 18, 2019 to October 16, 2019 respectively. Defendant denied the claims for Plaintiff’s failure to provide requested verification. While Defendant denied Plaintiff’s claims well after the thirty (30) days required for timely payment or denial, Defendant may delay payment pending an investigation of Plaintiff’s alleged noncompliance with licensing and incorporation statutes, but only upon showing good cause to pursue the investigation (Andrew Carothers, M.D., P.C. v Progressive Ins. Co., 33 NY3d at 405; State Farm v Mallela, 4 NY3d at 322).

A. Defendant’s Requests for Verification

“An applicant from whom verification is requested shall, within 120 calendar days from the date of the initial request for verification, submit all such verification under the applicant’s control or possession or written proof providing reasonable justification for the failure to comply” (11 NYCRR § 65-3.5[o]).

In the instant matter, Defendant acknowledged receiving the bills and mailed to Plaintiff a request (“First Verification Request“) for additional verification, in letters dated March 13, 2019, March 21, 2019, April 5, 2019, April 29, 2019, May 7, 2019, May 21, 2019 and June 11, 2019 (see Motion, Linwood Aff). Here, Plaintiff had one-hundred twenty (120) days to provide Defendant with requested verification under Plaintiff’s control or possession or a written [*3]explanation supporting Plaintiff’s failure to comply. In the First Verification Request, Defendant requested “1. all written agreements between Jiang Acupuncture and Jiang and Top One Medical Billing ; 2.montly statements sent by Top One Medical Billing to Jiang Acupuncture detailing amounts billed and collected by Top One Medical Billing on behalf of Jiang Acupuncture for the past 12 months; 3. all documents reflecting payments to or from Top One Medical Billing during the past 12 months, including endorsed payment drafts issued by Jiang Acupuncture to Top One Medical Billing for the period of September 2016-August 2017; 4. All documents reflecting or relating to gifts given by Jiang Acupuncture and/or Jiang… to… Davis, Graham Wellness Medical PC., or any person who worked at [XXX] Graham Avenue during the past 12 months, including but not limited to credit or debit card statements, credit or debit card receipts, purchase receipts, or documents reflecting cash withdrawals; 5. General ledger of Jiang Acupuncture for the past 12 months; 6. W-2/1099 issued by Jiang Acupuncture to… Jiang for most recent tax year available; 7. All schedule K-1s issued by Jiang Acupuncture for most recent tax year available; 8. Jiang Acupuncture’s complete copy of corporate tax returns for most recent tax year available; and 9. Jiang Acupuncture’s corporate bank records for the past 12 months” (id.). Defendant made follow up requests (“Second Verification Request,” together with the First Verification Request, the “Verification Request“) for the documents in letters dated April 17, 2019, April 25, 2019, May 8, 2019, June 4, 2019, June 11, 2019, June 27, 2019 and July 18, 2019 respectively (id.). Plaintiff did not dispute that Plaintiff did not provide the requested documents to Defendant.

B. Good Cause for Requested Verification

Defendant argued that the requested documents were necessary to verify the medical necessity of the billed services, and whether the ownership, control, and operation of Plaintiff complied with New York State licensing requirements. Plaintiff countered that the verification was improper, that Defendant failed to establish “that the verification requests were necessary”; and that “EUO transcripts [were] inadmissible hearsay, as the transcripts [were] not signed by the Plaintiff.” Plaintiff further argued that “CPLR 3116(a) provides that an EUO transcript must be submitted to the witness so that the witness can read it and make any changes.” (Cross-Motion, Fagan Aff.) The Court notes that Defendant’s supporting documents indicates that Plaintiff in the instant matter had various claims resulting from different assignors, including Plaintiff assignor in the matter before this Court, pending with the Defendant.

Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, tax returns and bank statements were probative on whether a medical service provider complied with licensing laws (see All Boro Psychological Servs., P.C. v Auto One Ins. Co., 2012 NY Slip Op 50777[U] *1-2; Q-B Jewish Med. Rehabilitation, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 33 Misc 3d 64, 66 [App Term 2d Dept 2011], see Dore v Allstate Indem. Co., 264 AD2d 804, 804-05 [2d Dept 1999]). While mere allegations of fraud would be sufficient to sustain a motion to compel discovery of evidence of noncompliance with licensing laws (see Lexington Acupuncture, P.C. v General Assur. Co., 35 Misc 3d 42, 43 [App Term 2d Dept 2012]; Medical Polis, P.C. v Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 153[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50342[U] *2 [App Term 2d Dept 2012]), here, Defendant sought summary judgment, which requires admissible evidence (see Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am. v Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C., 155 AD3ed at 886; One Beacon Ins. Group, LLC v Midland Med. Care, P.C., 54 AD3d at 740; Vista Surgical Supplies, Inc. v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 22 Misc 3d [*4]142[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50493[U] *2 [App Term 2d Dept 2009]; Oleg Barshay, P.C. v State Farm Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 74, 78 [App Term 2d Dept 2006]). In our instant matter, Defendant failed to support its good cause with admissible evidence for investigating Plaintiff’s alleged noncompliance with the licensing statutes as explained below.

Defendant presented an affidavit sworn December 22, 2020, in which Baines, an investigator in Defendant’s Special Investigative Unit, detailed Defendant’s investigation of Plaintiff, as part of an alleged broader scheme of non-compliance with licensing laws, leading to the Verification Request at issue. In her affidavit, Baines stated that Defendant concerned that “whether (i) the services billed by the providers operating from 150 Graham Avenue (including Jiang Acupuncture) were medically necessary; (ii) whether the services billed were actually provided; and (iii) whether the ownership control and operation of Jiang Acupuncture and the other professional corporations (“PCs”) operating from [XXX] Graham Avenue complied with New York State licensing requirements.” As a result, an examination under oath (“EUO“) was requested and conducted. In her affidavit, Baines quoted Jiang Acupuncture’s listed owner, Jiang, L.Ac.’s testimony at the EUO to demonstrate that Jiang’s “testimony did not resolve State Farm’s questions[; and that, t]o the contrary, her testimony only raised additional questions as to whether Jiang Acupuncture’s services were reimbursable”. (see Motion, Baines Aff.) To support its Motion, Defendant presented the transcript of Jiang’s EUO, however, the transcript was not subscribed by Jiang. CPLR 3116 requires that the transcript “shall be submitted to the witness for examination and shall be read to or by him or her, and any changes in form or substance which the witness desires to make shall be entered at the end of the deposition with a statement of the reasons given by the witness for making them [; that i]f the witness fails to sign and return the [transcript] within sixty days, it may be used as fully as though signed.” (CPLR 3116[a].) Here, it is unclear based on the Motion if the transcript was ever presented to Jiang for signature. Since Defendant failed to present a signed transcript of Jiang to support its Motion, Baines’ account of Jiang’s EUO testimony is hearsay. (see Alleviation Med. Servs., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 191 AD3d 934, 935 [2d Dept 2021]; United Specialty Ins. v Columbia Cas. Co., 186 AD3d 650, 651 [2d Dept 2020]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Sesey, 183 AD3d 780, 783 [2d Dept 2020]; Jamaica Dedicated Med. Care, P.C. v Praetorian Ins. Co., 47 Misc 3d 147[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50756[U] *1 [App Term 2d Dept 2015]; Apazidis, M.D., P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Misc 3d 1225[A].)

In Defendant’s Opposition to Cross-Motion, Defendant did not address the issue of unassigned transcripts, however, simply relied on the truth of Jiang’s EUO testimony to establish good cause for requesting verification from Plaintiff which in the context of a summary judgment motion requires admissible evidence. Since Defendant failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to a judgment as a matter of law, the court must deny Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Pullman v Silverman, 28 NY3d 1060, 1063 [2016]; United Specialty Ins. v Columbia Cas. Co., 186 AD3d at 651-52; Matter of Long Is. Power Auth. Hurricane Sandy Litig., 165 AD3d 1138, 1140 [2d Dept 2018]; Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am. v Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C., 155 AD3d at 887).

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint is denied.

C. Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion

Regarding the Cross-Motion, Plaintiff bore the burden to show it submitted the statutory [*5]claim forms indicating the fact and amount of the loss sustained and “that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue” (Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d at 501; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v QBE Ins. Corp., 114 AD3d 648, 648 [2d Dept 2014]; NYU-Hospital for Joint Diseases v Esurance Ins. Co., 84 AD3d 1190, 1191 [2d Dept 2011]; Fair Price Med. Supply Corp. v ELRAC Inc., 12 Misc 3d 119, 120 [App Term 2d Dept 2006]). Here, Defendant’s denial of claim forms acknowledging receipt of Plaintiff’s claims constituted prima facie evidence that Defendant received Plaintiff’s claims and that the denial was overdue (see Lopes v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 127[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51279[U] *2 [App Term 2d Dept 2009]). However, an ineligibility of receiving No Fault insurance benefit due to non-compliance with licensing statutes defeats such prima facie showing.

Based on foregoing discussion, Defendant had identified the existence of evidence in Plaintiff’s exclusive control which raised the issue of Plaintiff’ ineligibility to receive No Fault benefit payments. Because the requested verification are still outstanding, factual issues exist as to Plaintiff’ eligibility to receive No Fault benefit payments. Since Defendant’s defense of Plaintiff’s ineligibility to receive No Fault benefit payments is not precluded by Defendant’s untimely denial of Plaintiff’s claims and Plaintiff still has not provided the requested verification, this Court also must deny Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion (CPLR 3212[f]; RLC Med., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 29 Misc 3d 134[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51962[U] *1 [App Term 2d Dept 2010]; Points of Health Acupuncture, P.C. v Lancer Ins. Co., 28 Misc 3d 133[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51338[U] *3 [App Term 2d Dept 2010]; Five Boro Psychological Servs., P.C. v AutoOne Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 89, 90 [App Term 2d Dept 2010]).

IV. Order

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for summary judgment (Motion Seq. #1) is denied, and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for summary judgement for it’s claim (Motion Seq. #3) is denied.

This constitutes the DECISION and ORDER of the Court.

Dated: September 11, 2023
Civil Court of the City of New York
_____________________________________
Honorable Wendy Changyong Li, J.C.C.

[*1]

Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County, June 30, 2023

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Hollander Legal Group, P.C., Melville (Justin A. Calabrese of counsel), for defendant.

Law Offices of Gabriel & Moroff, P.C., Rockville Centre (John E. Fagan of counsel), for plaintiff.

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that plaintiff assignor failed to appear for four duly and timely scheduled examinations under oath (EUO) is granted in its entirety, and plaintiff’s cross-motion is denied. Plaintiff’s argument that defendant failed to establish timely denial, in that denial exceeded the 30-day time period from the second EUO no-show, is unpersuasive and outmoded in light of the Appellate Division’s recent decision in Quality Health Supply Corp. v Nationwide Ins. (216 AD3d 1013 [2d Dept 2023]), reversing a decision of the Appellate Term (see Quality Health Supply Corp. v Nationwide Ins., 69 Misc 3d 133[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 51226[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]).

This court has struggled with this issue in the past. Despite that the earlier Quality Health held that “the 30-day period for an insurer to pay or deny a claim based upon a failure to appear for an EUO begins to run on the date of the second EUO nonappearance” (2020 NY Slip Op 51226[U], *1 [citation omitted]), this court found that a timely denial issued after a fourth missed EUO was sufficient to support defendant’s request for summary judgment (see NGM Acupuncture, P.C. v Nationwide Ins. Co., Civ Ct, Queens County, June 15, 2021, index No. 706015/2019). This court reasoned that to hold otherwise puts defendants at a disadvantage for offering plaintiffs additional opportunities to appear for an EUO, and disincentivizes diligent and thorough investigations. Even more so, it gave plaintiffs an advantage if they did appear at a third or fourth scheduled EUO.

Following the earlier Quality Health, the Appellate Term issued a decision in FJL Med. Servs., P.C. v Nationwide Ins. (77 Misc 3d 129[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 51213[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]) that addressed this issue in a more comprehensive fashion. FJL essentially confirmed the finding of the Appellate Term in Quality Health. It reasoned that “an insurer cannot indefinitely extend its toll of the time to pay or deny a claim after a second nonappearance at a scheduled EUO by scheduling successive additional EUOs until the insurer unilaterally decides that it has offered enough opportunities{**80 Misc 3d at 653} to appear and end its toll” (2022 NY Slip Op 51213[U], *2-3). Disregarding defendant’s arguments based upon the regulations and rooted in fairness principles, the court framed the issue as whether an insurer properly continued its toll period to pay or deny a claim, instead of whether a provider or insured appeared for a duly scheduled and/or rescheduled EUO.

Although this court continued to disagree with the premise expressed in Quality Health and expounded upon in FJL, in light of that later decision, this [*2]court capitulated and denied a defendant’s motion contemplating the same issue discussed here (see Access Care PT, P.C. v Palisades Ins. Co., 2023 NY Slip Op 32567[U] [Civ Ct, Queens County, Mar. 7, 2023]).

Having to contend with its prior decisions, this court is being asked to, again, consider this issue. However, now it has the Appellate Division’s decision in Quality Health which, arguably, endorses this court’s earlier opinion in NGM Acupuncture. In reversing the Appellate Term, the Appellate Division found that a denial for nonappearance issued after the last scheduled EUO, and in that case there were three, was timely and proper (see Quality Health Supply Corp., 216 AD3d at 1013). With this in mind, the court finds here that defendant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing plaintiff’s complaint by showing that its scheduling letters were timely and properly mailed, that the assignor failed to appear on each of the four scheduled dates, and that it ultimately issued a timely and proper denial following a failure to appear on the last scheduled date (see e.g. Quality Health Supply Corp., 216 AD3d 1013).

It is noteworthy that plaintiff did not deny receipt of the scheduling letters or that the assignor failed to appear on all four occasions. Actually, plaintiff highlighted that it responded to defendant’s scheduling letters by objecting to the location of the EUO but, also, expressing its assignor’s willingness to attend. Despite these responses, plaintiff seeks to penalize defendant for extending multiple opportunities to its assignor to appear. The contradictory nature of this argument and its effect of placing insurers in a problematic position is evident.

Most importantly, and what this court believes was previously overlooked, is that appearance for an EUO is a condition precedent to coverage (see generally Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am. v George, 183 AD3d 755, 756 [2d Dept 2020];Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35{**80 Misc 3d at 654} AD3d 720, 722 [2d Dept 2006]; Excel Imaging, P.C. v Infinity Select Ins. Co., 46 Misc 3d 128[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 51796[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]). By circumventing this principle, and virtually ignoring the EUO nonappearances, form prevailed over substance. The most recent Quality Health rectifies this imbalance and, also, promotes the mandate of the no-fault regulations prohibiting insurers from treating their insureds in an adversarial fashion (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.2 [b]; see also NGM Acupuncture, P.C. v Nationwide Ins. Co.). Ultimately, a plaintiff’s failure to appear for a duly scheduled EUO, barring any issues of timeliness, should be the predominate consideration in disputes such as the one before this court.

Plaintiff’s complaint is hereby dismissed.

Index No. CV-714236-22/RI

Kopelevich & Feldsherova PC for Plaintiff

Gallo Vitucci Klar LLP for Defendant

Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219 (a), of the papers considered in the review of this application:

After argument and upon the foregoing cited papers, the decision on Defendant’s motion and Plaintiff’s cross-motion is as follows:

Plaintiff, PAK HONG SIK MD MEDICAL CARE, P.C. (hereinafter, “Plaintiff”), as assignee of JOSE FELICIANO (hereinafter, “Assignor”), commenced this action against the defendant, OMNI INSURANCE COMPANY (hereinafter, “Defendant”), to recover assigned first-party No-Fault benefits for medical treatment provided to Assignor.

Currently before the Court is Defendant’s motion (i) to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a cause of action and (ii) for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212. Plaintiff cross-moved for a motion finding the Defendant in default for failing to interpose an Answer in this matter. The Defendant filed an affirmation in further support of its motion and in opposition to the cross-motion. The parties argued the motion before the undersigned on May 4, 2023, and the motion was marked submitted.

The Defendant moves to dismiss the matter on the grounds that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Defendant. The Defendant argues that it is not licensed to issue insurance [*2]policies in New York or transact any business in New York. In support of its motion, Defendant presented an affidavit of Kim Blankenship, the Assistant Vice President of Operations of American Independent Companies Inc., (“AICI”) the alleged parent company of the Defendant. The Court notes that the affidavit was notarized in 2020 in Cobb County, Georgia and contains an unsigned certificate of conformity. While the lack of a certificate of conformity may be excused under CPLR 2001, the Court finds that the affidavit still predates the accident at issue by more than six months. Considering the Defendant’s motion is made more than 2 years after the affidavit was executed, the Defendant does not offer any reasonable explanation for failing to produce a contemporaneous affidavit.

The Defendant also submits a screenshot of a website entitled “NAIC.” The Court finds the screenshot of the NAIC website inadmissible for several reasons. The screenshot is not dated, does not have an accompanying affidavit explaining its origin, and does not list the website’s URL. While this website may be useful to the Defendant’s investigation, it is not offered in admissible form.

Also annexed to the Defendant’s motion is a NYS DMV MV-104 accident report (incorrectly labeled and referred to as a “Police Accident Report”). The Court takes judicial notice this is not a report issued or completed by the New York City Police Department. The accident report was allegedly completed and signed by Mr. Feliciano reporting the accident to the DMV listing the Defendant as his carrier. However, the state issuing the driver’s license and vehicle registration, along with the insurance code, are all missing from the document.

Defendant cites to Matter of Eagle Ins. Co. v Gutierrez-Guzman, a matter decided in 2005 by the Appellate Division, Second Department, in support of its motion (21 AD3d 489, 491 [2d Dept 2005]). In this case, the court found that the Supreme Court, Nassau County did not have personal jurisdiction over an insurance company named “American Independent Insurance Company” (“AIIC”). Defendant infers that AIIC and AICI are one in the same. However, there has been no evidence presented to demonstrate that the two companies are in fact the same entity or even the parent company of the Defendant. Assuming for a moment that AIIC and AICI are the same corporate entity, and the Defendant’s parent company, the Court does not find this decision binding since it was related to an accident that occurred over twenty years ago, and that the Defendant’s business practices in New York might have changed since the Appellate Division’s decision.

It should be noted that the Defendant brought a prior motion for identical relief that was denied by the undersigned in a decision and order dated January 30, 2023. In the prior order, the Court found Defendant’s unsigned affidavit of Ms. Blankenship to be defective and inadmissible. Inasmuch as the Defendant states that it disagrees with the Court’s prior order, there is no request before the Court to vacate the prior order.

In opposition, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendant is barred from bringing the instant motion due to the “single motion rule.” The Plaintiff also cites the “accident report” to support a finding of jurisdiction. The Court finds this to be a self-serving document signed by Mr. Feliciano in which any information relevant to jurisdiction is missing. In support of its cross-motion for a default judgment, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendant is in default for failing to file an answer within 30 days from the Court’s prior order, as it was directed to do.

DISCUSSION

Turning first to the branch of Defendant’s motion which is for summary judgment, that request must be denied. Since the Defendant has yet to file an answer, issue has not been joined, and any motion for summary judgment is improper. The joinder of issue is a prerequisite that is “strictly adhered to” (City of Rochester v Chiarella, 65 NY2d 92, 101 [1985]). This does not bar the Defendant from bringing a motion for summary judgment once issue has been joined.

As to the Defendant’s motion to dismiss, this Court finds the Defendant is barred from seeking such relief in successive motions. CPLR 3211(e) states that “At any time before service of the responsive pleading is required, a party may move on one or more of the grounds set forth in subdivision (a) of this rule, and no more than one such motion shall be permitted” (emphasis added). Courts have consistently held this “single motion rule” to bar successive motions to dismiss (See Ramos v City of New York, 51 AD3d 753, 754 [2d Dept 2008]). The purpose of the single-motion rule is “not only to prevent delay before answer, but also to protect the pleader from being harassed by repeated CPLR 3211(a) motions and to conserve judicial resources” (Oakley v County of Nassau, 127 AD3d 946, 947 [2d Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). While the Defendant is barred from seeking pre-answer dismissal, the single motion rule will not prohibit the Defendant from seeking that relief in another form, such as a motion for summary judgment (See Id; Tapps of Nassau Supermarkets, Inc. v Linden Blvd., L.P., 269 AD2d 306, 307 [1st Dept 2000]).

The Court notes that if the Defendant’s motion was not barred by the “single motion rule,” the Defendant still failed to meet its entitlement to dismissal, based upon the defects and inadmissible evidence explained above.

As to the Plaintiff’s cross-motion, the Court finds that while the Defendant did not file an answer as directed by the Court, the Defendant did file this motion within 30 days of the Court’s prior order. Therefore, the Defendant is now placed on notice that this Court will not entertain any further pre-answer motions to dismiss and must interpose an answer in this matter.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendant’s motion is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that the Defendant shall file and serve its Answer within 14 days from the date of this Order; and it is further

ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s cross-motion is DENIED, with leave to renew should Defendant fail to timely file its Answer as directed herein by the Court.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Index No. CV-721025-20-KI

Plaintiff: Oleg Rybak
The Rybak Firm PLLC
1810 Voorhies Ave, Suite 7
Brooklyn, NY 11235-3313
(718) 975-2035
orybak@rybakfirm.com

Defendant: Steven Levy
Callinan and Smith LLP
3361 Park Avenue-Suite 104
Wantagh, NY 11793
(516)-784-5148
slevy@callinansmith.com

Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219 (a), of the papers considered in the review of this Motion for Summary Judgment submitted on February 1, 2023,

Upon the foregoing cited papers, and oral argument, the Decision/Order on the Defendant’s Motions for Summary Judgement and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motions for Summary Judgement is as follows:

Defendant, Ameriprise Insurance Company, (hereinafter “Defendant”) moves by Notices of Motion dated November 2, 2020, for Orders pursuant to CPLR § 3212 (b) granting Defendant summary judgment as a matter of law and dismissing Plaintiff’s Summons and Complaint, in its entirety, with prejudice, based upon Plaintiff’s failure to attend duly scheduled Examinations Under Oath (“EUOs”). These matters are consolidated for the purposes of oral argument and this motion. Plaintiff, Michele B. Glispy, (hereinafter “Plaintiff” or “Assignee”), cross moves by Notices of Cross-Motion dated, July 9, 2021, July 12, 2021, and July 6, 2021, respectively, pursuant to CPLR § 3211 (c), CPLR § 3212 (a) seeking summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, denying defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement, or limiting the issues of fact for trial pursuant to CPLR § 3212 (g), and seeking dismissal of defendant’s affirmative defenses pursuant to CPLR § 3211 (b).

This matter involves a claim for assigned first-party no fault benefits, which resulted from plaintiff providing medical treatment to Assignor, Maria Rodriguez (hereinafter “Assignor”), following a motor vehicle accident, which occurred on October 25, 2018. Defendant acknowledges receipt of specified bills in its denials, however, at oral argument both defendant and plaintiff agreed that bills one, two, and three were not received. After the receipt of the bills specified, defendant sent two Examinations Under Oath (hereinafter “EUO”) scheduling letters for each matter, CV-721025-20-KI letters are dated January 23, 2019, and February 19, 2019, CV-721026-20-KI and CV- 721033-20-KI letters are both dated January 4, 2019 and January, 23, 2019, respectively, to the assignor’s home address listed on the NF-3’s and Verification of Treatment forms and to the provider’s billing address. Defendant annexed affidavits in all three instant matters of Michael A. Callinan, Esq. (hereinafter the “Callinan Affidavits”) all dated October 19, 2020, in order to establish the mailing of the scheduling letters and the non-appearance of the assignor for the scheduled EUO’s. Defendant states that the [*2]assignor did not attend the two scheduled EUO’s for each of the three matters sub judice, and therefore, the defendant asserts that they are entitled to summary judgement dismissing the complaints.

At oral argument, defendant confirmed that it properly mailed EUO scheduling letters to the assignor for all three scheduled EUO’s. Defendant contends that the EUO scheduling letters sent to the assignor, the Callinan affidavits establishing both mailing of the letters and the non-appearance of assignor, in conjunction with a statement on the record, are sufficient under the current no-fault laws, to warrant dismissal of plaintiff’s case for the assignor’s failure to appear. The Court notes that the Callinan affidavits were identical in sum and substance as to the instant matters, but for the dates of the scheduling letters. As set forth below, defendant put forth numerous cases in which the Second Department has held that affidavits similar to Mr. Callinan’s were sufficient to establish the proper mailing of EUO scheduling letters and EUO non-appearance.

Plaintiff argues that the Callinan affidavits were conclusory and insufficient to establish proper mailing as required under CPLR. Plaintiff asserted that defendant did not annex copies of the envelopes in which the scheduling letters were sent as was required according to plaintiff. In the Cross-Motions for Summary Judgement and at oral argument, plaintiff drew the Court’s attention to the matter of Carle Place Chiropractic v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 19 Misc 3d 1139A, 866 NYS2d 90 [1st Dist. Nassau Co. 2008]. Plaintiff argues that the Court’s rationale in Carle Place should be applied to the matters sub judice for failure to establish proper mailing procedure. The case is not an appellate case and has no precedential authority herein.

Plaintiff seeks to create new law by using this Court to impose more rigorous requirements on defendants to prove EUO non-appearance and the mailing of scheduling EUO letters. There is no legal requirement of such additional proof along with personal knowledge of mailing procedures to prove mailing of scheduling notices. Additionally, there is no requirement of that which plaintiff urged at oral arguments, to wit: annexing proof of first class mailing and/or envelopes in which the scheduling letters were sent, in addition to affidavits by an attorney with personal knowledge of the mailing of the specific scheduling letters at issue.

All three of plaintiff’s Cross-Motions acknowledge receipt of the scheduling letters by stating that plaintiff responded to the EUO scheduling letters in March of 2019. Though not annexed in plaintiff’s cross-motions, defendant’s motion papers contain, three letters from plaintiff’s counsel, all dated March 5, 2019, after the two scheduled EUO dates had already passed in each instant matter.

In this matter the Callinan affidavits describe in detail that he created the mailing procedure at the legal office handling these matters for defendant, as he was partner and oversaw the mailing of EUO scheduling letters, explicitly outlining his personal knowledge of mailing procedure. The Callinan affidavits state Mr. Callinan was personally responsible for handling these instant matters and these files “on a day-to-day basis.” His “personal knowledge” was not limited to file review and office mailing procedure. It was based upon his personal involvement on these matters in conjunction with review of the file, his creation and over-sight of office mailing procedure, and his knowledge of office mailing procedure.

Defendant argues that the Callinan affidavits established both mailing and the EUO non-appearances. There was no contradictory evidence provided by plaintiff in their motion papers aside from a blanket assertion that defendant did not have enough personal knowledge to establish proper mailing and EUO non-appearance and letters allegedly sent to defendant in [*3]March 2019 attempting to reschedule the EUO’s that were not actually annexed. Plaintiff did not provide any affidavit from its assignor to contradict the assertions made by the Callinan affidavits. Defendant cited to multiple cases in which the Second Department upheld both the sufficiency of similar affidavits to establish EUO no-shows and mailing of scheduling letters, to those of the Callinan affidavits in the matters sub judice as set forth below. Though plaintiff’s Cross-Motion asserts that there was no statement on the record to prove EUO non-appearance, in each of the three instant matters, defendant attached Mr. Callinan’s statements (Defendant’s Motions for Summary Judgement Exhibit “F”) on the record reflecting the non-appearances of plaintiff’s assignor for the scheduled EUO’s in contradiction to plaintiff’s assertions.

In Adelaida Physical Therapy, P.C. v Ameriprise Auto & Home, 58 Misc 3d 130(A), 92 NYS3d 702 (2nd Dept., 2017), the Second Department held that, “contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the affirmation submitted by defendant’s attorney, who was present in his office to conduct plaintiff’s EUO on the scheduled dates, was sufficient to establish that plaintiff had failed to appear for the EUOs” (see, Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720, 827 NYS2d 217 [2006]). Adelaida Physical Therapy, P.C. v Ameriprise Auto & Home, 58 Misc 3d 130(A), 92 NYS3d 702 (2nd Dept., 2017). Adelaida represents one of many examples proffered by defendant in which the Second Department has held that attorney affirmations alone can establish both mailing of EUO scheduling letters and non-appearance for an EUO. The Court in Adelaida did not require defendant to provide envelopes in which the scheduling letters were sent out in, nor did it as plaintiff requested in its Cross-Motion, ask defendant to provide a log of other people scheduled for EUO’s the same day as the assignor in question. Id. The affirmation of the attorney was relied upon in Adelaida to prove both sufficient mailing and failure of the assignor to appear for an EUO and therefore, affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s case. Id.

The Second Department applied similar logic in Island Life Chiropractic Pain Care, PLLC v Ameriprise Ins., 1, 69 Misc 3d 143(A), 133 NYS3d 384, (2nd Dept. 2020) and wrote “defendant established that initial and follow-up letters scheduling an examination under oath had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123, 857 NYS2d 211 [2008]); that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear on either date (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720, 827 NYS2d 217 [2006]); and that the claims had been timely denied on that ground (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123, 857 NYS2d 211). As plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to defendant’s motion, defendant is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Island Life Chiropractic Pain Care, PLLC v Ameriprise Ins., 1, 69 Misc 3d 143(A), 133 NYS3d 384, (2nd Dept. 2020). Similarly, to Island Life Chiropractic Pain Care, PLLC v Ameriprise Ins., this Court finds that in the three matters sub judice that defendant has established timely mailing of EUO scheduling letters and the non-appearance of the assignor at scheduled EUO’s by the Callinan affidavits and Mr. Callinan’s three statements on the record. Additionally, plaintiff has failed to raise an issue of fact for trial.

Summary Judgment is a drastic remedy and should be granted only in the absence of any triable issue of material fact. See, Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v Ceppos, 46 NY2d 141 [1978]; Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361 [1974]. In order to prevail, the movant must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient proof to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact. Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]. The appearance of the eligible injured person, or its assignor, at an EUO is a condition precedent [*4]to coverage. See W&Z Acupuncture, P.C. v. Amex Assur. Co., 24 Misc 3d 142(A) (NY App. Term July 31, 2009). The Second Department holds that, “[a]n insurer may establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law based on the failure to submit to an EUO by establishing that the letters scheduling the EUOs were timely and properly mailed, that the insured failed to appear at two scheduled EUOs, and that the insurer issued a timely and proper denial of the claims.” Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am. v. George, 183 AD3d 755, 756 (2nd Dept. 2020).

The Court finds that though other arguments were raised by both plaintiff and defendant in their Motion papers, the sole issues at oral argument were the mailing of the scheduling letters and the veracity of the Callinan affidavits to prove non-appearance of the assignor at the scheduled the EUO’s. The Court found no need to explore those additional written arguments as they are rendered moot by the issues determined in this decision.

Thus, the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement must be granted as plaintiff has failed to rebut the presumption of the mailing of the EUO scheduling letters and non-appearance at the EUO’s. Plaintiff has failed to raise an issue of fact for trial. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion must be denied by the Court as it is moot.

WHEREFORE it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that defendant’s motions for summary judgement dismissing the complaint is granted pursuant to CPLR § 3212 and the matter is dismissed. Plaintiff’s cross-motions for Summary Judgement are denied in all respects.

_______________s/_____________________
HON. JILL R. EPSTEIN, JCC

Index No. CV-712234-21/BX

Law Offices of Gabriel & Moroff, P.C., by Joseph Padrucco, Esq., for Plaintiff

McDonnell Adels & Klestzick, PLLC, by Christopher Stevens, Esq., for Defendant

Recitation as Required by CPLR §2219(a), the following papers were read on this motion:

Plaintiff Integrated Pain Management, PLLC, seeks $366.64 in no-fault insurance benefits for medical services it rendered to assignor Mikwam Murphy on August 16, 2018. The services consisted of treatment for injuries Murphy allegedly sustained in an automobile accident on July 22, 2018. Defendant Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Company moves pursuant to CPLR § 3212 for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, contending that plaintiff is barred by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case from relitigating the issue of coverage for this claim (Stevens Affirm. ¶ 18). Plaintiff does not oppose the motion.

In 2019, Empire Fire commenced a declaratory judgment action in Kings County Supreme Court against Integrated Pain Management and Murphy, among others (see Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Adams, Index No. 512686/19 [Sup. Ct., Kings Co.] [the “Brooklyn Action”]). In that case, Empire Fire alleged that Integrated Pain Management and Murphy participated in an insurance fraud scheme in which rented vehicles would intentionally get into “accidents” with unsuspecting third-party drivers (id. at NYSCEF No. 1). The drivers and passengers in the rented vehicles would receive payments of up to $1,500, and in exchange for those payments would seek medical treatment from certain designated medical providers, who would seek reimbursement under Empire Fire’s no-fault insurance policy (id.).

Empire Fire sought a declaration that it was not obligated to pay for the medical treatments provided by Integrated Pain Management to Murphy arising out of a July 22, 2018 automobile accident, the same accident at issue in the instant case. Neither Integrated Pain Management nor Murphy appeared in the Brooklyn Action.

By decision and order dated April 8, 2021, Supreme Court granted default judgment for [*2]Empire Fire, ruling in relevant part that Empire Fire was not contractually obligated to reimburse Integrated Pain Management for the services it rendered to Murphy arising from the July 22, 2018 accident, because the alleged losses were not the result of an “accident” as contemplated by the insurance policy (id. at NYSCEF 129).

In support of summary judgment in this action, defendant argues that plaintiff’s claim is barred as a matter of law under the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case, given Supreme Court’s ruling that contractually there is no no-fault coverage for the July 22, 2018 “accident.” It emphasizes that plaintiff Integrated Pain Management and Murphy were both parties to the Brooklyn Action and the claim here arises out of the very same accident at issue in that case.

A party seeking summary judgment “must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case” (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of triable issues of fact (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). “[M]ere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient” to defeat summary judgment (id.). Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and must be denied if there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue of material fact (Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223, 231 [1978]). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment (Branham v Loews Orpheum Cinemas, Inc., 8 NY3d 931, 932 [2007]).

“Under res judicata, or claim preclusion, a valid final judgment bars future actions between the same parties on the same cause of action” (Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 NY2d 343, 347 [1999]). “As a general rule, once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy” (id. [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). “Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party , whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same” (id. at 349 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). “The doctrine applies if the issue in the second action is identical to an issue which was raised, necessarily decided and material in the first action, and the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier action” (id.; see also Rojas v Romanoff, 186 AD3d 103, 107-09 [1st Dept 2020][comparing claim preclusion and issue preclusion]).

The Court finds that defendant has met its prima facie burden on summary judgment under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Plaintiff seeks in this action to relitigate the identical issue raised and decided against it in the Brooklyn Action; that is, plaintiff’s right to payment under defendant’s no-fault insurance policy for medical services it rendered to Murphy related to the July 22, 2018 “accident.” Both parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this question in the Brooklyn Action, and Supreme Court clearly decided it against plaintiff. Plaintiff has failed to raise an issue of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the complaint is GRANTED and the case is dismissed with prejudice.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Index No. CV-713066-22/RI

Kopelevich & Feldsherova PC for Plaintiff

Rossillo & Licata, PC for Defendant

Robert J. Helbock Jr., J.

Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219 (a), of the papers considered in the review of this application:

Upon the foregoing cited papers, the decision on Defendant’s motion is as follows:

Plaintiff, SERGEY KALITENKO MD (hereinafter, “Plaintiff”), as assignee of NORMAN BARAHONA (hereinafter, “Assignor”), commenced this action against the defendant, INTEGON NATIONAL INS. CO. (hereinafter, “Defendant”), to recover assigned first-party No-Fault benefits for medical treatment provided to Assignor.

Currently before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 for an order dismissing the instant matter due to the Assignor’s failure to appear for duly noticed independent medical examinations and examinations under oath. Defendant submitted opposition to the motion; and the motion was argued before the undersigned on March 2, 2023.

DISCUSSION

The procedural history of this matter warrants an explanation before the Defendant’s instant motion may be discussed. The summons and complaint in this matter were filed by the Plaintiff on July 15, 2022. An affidavit of service was filed in this matter on August 26, 2022, demonstrating that service was made outside the City of New York, in Saddle Brook, New Jersey, on July 27, 2022. According to section 402(b) of the Civil Court Act, “If the summons is served by any means other than personal delivery to the defendant within the city of New York, it shall provide that the defendant must appear and answer within thirty days after proof of service is filed with the clerk.” In this matter, service was made outside the City of New York. Therefore, the Defendant had thirty days to file its answer from when the affidavit of service was filed with the Court (August 26, 2022). The Defendant filed its answer on October 4, 2022, more than the 30-day statutory period. Plaintiff filed a rejection of Defendant’s answer two days later on October 6, 2022. The Defendant filed the instant motion on December 1, 2022. Notably, Defendant did not move to compel the Plaintiff to accept its late answer.

Since Defendant’s answer was rejected, issue has not been joined, and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was improper. The joinder of issue is a prerequisite that is “strictly adhered to” (City of Rochester v Chiarella, 65 NY2d 92, 101 [1985]).

Under CPLR 3012(d), a court may “extend the time to appear or plead, or compel the acceptance of an untimely pleading, ‘upon such terms as may be just and upon a showing of reasonable excuse for delay or default'” (Bank of New York Mellon v Adago, 155 AD3d 594, 595 [2d Dept 2017]). This Court cannot sua sponte compel the Plaintiff to accept the Defendant’s untimely answer as no reasonable excuse for the default has been proffered by the Defendant. Therefore, before the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment can be decided, issue must be joined, by the acceptance of the Defendant’s untimely answer.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendant’s motion is DENIED without prejudice.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Index No. CV-710117-21/NY

Roman Kravchenko, Melville, for defendant.

Jaffe & Velazquez, LLP, New York City, (David J. Slaney, of counsel), for plaintiff.

In this action, plaintiff Country-Wide Insurance Company seeks de novo adjudication of a dispute involving first-party no-fault benefits, following a master arbitrator’s award in excess of $5,000 in favor of defendant Hackensack Surgery Center, LLC a/a/o Jessica Bae. Defendant now moves for an order compelling plaintiff to comply with defendant’s discovery requests for, among other things, production of the entire claim file and SIU file (Motion Seq. No. 001). Plaintiff opposes the motion.

BACKGROUND

Prior to commencement of this action, defendant Hackensack Surgery Center LLC demanded a no-fault arbitration for services provided to defendant’s assignor, Jessica Bae, for facility fees related to a shoulder surgery performed on February 8, 2019, which plaintiff Country-Wide Insurance Company had denied based upon a peer review report (see NY St Cts Elec Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 1, complaint ¶ 7 and Exhibit A to complaint [No Fault Arbitration Award], at 1).

The no-fault arbitrator ruled in defendant’s favor and awarded no-fault benefits in the amount of $21,330.00 (id.). The no-fault arbitrator found that plaintiff had not overcome the presumption of medical necessity, and reasoned that another no-fault arbitrator had rejected the same peer review report (id., at 2).

By a decision dated October 27, 2021, a master arbitrator affirmed the award of the no-fault arbitrator (NYSCEF Doc. No. 2, Master Arbitration Award).

Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (c), plaintiff commenced this action seeking de novo adjudication of the dispute. Issue was joined on or about March 21, 2022 (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 2, answer).

On or about May 5, 2022, defendant served discovery demands upon plaintiff (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 3). On July 6, 2022, plaintiff brought the instant motion to compel defendant to comply with its discovery demands (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 4).

On or about October 5, 2022, plaintiff opposed the motion and served its discovery response (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 8, affidavit of service). In reply, defendant argued that the responses were deficient (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 11, reply affirmation of plaintiff’s counsel ¶ 12).

On November 28, 2022, plaintiff served supplemental discovery responses (NYSCEF Doc Nos. 14-19).

Without any prior court approval, on January 18, 2023, plaintiff served a supplemental affirmation in opposition, with additional exhibits (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 20-22). Similarly also without prior court approval, on January 18, 2023, defendant served supplemental reply papers (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 23-24).

On January 20, 2023, defendant’s motion to compel was marked fully submitted and assigned to this court.

On February 8, 2023, this court held oral argument. At oral argument, defendant’s counsel clarified that defendant’s motion to compel was narrowed to items No.2 and #14 of defendant’s demand for discovery and inspection dated May 5, 2022.

DISCUSSION

CPLR 3101 (a) directs that there shall be “full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action” (id.). “The test is one of usefulness and reason” (Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 407 [1968]). CPLR 3101 “embodies the policy determination that liberal discovery encourages fair and effective resolution of disputes on the merits, minimizing the possibility for ambush and unfair surprise” (Spectrum Sys. Intern. Corp. v Chem. Bank, 78 NY2d 371, 376 [1991]).

“Liberal discovery is favored and pretrial disclosure extends not only to proof that is admissible but also to matters that may lead to the disclosure of admissible proof” (Twenty Four Hour Fuel Oil Corp. v Hunter Ambulance, 226 AD2d 175-176 [1st Dept 1996]). “[T]he acid test [*2]for disclosure of information is not whether the party can make out a prima facie case without the evidence, but whether he or she can make out a more persuasive case with it.” (6 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac CPLR ¶ 3101.08). However, “[u]nder our discovery statutes and case law, competing interests must always be balanced; the need for discovery must be weighed against any special burden to be borne by the opposing party” (Kavanagh v Ogden Allied Maintenance Corp., 92 NY2d 952, 954 [1998][quotation marks and citation omitted]).

“A motion court is afforded broad discretion in supervising disclosure and its determinations will not be disturbed unless that discretion has been clearly abused” (Youwanes v Steinbrech, 193 AD3d 492 [1st Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

As a threshold matter, this court accepts the parties’ supplemental submissions (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 14-25), given the absence of prejudice to either side.

Item 14 of defendant’s demand for discovery and inspection dated May 5, 2022 requests “A full copy of ‘s [sic] claim file(s) and SIU file(s) and reports relating to this matter” (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 3).

In response, Jessica Mena-Sibrian, a No-Fault Litigation/Arbitration Supervisor employed by plaintiff, averred, “there is no SIU file for this matter” (NYSCEF Co. No. 18, aff of Jessica Mena-Sibrian ¶ 4). Mena-Sibrian explained,

“In the ordinary course of business, a SIU file would be created on a claim if an examiner makes a request for it or for a signed statement. The claims file for this matter does not contain any such request and, therefore, no SIU file was created. There is no existing SIU file or reports regarding any type of insurance investigation to provide to Defendant”

(id. ¶ 5). Because defendant’s representative stated under oath that no SIU file exists, so much of plaintiff’s motion which seeks to compel production of the SIU file is denied.

As to the full copy of plaintiff’s claim file, plaintiff stated in its supplemental responses to defendant’s demands for discovery and inspection,

“ANSWER: As to 1-17, the Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory to the extent that it seeks information that is irrelevant, overly broad, privileged and unrelated to the issue in this case. Copies of any document relevant to this claim is hereto annexed, if any”

First, as defendant points out, plaintiff’s initial response to defendant’s discovery demands were untimely served on or about October 5, 2022, well after 20 days of service of those demands on May 5, 2022 (see CPLR 3122). “Accordingly, plaintiff waived objection[s] based on any ground other than privilege or palpable impropriety” (Khatskevich v Victor, 184 AD3d 504, 505 [1st Dept 2020]; see also Accent Collections, Inc. v Cappelli Enter., 84 AD3d 1283, 1284 [2d Dept 2011]; Duhe v Midence, 1 AD3d 279, 280 [1st Dept 2003]).

Here, in opposition to defendant’s motion, plaintiff does not assert any specific privilege against production of the claim file. As defendant points out,

“The payment or rejection of claims is a part of the regular business of an insurance [*3]company. Consequently, reports which aid it in the process of deciding whether to pay or reject a claim are made in the regular course of its business. Reports prepared by insurance investigators, adjusters, or attorneys before the decision is made to pay or reject a claim are not privileged and are discoverable, even when those reports are mixed/multi-purpose reports, motivated in part by the potential for litigation with the insured”

(Advanced Chimney, Inc. v Graziano, 153 AD3d 478, 480 [2d Dept 2017] [internal citations, quotation marks, and emendation omitted]; see also Venture v Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 153 AD3d 1155, 1159 [1st Dept 2017]). Therefore, plaintiff demonstrated entitlement to production of the entire claim file, which must be provided to defendant within 60 days.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, plaintiff’s supplemental response to item 14 did not render defendant’s motion academic.

Plaintiff’s response to item 14 was insufficient. “Whenever a person is required pursuant to such notice or order to produce documents for inspection, that person shall produce them as they are kept in the regular course of business or shall organize and label them to correspond to the categories in the request” (CPLR 3122). Here, plaintiff did not label which items attached to its discovery response were part of the claim file. Thus, it is not possible for the court to determine that plaintiff had, in fact, turn over the entire claim file.

Turning to item 2, defendant demanded,

“If any other action or arbitration has been filed by or on behalf of Defendant or EIP with respect to the accident underlying the within dispute, a copy of the pleadings in such court action(s) or, if arbitration was commenced, a copy of the arbitration request form(s) (AR-1) and of any letter scheduling conciliation filings and deadlines. Also provide copy of any Decision, Order, Stipulation, Arbitration Award, Consent Agreement, and/or any other determination, however named and whether final or non-final, issued in the court action or arbitration proceedings”

At oral argument, defendant’s counsel explained that the information was sought for the purpose of discovering a determination on the issue of medical necessity from any actions or arbitrations that could be used as collateral estoppel against plaintiff in this action.

In the court’s view, the demand is overly broad on its face (see Country-Wide Ins. Co. v Long Is. Spine Specialists PC, 2021 NY Slip Op 30115[U], *3 [Sup Ct, NY County 2021]). The scope of the demand covers documents about any actions or arbitrations “with respect to the underlying accident,” which could therefore include the universe of services provided to the assignor that might not implicate the issue of the medical necessity of the shoulder surgery—such as services provided to the assignor which either predated the shoulder surgery, or services that were not ancillary to the shoulder surgery, such as physical therapy or pharmaceuticals provided for pain management. While the demand could be narrowed, “it is not the court’s obligation to prune those pre-litigation devices” (Kimmel v Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, 214 AD2d 453, 453-454 [1st Dept 1995]).

Additionally, the expense and burden upon plaintiff to produce these documents is [*4]disproportionate to likelihood that the information sought could lead to a determination that could be used as collateral estoppel in this action. Defendant is already aware of another adverse determination of medical necessity from another arbitration, which was referenced in the award of the no-fault arbitrator.

Having weighed the need for discovery against the burden to plaintiff (Kavanagh, 92 NY2d at 954), an order compelling plaintiff to comply with item 2 of defendant’s demand for discovery and inspection dated May 5, 2022 is denied.

CONCLUSION

Upon the foregoing cited papers, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant’s motion to compel (Motion Seq. No. 001) is GRANTED TO THE EXTENT that plaintiff is directed to produce the entire claim file to defendant within 60 days, and plaintiff’s motion is otherwise denied.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

________________________________
RICHARD TSAI, J.
Judge of the Civil Court

Index No. CV-709111-18/KI

Attorney for Plaintiff:
Sara Diamond, Esq. (Of Counsel)
Law Offices of Melissa Betancourt, PC
2761 Bath Avenue, Suite B1 & B2
Brooklyn, New York 11214

Attorney for Defendants:
Helen Mann Ruzhy, Esq.
Law Offices of Tina Newsome-Lee
485 Lexington Avenue, 7th Fl.,
New York, New York 10007

After a bench trial, this Court dismisses the complaint on the following grounds:

This action was brought by a provider seeking to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits.

Here, the triable issue is the medical necessity of the treatment received by Joshua Lessy. The parties stipulated to: Plaintiff’s timely submission of the claim, and Defendant’s timely denial thus establishing their prima facie case; the expert qualifications of licensed Chiropractor Dr. Todd Aordkian, his peer review report, and the documents he reviewed.

At trial, the Defendant bears the burden of production and the burden of persuasion for its claim of lack of medical necessity of the treatment or testing for which payment is sought (A.M. Med. Services, P.C. v Deerbrook Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 1139(A) (Civ Ct 2008)). At a minimum, Defendant must establish a factual basis and medical rationale for the lack of medical necessity of Plaintiff’s services (see CityWide Social Work & Psy. Serv., P.L.L.C. v Travelers Indem. Co., 3 Misc 3d 608 (Civ Ct 2004); Inwood Hill Med. P.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 3 Misc 3d 1110(A) (Civ Ct 2004). “The insurer may rebut the inference of medical necessity through a peer review and, if the peer review is not rebutted, the insurer is entitled to denial of the claim (e.g., A Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v. NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131(A) (App Term 2007)).

According to the detailed credible testimony of Dr. Aordkian, the cervical collar, back support, cervical traction unit, and the TENS unit provided by plaintiff were not medically necessary. None of these devices met the criteria for the treatment of Mr. Lessy. Relying upon the medical treatise written by Panjabi and White, Dr. Aordkian opined the criteria for back support is where there are situations of clinical instability, a fracture or dislocation of a lumbar spine, scoliosis measuring more than 25 degrees, inactive spondylolisthesis with a pars fracture, and postoperative treatment in certain lumbar spine surgeries. Based on his review of the medical records, the Assignor sustained a musculoskeletal injury. Therefore, the treatment provided would be counteractive because it would decrease the range of motion. The cervical collar is used in conversative management of cervical spine fractures where surgery is not necessary. The collar around the fractured vertebra allows the bone to heal and tightens the damaged muscle and joint structures. Here, the Assignor sustained a soft tissue brain-type injury, therefore, it was counterintuitive to place a collar around these structures because movement is restricted. Traction is traditionally used for situations where there is a damaged disk, and the disk herniation is pressing on a nerve arm pain. Here, the medical records failed to document any radicular signs or symptoms along the upper extremities involving a specific nerve root compression demonstrated on the cervical spine MRI Study. Further, Dr. Aordkian credibly testified that there was no successful cervical traction demonstrated in the treatment. The criteria for use of a TENS unit occurs where therapy has been found to be beneficial, and then the Assignor can be prescribed a TENS unit on discharge once the active treatment ends. Dr. Aordkian testified the TENs unit was ordered for home use while the Assignor was under active treatment, therefore, the TENS unit was prescribed prematurely. The chiropractor who prescribed this TENS unit did not demonstrate a successful trial of the TENS unit therapy in the office.

Defendant’s medical expert was very specific and detailed in explaining the basis for his medical opinion. The Court finds Dr. Aordkian’s testimony to be medically sound and credible. Dr. Aordkian sufficiently demonstrated he relied on his review of the Assignor’s medical records to reach his opinion that the services were not medically necessary for the Assignor’s condition. Dr. Aordkian’s testimony “demonstrated a factual basis and medical rationale for the determination that there was a lack of medical necessity” for the services (New Horizon Surgical Ctr., L.L.C. v. Allstate Ins., 52 Misc 3d 139(A) (App Term 2016)). Considering Dr. Aordkian testimony and the relevant medical records submitted to the Court, this Court finds that Defendant met its burden and provided sufficient proof that the procedures were not medically necessary.

Where the defendant insurer presents sufficient evidence to establish a defense based on the lack of medical necessity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff which must then present its own evidence of medical necessity (see Prince, Richardson on Evidence §§ 3-104, 3-202 (Farrell 11th ed)); W. Tremont Med. Diagnostic, P.C. v. Geico Ins. Co., 13 Misc 3d 131(A) (App Term 2006)). Plaintiff called no witnesses to rebut the defendant’s showing of a lack of medical necessity (see New Horizon Surgical Ctr., L.L.C, 52 Misc 3d 139(A) Moreover, Plaintiff failed to submit any evidence, such as the testimony of the referring physician or of its own medical expert, to establish that the Procedures were medically necessary (MK Healthcare Med. PC v. Travelers Ins. Co., 76 Misc 3d 1205(A) (Civ Ct 2022)). Plaintiff failed to demonstrate its entitlement to judgment or otherwise rebut Defendant’s showing.

Defendant met its burden of establishing that the services rendered to Joshua [*2]Plessy by Plaintiff were not medically necessary. No rebuttal was offered by the plaintiff. This case is dismissed.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Index No. CV-721236-19/QU

Plaintiff’s Counsel:
Law Offices of Gabriel & Moroff, P.C.
2 Lincoln Avenue, Suite 302
Rockville Centre, NY 11570

Defendant’s Counsel:
Hollander Legal Group
105 Maxess Road Suite S128
Melville, NY 11747

I. Papers

The following papers were read on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint and Plaintiff’s cross-motion on its claim:

Papers        & nbsp;           & nbsp;           & nbsp;           & nbsp;        Numbered
Defendant’s Notice of Motion and Affirmation in Support dated September 17, 2020 (“Motion”) and electronically filed with the court on September 21, 2020. 1
Plaintiff’s Notice of Cross-Motion and Affirmation in Support dated December 13, 2021 (“Cross-Motion”) and electronically filed with the court on the same date. 2
Defendant’s Affirmation in Opposition to Cross-Motion dated December 13, 2021 (“Opposition to Cross-Motion”) and electronically filed with the court on the same date. 3

In a summons and complaint filed on September 23, 2019, Plaintiff sued Defendant insurance company to recover $385.63 in unpaid first party No-Fault benefits for medical services provided to Plaintiff’s assignor Jackson on July 10, 2018, plus attorneys’ fees and [*2]statutory interest (see Motion, Aff. of Volpe, Ex. A). Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that Plaintiff failed to attend scheduled Examinations Under Oath (“EUO“). Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment on its claims against Defendant. An oral argument and settlement conference by both parties was conducted by this Court.

III. Discussion and Decision

CPLR 3212 provides that “a motion for summary judgment shall be supported by affidavit, by a copy of the pleadings and by other available proof, such as depositions and written admissions…” (CPLR 3212 [b]). “Mere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient” (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). “A [party] moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of coming forward with admissible evidence, such as affidavits by persons having knowledge of the facts, reciting the material facts and showing that the cause of action has no merit” (GTF Mktg. v Colonial Aluminum Sales, 66 NY2d 965, 967 [1985]; Anghel v Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, P.C., 190 AD3d 906, 907 [2d Dept 2021], see Jacobsen v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 NY3d 824, 833 [2014]). A motion for summary judgment “shall be granted if, upon all the papers and proof submitted, the cause of action or defense shall be established sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in favor of any party” (CPLR 3212[b]; Zuckerman v City of New York, at 562, see GTF Mktg. v Colonial Aluminum Sales, 66 NY2d at 968).

It is well established that insurers must pay or deny No-Fault benefit claims “within thirty (30) calendar days after receipt of the proof of the claim” (Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498, 501 [2015]; Fair Price Med. Supply Corp. v Travelers Indem. Co., 10 NY3d 556, 563 [2008]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d 312, 317 [2007]; see Insurance Law § 5106[a]; 11 NYCRR § 65-3.8[c]; Presbyterian Hosp. in City of NY v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 278 [1997]). Failure to establish timely payment or denial of the claim precludes the insurer from offering evidence of its defense to non-payment (Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d at 506; Fair Price Med. Supply Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 10 NY3d at 563; Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d at 318; Presbyterian Hosp. in City of NY v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d at 281-86). Noncompliance with an insurance policy provision requiring disclosure through an EUO is a failure of a condition precedent to an insurer’s duty to indemnify (IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. v Stracar Med. Servs., P.C., 116 AD3d 1005, 1007 [2d Dept 2014]; National Med. & Surgical Supply, Inc. v ELRAC, Inc., 54 Misc 3d 131[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50028[U] *1 [App Term 2d Dept 2017]) and is a material policy breach precluding recovery of proceeds under the insurance policy (Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am. v George, 183 AD3d 755, 756 [2d Dept 2020]; Interboro Ins. Co. v Clennon, 113 AD3d 596, 597 [2d Dept 2014]).

In opposition to Defendant’s motion in its Cross-Motion, Plaintiff first argued that Defendant’s request for an EUO was untimely. In the Opposition to Cross-Motion, Defendant merely stated in conclusory terms that it timely requested the EUOs. “Subsequent to the receipt of one or more of the completed verification forms, any additional verification required by the insurer to establish proof of claim shall be requested within 15 business days of receipt of the prescribed verification forms” (11 NYCRR 65-3.5[b]). In our instant matter, Defendant’s counsel first requested an EUO of Plaintiff in a letter dated September 21, 2018 (see Motion, [*3]Volpe Aff., Ex. G). Since Defendant’s denial of claim forms, dated February 13, 2019, indicated that Defendant received Plaintiff’s bills on August 27, 2018, Defendant’s first EUO request was untimely because it was made 25 days after receipt of the bill (Eagle Surgical Supply, Inc. v Allstate Indem. Co., 41 Misc 3d 141[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 52012[U] *2 [App Term 2d Dept 2013], see Mount Sinai Hosp. v Triboro Coach, 263 AD2d 11, 16 [2d Dept 1999]). While Defendant presented a delay letter dated September 6, 2018, it did not suffice to toll the 30 days because it did not request verification from Plaintiff, but only indicated that verification would be sought (Mount Sinai Hosp. v Triboro Coach, 263 AD2d at 17; Parsons Med. Supply Inc. v Progressive Northeastern Ins. Co., 36 Misc 3d 148[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 51649[U] *2 [App Term 2d Dept 2012]; Points of Health Acupuncture, P.C. v Lancer Ins. Co., 28 Misc 3d 133[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51338[U] *2 [App Term 2d Dept 2010]; Alur Med. Supply, Inc. v Progressive Ins. Co., 21 Misc 3d 134[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52191[U] *1 [App Term 2d Dept 2008]).

Plaintiff also argued that Defendant was required to pay or deny the claims after Plaintiff failed to attend the second EUO. Defendant maintained that payment or denial of the claims was premature until Plaintiff provided the requested verification. “[A]n insurer shall not issue a denial of claim form (NYS form NF-10) prior to its receipt of verification of all the relevant information requested pursuant to 65-3.5 and 65-3.6 of this Subpart (e.g. medical reports, wage verification, etc.)” (11 NYCRR 65-3.8[b][3]). However, “[t]his subdivision shall not apply to a prescribed form (NF-Form) as set forth in Appendix 13 of this Title, medical examination request, or examination under oath request” (id.) (emphasis added). Therefore, the outstanding verification of Plaintiff’s EUO did not bar Defendant from denying the claims. The failure to attend two scheduled EUOs has been held a sufficient basis for Defendant to deny a No-Fault claim (see Interboro Ins. Co. v Clennon, 113 AD3d 596, 597 [2d Dept 2014]; New Way Med. Supply Corp. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 64 Misc 3d 136[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 51158[U] *2 [App Term 2d Dept 2019]; Vladenn Med. Supply Corp. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 52 Misc 3d 129[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50928[U] *1-2 [App Term 2d Dept 2016]; Palafox PT, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 49 Misc 3d 144[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51653[U] *1 [App Term 2d Dept 2015]).

In our instant case, Defendant scheduled two additional EUOs after Plaintiff objected to them and denied the claim after Plaintiff’s nonappearance at the fourth scheduled EUO. In cases involving a failure to appear for an EUO, “the 30 days to pay or deny the claim begins to run on the date of the second failure to appear — the date that the insurer is permitted to conclude that there was a failure to comply with this condition precedent to coverage” (Chapa Prods. Corp. v MVAIC, 66 Misc 3d 16, 18 [App Term 2d Dept 2019], see Island Life Chiropractic Pain Care, PLLC v 21st Century Ins. Co., 74 Misc 3d 17, 19 [App Term 2d Dept 2021]; Quality Health Supply Corp. v Nationwide Ins., 69 Misc 3d 133[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 51226[U] *1-2 [App Term 2d Dept 2020]). Thus, Defendant’s denial of the claim on February 13, 2019, well beyond 30 days from Defendant’s receipt of the claim on August 27, 2018, was untimely (Quality Health Supply Corp. v Nationwide Ins., 2020 NY Slip Op 51226[U] *2, 69 Misc 3d 133 [App Term 2d Dept 2020]). The requirement to deny a No-Fault claim after nonappearance at a second EUO would not apply if the additional scheduled EUOs pertained to claims other than the first and second scheduled EUOs (see Island Life Chiropractic Pain Care, PLLC v 21st Century Ins. Co., 74 Misc 3d at 20). In contrast, all four EUOs Defendant scheduled in this case related to the same claims. While Defendant argued that our instant case was distinguishable from Quality Health Supply Corp. v Nationwide Ins. (2020 NY Slip Op 51226[U], 69 Misc 3d 133 [App Term [*4]2d Dept 2020]) because Plaintiff objected to the EUOs and Defendant explained the reasons for scheduling the additional EUOs beyond the first two, the Appellate Term did not indicate that either of those factual distinctions impacted its holding in that case, Island Life Chiropractic Pain Care, PLLC v 21 st Century Ins. Co. (74 Misc 3d at 19) or Chapa Prods. Corp. v MVAIC (66 Misc 3d at 18), all of which clearly held that the time to pay or deny ran from the non-appearance at the second scheduled EUO. Finally, while a timely EUO request tolls Defendant’s time to pay or deny a No-Fault claim (Island Life Chiropractic Pain Care, PLLC v 21st Century Ins. Co., 74 Misc 3d at 19), as discussed above, Defendant’s EUO requests were not timely. Defendant’s motion for summary judgement dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint is denied.

Regarding the Cross-Motion, Plaintiff pointed to its bills and Defendant’s denial of claim forms which indicated that Defendant received Plaintiff’s bills totaling $385.63 on August 27, 2018 (see Motion, Volpe Aff., Ex. E). A denial of claim form, however, is insufficient to establish a medical provider’s prima facie case but suffices to establish Defendant’s receipt of Plaintiff’s claim and nonpayment of that claim (Lopes v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 127[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51279[U] *2 [App Term 2d Dept 2009]). As discussed above, since Defendant was required under the circumstances to pay or deny the claim within 30 days of Plaintiff’s failure to attend the second scheduled EUO on November 30, 2018 (see Motion, Volpe Aff., Ex. J), Defendant’s denial on February 13, 2019 was untimely. Therefore, Plaintiff has established its prima facie case demonstrating entitlement to summary judgment on its claim.

IV. Order

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for summary judgment is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk shall enter a judgment in Plaintiff’s favor against Defendant in the amount of $385.63 together with statutory interest from August 27, 2018 and statutory attorneys’ fees.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the court.