SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT

Plaintiff appeals from three orders of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Sharon A.M. Aarons, J.), dated July 17, 2008 (two orders) and July 18, 2008, which granted defendant’s motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaints.

Per Curiam. [*2]

Orders (Sharon A.M. Aarons, J.), dated July 17, 2008 (two orders) and July 18, 2008, consolidated for the purpose of this decision, affirmed, with $10 costs on each action.

In these three actions by the provider, plaintiff Physical Performance Testing of NY (Physical), to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant New York Central Mutual Insurance Company (Mutual) moved for summary judgment. Civil Court granted Mutual’s motions for summary judgment dismissing Physical’s complaints, finding that Physical was unlicensed and, therefore, ineligible for reimbursement of first-party no-fault benefits. Physical appeals, as limited by its brief, and we affirm.

It is well-settled that a provider of healthcare services is not eligible for reimbursement of assigned first-party no-fault benefits “under section 5102(a)(1) of the Insurance Law if the provider fails to meet any applicable New York State or local licensing requirement necessary to perform such service in New York” (Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.16[a][12]; see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela, 4 NY3d 313, 321 [2005]). State law mandates that professional service corporations be owned and controlled only by licensed professionals (see Business Corporation Law §§ 1503[a], 1507, 1508), and that licensed professionals render the services provided by such corporations (see Business Corporation Law § 1504[a]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.16[a][6]). A professional corporation, which is actually controlled by a management company owned by unlicensed individuals in violation of the Business Corporation Law, is not entitled to be reimbursed for no-fault benefits (see One Beacon Ins. Group, LLC v Midland Med. Care, P.C., 54 AD3d 738, 740 [2008]).

The Court of Appeals has held that the Superintendent of Insurance promulgated 11 NYCRR 65-3.16(a)(12) so as to “exclud[e] from the meaning of basic economic loss’ payments made tounlicensed or fraudulently licensed providers, thus rendering them ineligible for reimbursement” (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela, 4 NY3d at 320; see Allstate Ins. Co. v Belt Parkway Imaging, P.C., 33 AD3d 407, 408 [2006]).

Applying these principles to the matter at bar, Mutual has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaints by demonstrating that the services rendered by Physical are not reimbursable expenses under the No-Fault Law. In opposition, Physical failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to its claims because they were not performed by a medical professional corporation, or a licensed health provider.

We have examined Physical’s remaining contentions, and to the extent they are preserved for appellate review, find them to be without merit.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
Decision Date: April 11, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT

Defendant, as limited by its briefs, appeals from that portion of an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Raul Cruz, J.), dated August 30, 2012, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Raul Cruz, J.), dated August 30, 2012, insofar as appealed from, reversed, with $10 costs, motion granted in toto and complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

The defendant-insurer made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the no-fault claims at issue by establishing that it timely and properly mailed the notices for independent medical examinations (IMEs) to plaintiff’s assignor, and that the assignor failed to appear (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559, 560 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011]; cf. Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720, 721 [2006]). In opposition, plaintiff did not deny the assignor’s nonappearance or otherwise raise a triable issue with respect thereto, or as to the mailing or reasonableness of the underlying notices (see Unitrin at 560). The assignor’s “denial of receipt, standing alone, is insufficient” (Badio v Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 12 AD3d 229, 230 [2004]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
Decision Date: March 27, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT

Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Raul Cruz, J.), entered April 25, 2011, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Raul Cruz, J.), entered April 25, 2011, reversed, with $10 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

The defendant-insurer made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the action for first-party no-fault benefits by establishing that it timely and properly mailed the notices for independent medical examinations (IMEs) to plaintiff’s assignor, and that the assignor failed to appear (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559, 560 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011]; cf. Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720, 721 [2006]). In opposition, plaintiff did not deny the assignor’s nonappearance or otherwise raise a triable issue with respect thereto, or as to the mailing or reasonableness of the underlying notices (see Unitrin at 560).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
Decision Date: March 20, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT

Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Fernando Tapia, J.), entered March 16, 2011, which denied its motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211.

Per Curiam.

Order (Fernando Tapia, J. ), entered March 16, 2011, affirmed, with $10 costs.

Accepting plaintiff’s allegations as true, and according them the benefit of every favorable inference, as we must in the context of a motion to dismiss on the pleadings (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87—88 [1994]), we find the complaint, as amplified by the affidavit in opposition of plaintiff’s billing manager (see Commissioners of State Ins. Fund v Wojciech Perkowski, Inc., 291 AD2d 219 [2002]), sufficient to state a cause of action for recovery of first-party no-fault benefits. Nor was the affidavit of defendant’s no-fault litigation examiner so “essentially undeniable” as to qualify as documentary evidence that conclusively refutes any claim that plaintiff might have (see Mason v First Cent. Nat. Life Ins. Co. of New York, 86 AD3d 854, 855 [2011]; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3211:10, at 21—22).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
Decision Date: March 12, 2013

[*1]

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department, March 12, 2013

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Picciano & Scahill, P.C., Westbury (Albert J. Galatan of counsel), for appellant. Baker, Sanders, Barshay, Grossman, Fass, Muhlstock & Neuwirth, LLC, Garden City (Steven J. Neuwirth of counsel), for respondent.

{**39 Misc 3d at 16} OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Order, entered April 17, 2012, affirmed, without costs.

A related Supreme Court action brought by the defendant insurer against various medical providers resulted in a declaration that defendant was entitled to deny all no-fault claims arising from injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff’s assignor (Cuffie) in the underlying July 2, 2008 motor vehicle accident. Since the plaintiff medical supplies provider was not a party to the declaratory judgment action it is not bound by Supreme Court’s determination, as it did not have a full and fair opportunity to contest the issues in that proceeding (see Gilberg v Barbieri, 53 NY2d 285, 291 [1981]). Although plaintiff’s assignor was a named party in the prior action, plaintiff cannot be deemed to be in privity with its assignor, since the declaratory judgment action was commenced after the assignment (see Gramatan Home Invs. Corp. v Lopez, 46 NY2d 481, 486-487 [1979]).

Schoenfeld, J. (concurring). In light of the Court of Appeals’ holding in Gramatan Home Invs. Corp. v Lopez (46 NY2d 481 [1979]), I join my colleagues in voting to affirm the order denying summary judgment to the defendant insurer. Considerations of due process prohibit binding a party to the result of an action in which that party has not been given an opportunity to be heard. I write separately to [*2]acknowledge that the outcome reached today does not serve to promote the purposes of this State’s No-Fault Law to provide a less costly, more efficient automobile accident reparation system and to ease court congestion (see Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 50-51 [1975]).

As (now retired) Justice Golia properly recognized in closely analogous circumstances, no-fault actions do not fit squarely within the Gramatan rule, given “the unique nature and reality of the assignment of claims for first-party benefits under the Insurance{**39 Misc 3d at 17} Law and the no-fault regulations of this State” (Magic Recovery Med. & Surgical Supply Inc. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 67, 69 [2010 dissenting op]). That being so, and in view of the prior Supreme Court judgment declaring that plaintiff’s assignor and the assignee providers named as defendants in that action “are not entitled to first-party benefits” stemming from the subject motor vehicle accident due to the assignor’s “material misrepresentations in the procurement of the insurance policy,” it is not unreasonable to say that the denial of summary judgment dismissing this assignee provider’s claim tends to exalt form over substance, delaying the seemingly inevitable dismissal of the claim until after trial. Nonetheless, on balance, I feel compelled to adhere to the rule set forth in Gramatan without a signal to the contrary from a higher appellate authority. Lastly, and parenthetically, it is noted that in the event the plaintiff assignee does not ultimately succeed against defendant on the no-fault claim, plaintiff could seek redress against the assignor under the clear terms of the assignment of benefits form.

Lowe, III, P.J., and Torres, J., concur; Schoenfeld, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT

Defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Donald A. Miles, J.), entered July 20, 2011, as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Donald A. Miles, J.), entered July 20, 2011, modified to dismiss plaintiff’s first through sixth, and ninth trough twelfth causes of action; as modified, order affirmed, without costs.

The defendant-insurer made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the no-fault claims set forth in the first through sixth, and ninth through twelfth causes of action, by establishing that it timely and properly mailed the notices for independent medical examinations (IMEs) to plaintiff’s assignor, and that the assignor failed to appear (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559, 560 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011]; cf. Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720, 721 [2006]). In opposition, plaintiff did not specifically deny the assignor’s nonappearance or otherwise raise a triable issue with respect thereto, or as to the mailing or reasonableness of the underlying notices (see Unitrin at 560).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT. [*2]
Decision Date: March 01, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT

Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Ben R. Barbato, J.), entered December 10, 2010, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Ben R. Barbato, J.), entered December 10, 2010, reversed, with $10 costs, motion granted and complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

The defendant-insurer made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that it timely denied plaintiff’s first-party no-fault claim based on a chiropractor’s sworn peer review report, which set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the chiropractor’s stated conclusion that the underlying MRI tests lacked medical necessity. In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue. The unsworn letter report submitted by plaintiff from the assignor’s treating chiropractor was without probative value (see CPLR 2106; Pierson v Edwards, 77 AD3d 642 [2010]), and, even if considered, the conclusory findings set forth therein were insufficient to withstand summary judgment (see CPT Med. Servs., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 87 [2007]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
Decision Date: February 21, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT

Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Robert R. Reed, J.), entered April 18, 2011, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Robert R. Reed, J.), entered April 18, 2011, affirmed, with $10 costs.

We sustain the denial of defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing this first-party no-fault action. Defendant’s June 26, 2008 request for additional verification in the form of an examination under oath (EUO) of the plaintiff medical provider was untimely and did not serve to toll defendant’s time to pay or deny the claim, since the request was made well beyond the requisite 15-day time period following the assignor’s EUO (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5[b]; 65—3.8[a][1]; see Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr. v Allstate Ins. Co., 61 AD3d 13, 17-18 [2009]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
Decision Date: February 01, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT

Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Raul Cruz, J.), entered February 27, 2012, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Raul Cruz, J.), entered February 27, 2012, reversed, with $10 costs, motion granted and complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

The defendant-insurer made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the action for first-party no-fault benefits by establishing that it timely and properly mailed the notices for independent medical examinations (IMEs) to the assignor and his attorney, and that the assignor failed to appear (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559, 560 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011]; cf. Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720, 721 [2006]). In opposition, plaintiff did not deny the assignor’s nonappearance or otherwise raise a triable issue with respect thereto, or as to the mailing or reasonableness of the underlying notices (see Unitrin at 560).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
Decision Date: December 27, 2012

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT

Defendant, as limited by its brief, appeals from that portion of an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Raul Cruz, J.), dated February 17, 2012, which denied, in part, its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Raul Cruz, J.), dated February 17, 2012, insofar as appealed from, reversed, without costs, motion granted in toto and complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

The defendant-insurer made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the action for first-party no-fault benefits by establishing that it timely and properly mailed the notices for independent medical examinations (IMEs) and examinations under oath (EUOs) to plaintiff’s assignor, and that the assignor failed to appear (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559, 560 [2011]; cf. Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720, 721 [2006]). In opposition, plaintiff did not specifically deny the assignor’s nonappearance or otherwise raise a triable issue with respect thereto, or as to the mailing or reasonableness of the underlying notices (see Unitrin at 560).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
Decision Date: December 24, 2012