Decided on August 12, 2022

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

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Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th and 13th Judicial Districts, August 12, 2022

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Richard Rozhik of counsel) for appellant.

Abrams, Cohen & Associates, P.C. (Frank Piccininni of counsel) for respondent.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits from the alleged insurer of its assignor, defendant failed to appear or answer the complaint, and a default judgment was entered on July 26, 2018. On September 6, 2018, defendant served an answer and, in November 2018, it moved to vacate the default judgment. Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court entered October 21, 2019, granting defendant’s motion, finding that defendant had demonstrated a reasonable excuse for its default and a meritorious defense.

In its moving papers, defendant explained that its default had been due to its own failure to forward the complaint to its attorneys. However, it asserted that it had not ignored the matter, but rather had informed plaintiff several months prior to the commencement of the action that it was not the insurance carrier for plaintiff’s assignor—an assertion which plaintiff has never contradicted. Upon receiving notice of the default judgment, defendant requested that the action [*2]be “withdrawn.” Defendant thereafter referred the matter to its counsel, which promptly served an answer and then moved to vacate the default judgment.

A defendant seeking to vacate a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]). The determination of what constitutes a reasonable{**76 Misc 3d at 16} excuse for a default generally lies within the sound discretion of the motion court (see Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Ramnarine, 172 AD3d 886, 886 [2019]). Here, in light of the absence of an evident pattern of neglect and counsel’s prompt actions, upon entering the case, in seeking to vacate the default (see Barajas v Toll Bros., 247 AD2d 242, 242-243 [1998]), the meritorious defense of lack of coverage, which plaintiff has never disputed, plaintiff’s failure to claim any prejudice by reason of the brief delay involved (see New York Univ. Hosp. Tisch Inst. v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 15 AD3d 554, 555 [2005]; see also Matter of A&F Scaccia Realty Corp. v New York City Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 200 AD3d 875, 878 [2021]; Allstate Ins. Co. v North Shore Univ. Hosp., 163 AD3d 745, 746 [2018]), and the public policy favoring the resolution of cases on the merits (see Allstate Ins. Co. v North Shore Univ. Hosp., 163 AD3d at 746; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 58 AD3d 832, 833 [2009]; Legion Ins. Co. v James, 27 Misc 3d 128[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50593[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]), we conclude that the Civil Court providently exercised its discretion in granting defendant’s motion.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Weston, J. (dissenting and voting to reverse the order and deny defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment in the following memorandum).

When defendant was served with a summons and complaint on May 29, 2018, it elected not to forward the matter to its attorney to serve and file an answer because it believed that plaintiff’s claim is meritless. Defendant did not answer until September 6, 2018, approximately six weeks after a default judgment had been entered on July 26, 2018, and more than three months after service. A party may not choose when to answer and, given the lengthy delay in answering, it is clear that defendant’s default was intentional and, therefore, inexcusable (see Fok v Insurance Co. of N. Am., 151 AD2d 722, 722 [1989]). Since defendant failed to establish a reasonable excuse for its default in answering the complaint, defendant’s motion should have been denied without the need to consider whether defendant demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious defense (see Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Ramnarine, 172 AD3d 886, 887 [2019]; New Century Mtge. Corp. v Adeyan-Ju, 139 AD3d 683, 684 [2016]).

Accordingly, I vote to reverse the order and deny defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment.{**76 Misc 3d at 17}

Aliotta, P.J., and Buggs, J., concur; Weston, J., dissents in a separate memorandum.

Marshall & Marshall, PLLC (David A. Gierasch of counsel), for appellant. Dash Law Firm, P.C. (James Errera of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Suffolk County, Third District (C. Stephen Hackeling, J.), entered July 19, 2021. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted and plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC) (sued herein as MVAIC Insurance Company) appeals from an order of the District Court denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granting plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

It is undisputed that plaintiff was required to submit its claim forms to MVAIC within 45 days after the services at issue had been rendered (see 11 NYCRR 65-1.1; Synergy First Med., PLLC v MVAIC, 44 Misc 3d 127[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50964[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th [*2]& 13th Jud Dists 2014]) and that plaintiff did not do so. In support of its motion for summary judgment, MVAIC established that it had timely denied plaintiff’s claims, based upon plaintiff’s untimely submissions, and that it had informed plaintiff that MVAIC could excuse the delay if plaintiff provided “reasonable justification” for the delay (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.3 [e]; see also Matter of Medical Socy. of State of NY v Serio, 100 NY2d 854, 862-863 [2003]; Mount Sinai Hosp. of Queens v Country Wide Ins. Co., 43 Misc 3d 139[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50780[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2014]). In opposition to MVAIC’s motion, plaintiff demonstrated that it had initially sent the claims at issue to an insurance company, but after plaintiff learned that the insurance company would not cover the claims, plaintiff sent the claims to MVAIC. However, plaintiff did not establish that it had provided MVAIC with a reasonable justification as to why it had initially submitted the claims to the insurance company. As a result, plaintiff did not establish that it had provided MVAIC with a reasonable justification for its untimely submission to MVAIC of the claim forms (see Norman Y. Schoenberg, M.D., P.C. v N.Y.C. Tr. Auth., 39 Misc 3d 128[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50421[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]; Prestige Med. & Surgical Supply, Inc. v Chubb Indem. Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 145[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50449[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]).

Accordingly, the order is reversed, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted and plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is denied.

EMERSON, J.P., GARGUILO and DRISCOLL, JJ., concur.

ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: August 11, 2022

Decided on August 5, 2022

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Decided on August 5, 2022

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (David Landfair of counsel), for appellant. Dodge & Monroy, P.C., for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin Kelly Sheares, J.), entered August 8, 2019. The order granted defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment of that court entered April 13, 2018 upon defendant’s failure to appear or answer the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved to vacate a judgment entered on April 13, 2018 upon defendant’s failure to appear or answer the complaint. In support of the motion, defense counsel alleged that an answer had been timely served but it contained a wrong index number, as the year was incorrectly written, which error was due to law office failure. Approximately two weeks later, a second answer, with the correct index number, was served on plaintiff’s counsel, after the time to answer had expired. Defendant alleged as a meritorious defense to the action that plaintiff was not entitled to recover on its claim, as the underlying automobile accident was staged. In addition, defendant filed a declaratory judgment action in February 2018 against, among others, plaintiff and its assignor, [*2]wherein, by order entered April 19, 2018, plaintiff was enjoined from all no-fault collection/reimbursement actions. In opposition to the motion, plaintiff’s counsel alleged that defendant failed to properly serve an answer, as the first answer contained the wrong year in the index number and both answers were served by mail to the wrong address. In reply, defendant failed to explain why the answers were mailed to plaintiff’s counsel’s prior address. The Civil Court granted defendant’s motion.

It is well settled that in order to vacate a default judgment based on excusable default, the defaulting party must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for its default and a meritorious defense to the action (see Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138 [1986]; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 120 AD3d 1322, 1323 [2014]). A court may, in the exercise of its discretion, accept law office failure as an excuse (see CPLR 2005). However, counsel “must submit supporting facts in evidentiary form sufficient to justify the default” (Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead v Jablonsky, 283 AD2d 553, 554 [2001]) and include “a detailed explanation of [the] oversights” (Hospital for Joint Diseases v ELRAC, Inc., 11 AD3d 432, 433 [2004]; see also Grezinsky v Mount Hebron Cemetery, 305 AD2d 542 [2003]; Morris v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 191 AD2d 682, 683 [1993]).

In the case at bar, defendant failed to provide a detailed explanation of its default. Defendant’s attorney merely stated that the wrong index number reflected on its initial answer was due to law office failure. However, defendant’s attorney did not explain why both answers were mailed to plaintiff’s counsel’s prior address. In view of the foregoing, we need not consider whether defendant established a meritorious defense to the action (see Levi v Levi, 46 AD3d 519 [2007]). In any event, contrary to defendant’s contention in the Civil Court, this action was not barred based upon the April 19, 2018 order in the Supreme Court declaratory judgment action enjoining plaintiff from proceeding in this action, as that order was entered after the default judgment had been entered herein, and terminated upon the entry of the declaratory judgment on May 20, 2019 and there was no disposition against plaintiff in that judgment (see generally DSD Acupuncture, P.C. v Metlife Auto & Home, 49 Misc 3d 153[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51778[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]). Consequently, we find that the Civil Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment.

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment is denied.

ALIOTTA, P.J., GOLIA and BUGGS, JJ., concur.

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Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th and 13th Judicial Districts, July 22, 2022

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Richard Rozhik of counsel) for appellant.

Gullo & Associates, LLC (Kristina O’Shea of counsel) for respondent.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

Jules Francois Parisien, M.D., commenced this action against Kemper Insurance Company to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for medical services provided to his assignor, Jeremy Jagdeo, as a result of injuries Jagdeo allegedly sustained in an automobile accident on June 17, 2013. In its answer to the complaint, dated April 21, 2016, defendant identified itself as Unitrin Advantage Insurance Company (Unitrin). Before Parisien commenced this action, a declaratory judgment action had been commenced in Supreme Court, New York County, by Unitrin against Parisien, eight other providers, and the assignor herein, Jagdeo, alleging that Jagdeo had breached the terms of the insurance policy in question by failing to appear for duly scheduled independent medical examinations. Parisien appeared and interposed an answer in the declaratory judgment action. In an order entered September{**76 Misc 3d at 20} 11, 2017, the Supreme Court, upon granting an unopposed motion by Unitrin for summary judgment, declared [*2]that Parisien and five other providers were “not entitled to no-fault coverage for the motor vehicle accident that occurred on June 17, 2013 involving Jeremy Jagdeo.”

Plaintiff moved in the Civil Court for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for, in effect, summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the instant action is barred by virtue of the order in the declaratory judgment action. By order entered August 10, 2021, the Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion.

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, precludes a party from relitigating an issue where “the issue in the second action is identical to an issue which was raised, necessarily decided and material in the first action, and the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier action” (Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 NY2d 343, 349 [1999]; see D’Arata v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 NY2d 659 [1990]; Manko v Gabay, 175 AD3d 484 [2019]). While “[a]n issue is not actually litigated if, for example, there has been a default” (Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449, 456-457 [1985]), “ ’collateral estoppel may be properly applied to default judgments where the party against whom preclusion is sought appears in the prior action, yet willfully and deliberately refuses to participate in those litigation proceedings, or abandons them, despite a full and fair opportunity to do so’ ” (Miller v Falco, 170 AD3d 707, 709 [2019], quoting Matter of Abady, 22 AD3d 71, 85 [2005]). The party seeking to rely on collateral estoppel has the burden of establishing that the issue actually litigated and determined in the prior action is identical to the issue on which preclusion is sought (see Forcino v Miele, 122 AD2d 191, 193 [1986]; Triboro Quality Med. Supply, Inc. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 36 Misc 3d 131[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 51289[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]). The party attempting to defeat the application of collateral estoppel has the burden of establishing the absence of a full and fair opportunity to litigate (see D’Arata, 76 NY2d at 664; Uptodate Med. Servs., P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 23 Misc 3d 42, 44 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]).

Here, defendant established that the issue of whether plaintiff was entitled to receive no-fault benefits in connection with the June 17, 2013 accident involving Jagdeo was identical{**76 Misc 3d at 21} to the issue previously decided in the declaratory judgment action. The order in the declaratory judgment action indicates that Jagdeo was not entitled to receive no-fault benefits without regard to who the provider might be. Although plaintiff herein did not submit opposition to the motion giving rise to the order in the declaratory judgment action, he did appear and answer the complaint in that action. Therefore, plaintiff failed to establish that he did not receive a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the declaratory judgment action (see Reid v Reid, 198 AD3d 993, 994 [2021]; Miller, 170 AD3d at 709; David v State of New York, 157 AD3d 764, 765-766 [2018]; Matter of Abady, 22 AD3d at 85). Thus, defendant was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground of collateral estoppel.

We reject plaintiff’s argument that defendant was required to establish privity between itself and Unitrin in order for the Civil Court complaint to be dismissed based upon the order in the declaratory judgment action. Privity between the party seeking to invoke the doctrine and a party to the prior action is an element of res judicata (see Matter of Hunter, 4 NY3d 260, 269[*3][2005]; Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 NY 304 [1929]), not collateral estoppel (see B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v Hall, 19 NY2d 141, 147-148 [1967]; Windowizards, Inc. v S & S Improvements, Inc., 11 Misc 3d 128[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 50310[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). We note that the Civil Court, in granting defendant’s cross motion, did not specifically rely on res judicata.

We further note that, while defendant failed to raise the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel in its April 21, 2016 answer, defendant had no basis to assert that defense before September 11, 2017, when the order in the declaratory judgment action was entered (see Metro Health Prods., Inc. v Nationwide Ins., 52 Misc 3d 138[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51122[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]; Renelique v State-Wide Ins. Co., 50 Misc 3d 137[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50096[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]). While the better practice would have been for defendant to move to amend its answer after September 11, 2017, we deem defendant’s answer amended to assert the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel (see Barrett v Kasco Constr. Co., 84 AD2d 555, 556 [1981], affd 56 NY2d 830 [1982]; Active Chiropractic, P.C. v Allstate Ins., 58 Misc 3d 156[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 50201[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]). {**76 Misc 3d at 22}In any event, “an unpleaded defense may serve as the basis for granting summary judgment in the absence of surprise or prejudice to the opposing party” (Sullivan v American Airlines, Inc., 80 AD3d 600, 602 [2011]; see Renelique, 2016 NY Slip Op 50096[U]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Weston, J.P., Golia and Buggs, JJ., concur.

Decided on July 15, 2022

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff of counsel), for appellant. Zara Javakov, P.C. (Zara Javakov of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Lorna J. McAllister, J.), entered January 23, 2019. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court as denied defendant’s motion which had sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs).

Contrary to defendant’s contention, defendant’s motion failed to establish that defendant had timely denied plaintiff’s claims after plaintiff failed to appear at both an initial and a follow-up EUO (see Island Life Chiropractic Pain Care, PLLC v 21st Century Ins. Co., 74 Misc 3d 17 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2021]; Quality Health Supply Corp. v Nationwide Ins., 69 Misc 3d 133[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 51226[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th [*2]& 13th Jud Dists 2020]). As defendant did not demonstrate that it is not precluded from raising its proffered defense (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 1045 [2009]), defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was properly denied (see Quality Health Supply Corp. v Nationwide Ins., 2020 NY Slip Op 51226[U]). We reach no other issue.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

ALIOTTA, P.J., TOUSSAINT and GOLIA, JJ., concur.

ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: July 15, 2022

Decided on July 15, 2022

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS